




































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 



























































This dissertation examines the impact of electronic sound technology on theories and practices of 
listening in Paris since 1945. It focusses on experimental work, carried out by musicians and 
medical professionals and designed with the express purpose of transforming the minds, bodies, 
and experiences of listening subjects in order to produce “experimental listeners.” Why did the 
senses become a target of manipulation at this particular moment, and how was technology used 
and abused for these ends? What kinds of changes to human beings, permanent or otherwise, was 
sound technology imagined to produce? And on what grounds were such experimental activities 
legitimized? To answer these questions in high definition, the story follows two main 
protagonists: otolaryngologist Alfred Tomatis and composer Pierre Schaeffer.  
Chapter 1 provides a launch pad into the world of Tomatis’s unconventional listening 
therapy by focusing on the invention in 1953 of the Electronic Ear, a device that could be 
described as an experiment in sensory prosthetics. Chapter 2 looks at Schaeffer’s experimental 
research into listening—through his “sound objects”—where his ultimate goal was to establish 
an entirely new musical culture based upon a new sensibility of sound awoken by the novel 
sound technologies of his day. The third chapter dissects Tomatis’s unlikely “postmortem” 
analysis of Enrico Caruso’s ears. Under the microscope in Chapter 4 is Schaeffer’s practical 
relationship with his public and his theoretical understanding of the mass media.  
Combining musicology with the history of the senses, science studies, and sound studies, 
and drawing on archival research, I excavate the material and epistemological resources 
mobilized by these experimenters to make malleable the sense of sound: not only resources 
broadly understood as “scientific” (mainstream medicine, cybernetics, information theory, 
acoustics) but also those often considered less so (psychoanalysis, alternative medicine, 
mysticism, and a panoply of spiritual beliefs). The project scrutinizes attempts to transform lived 
experience using electronic sound production technology; more broadly, it explores the meaning 
of the technological itself and its capacity to contain strange hybrid machines caught between 
fact and fiction, science and magic, human and non-human, matter and spirit, and certainty and 
wonder.
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titles are given first in their original language, followed by a translation in parentheses; all other 
foreign-language material has been rendered into English in the main body text, with original 









We live in the age of mass loquacity. We are all writing it or at any rate talking it: 
the memoir, the apologia, the c.v., the cri de cœur. Nothing, for now, can compete 
with experience—so unanswerably authentic, and so liberally and democratically 
dispensed. Experience is the only thing we share equally, and everyone senses 
this. 
 





Sound: Experience of, Experiments with … 
Paris, 1948. The year of the first mainstream radio broadcast of musique concrète. A bored Pierre 
Schaeffer writes in his diary about a recent experience at an international conference: 
“Sometimes, in the course of endless sessions, I would listen to the delegates’ pronouncements 
with a ‘concrete ear’ and perceive all the better their perfectly illogical workings.”1 And here, 
some highlights from his 1952 essay “The Concrete Experiment in Music”: 
An experimental method in music means listening: first of all, all the time, before, 
during, after. 
 
The experiment in concrete music reveals within the ear, and with almost no 
relationship to the musical ear, a sound eye, sensitive to the form and color of 
sounds, and also, as there are two ears as well as two eyes, to the three-
dimensionality of these sounds. 
 
[In our experimentation with “concrete” sounds] we are concerned with making 
sounds accord with ears … [it is] because entering into [concrete music] is so 
novel, and it so profoundly reshapes the phenomenon of communication or 
musical contemplation, that I thought it necessary to write this book … the 
readership for which … should be a small fraction of the general public whom we 
have taken the trouble to prepare, a public that is experimental as well. It is to this 
public that these lines are addressed, and, even more, to those who will launch 
upon it the direct onslaught of their sounds.2 
Here is a composer—an experimental one, at that—underlining the importance of listening, not 
only as part of his creative process but as a parameter of composition: while sounds must 
“accord with ears,” the opposite is also implied—that ears must also accord with sounds.  
                                                
1. Pierre Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, trans. Christine North and John Dack (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2012), 21. 
2. Ibid., 169; 182; 188. 
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These new demands on the public could be described as a logical next step for those of an 
avant-gardist bent. Schaeffer’s project could easily be described, for example, under the rubric 
for the avant garde offered by Peter Bürger (to pick just one theorist’s schema), who writes of the 
avant-garde’s “… attempt to organize a new life praxis from a basis in art.”3 Following the 
Second World War, barely any parameter of music was left untouched by the avant-gardists—the 
grids of “total serialism” represent the extremes to which composers went to assume total control 
on (and from) the page. Why not treat listeners as just one more compositional parameter to 
tweak? In this light, Schaeffer’s project is radical; after all, his vision for future music and its 
listeners would mean abandoning the theoretical underpinnings of Western Art Music. Harmony, 
in its conventional sense, was a prime target, but Music itself would be replaced by a broader 
notion of sound; in place of centuries of cultured listening habits emerges an experimental ear. 
But is this kind of compositional play with the listener, as it were, not exactly what music 
is and always has been all about: first of all, all the time, before, during, after? Whatever terms 
are mobilized—“expectations,” dissonance, consonance, tension, resolution, harmony, or really 
any perceivable (and namable) feature of music—an attentive and reactive listener is surely 
imagined as the recipient of any act of music making. That, at least, would seem like a 
reasonable assumption, but for many composers of the twentieth century, matters were not that 
simple. Far from it. 
                                                




This dissertation examines what might be called a “listening turn”: an intensified engagement 
with listeners, in theory and in practice, by musical thinkers in Paris since 1945. I investigate the 
impact of electronic sound technology on theories and practices of listening. To do so, I focus 
specifically on the experimental work of two men: otolaryngologist Alfred Tomatis and 
composer Pierre Schaeffer. Between the two, an array of material, financial, and intellectual 
resources were funneled into projects that had the express purpose of transforming the minds, 
bodies, and experiences of listening subjects. What kinds of experiences did experimenters in 
sound hope to produce, and for what aims? How was experimentation with the senses 
conceptualized, carried out, and legitimized? And what were the real-world results of such 
experiments? To what extent did sound technology shed new light on the experience of listening 
to music and sound? These are important questions, ones that will be addressed many times and 
in different ways in the text that follows. 
Tomatis and Schaeffer both play leading roles in what follows, each serving as a focal 
point of two chapters. I have alternated between the characters—Chapters 1 and 3 focus on 
Tomatis; Chapters 2 and 4 concern Schaeffer—to help emphasize connections between them. 
The decision to focus on these two men was not exactly intentional (whatever that would mean); 
as research progressed, it became clear that their copious work on listening needed ample space 
for exploration (in a parallel universe, this dissertation could have focused on just one of these 
figures). This was especially the case for Tomatis, whose work is largely unexplored; with this 
dissertation, he appears for the first time in a musicological context. 
I should state from the outset that, in terms of documentary evidence, I have found few 
connections between Tomatis and Schaeffer. Both were present and gave papers at a conference 
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on phonology, organized by the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Paris, in 1953.4 Some 
years later, at a music therapy conference in Paris in 1983, Schaeffer gave another paper; one of 
the extra-curricular activities for conference attendees was a trip to the local Tomatis center.5 A 
final scrap of material evidence connecting Schaeffer and Tomatis is a hand-written card, 
thanking Schaeffer for sending a copy of his book in 1967, from “(le Docteur et) Madame A. 
Tomatis.”6 Thin pickings, indeed. 
Finding direct communication between the protagonists of my case studies is not, in the 
end, my goal. Historical case studies, almost by definition, are supposed to speak to broader 
themes, wider movements of thought. The problem with this approach—expressed as a zeitgeist, 
episteme, or mentalité—is the risk of situating ideas and actions both everywhere (in the air) and 
nowhere (no one human being possess the zeitgeist entirely). But this is a risk that I must take—
extrapolating from “data” cannot be avoided by the historian if they are to do more than present 
lists of objects. A reasonable balance must be sought: between accounting for the specificity of 
individual ideas and actions while considering the larger context. That sounds like history, to me. 
                                                
4. The conference was an interdisciplinary one, with papers on subjects as diverse as the rhythm and melody of 
speech, and medical and legal “expertise” relating to the larynx and the voice. Schaeffer’s paper is entitled “The 
Voice as Musical Material.” In a copy of the abstracts for the conference, Tomatis’s paper is listed next to 
Schaeffer’s. Pierre Schaeffer, “La voix comme matériau musicale,” paper presented at the Cours International de 
Phonologie et de Phoniatrie, Faculté de Médecine de Paris, March 6 1953; Alfred Tomatis, “La correction de la voix 
chantée,” paper presented at the Cours International de Phonologie et de Phoniatrie, Faculté de Médecine de Paris, 
March 6 1953. 
5. Pierre Schaeffer, “Les trois niveaux de l’écoute: le sonore, le musical et le sens,” paper presented at the Congrès 
mondial de musicothérapie, Association Francaise de Musicothérapie, 4-8 July, 1983. 
6. Pierre Schaeffer, lettres, 1967, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, L’Institut Mémoires de l’édition contemporaine (IMEC). 
L’abbaye d’Ardenne, Caen, France. 
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The Historical Problem 
The backdrop to Schaeffer’s remarks quoted above is the seismic cultural shift, felt in every 
corner of the musical world, that played out over the course of the twentieth century: a 
reimagining of the musical landscape precipitated by electronic sound technologies, the full 
implications of which have yet to be fully registered in musicology. While the transformative 
impact of these developments upon listeners cannot be overstated, musicology’s overly hygienic 
attitude towards this music and not that tells a different story, usually one in which the separation 
of Western Art Music from its others reigns supreme. In his Oxford History of Western Music, 
Richard Taruskin cordons off his subject matter by qualifying it as “literate.” Music of the “post-
literate” variety—that captured on record instead of on the page, for example—has displaced the 
literate tradition, and is one of several reasons why Western Art Music, according to Taruskin, is 
coming to an end.7 
This bleak narrative and debatable distinction between literate and post-literate music, 
allows Taruskin to plough on with yet another retelling of the history of Western Art Music that 
keeps sound technology at bay. His history of the twentieth century concerns only literate 
composers of music in the Western Art Music tradition, albeit often those with paradoxical ties 
to that tradition that nevertheless do little to assuage their grandiose claims of absolute novelty. 
Thus, the twentieth century appears as a century of envelope pushers, advancing the art 
parameter by parameter, tone by tone. Missing in most retellings of this story, however, is an 
account of audiences, publics, or listeners. Why? Because, by and large, the twentieth century is 
one in which the listener was treated with increasing indifference, suspicion, and even outright 
                                                
7. Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), xxi-
xxx. 
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disdain. If we ask of the twentieth century, where are the listeners?, we come up short. The truth 
is perhaps simple: elsewhere. 
Composers of elite music were by no means silent about the listener. Take “Who Cares if 
you Listen?”, Milton Babbitt’s infamous screed of 1958.8 There, while arguing for the protection 
of endangered elite music, he lays bare his feelings about the public. His music “demands 
increased accuracy … from the receiver (the listener) … [and] it makes ever heavier demands 
upon the training of the listener’s perceptual capacities,” and a given work of music can be 
“incorrectly performed or perceived”; thus, Babbitt’s ideal listener would be a “suitably 
equipped receptor.” The composer makes frequent reference to the “lay listener” as part of a 
public which, he claims, “does have its own music, its ubiquitous music: music to eat by, to read 
by, to dance by, and to be impressed by ... the whistling repertory of the man in the street.” He 
derides the “concert-going activity of the conspicuous consumer of musical culture,” in contrast 
to his own activity, making “special music in an alien and inapposite world.”9 There is more, 
much more, but in a nutshell, this is Babbitt’s agenda: the “very real possibility of complete 
elimination of the public and social aspects of musical composition …[so that] the composer 
would be free to pursue a private life of professional achievement, as opposed to a public life of 
unprofessional compromise and exhibitionism.”10 
Babbitt is not alone. As early as 1938, Theodor Adorno was lamenting what he called the 
“regression of listening” in society at large. Thanks to a thriving record industry, increasingly 
                                                
8. Milton Babbitt, “Who Cares If You Listen?” High Fidelity 8, no. 2 (1958): 38-40. Babbitt later claimed that the 
querulous title of the essay was not chosen by him, but the content of the essay is far more damning. Milton Babbitt, 
“A Life of Learning,” ACLS Occasional Paper 17 (1991): 15. 
9. Babbitt, “Who Cares?”, 245; 245; 246; 246; 247; 249; 250, respectively. 
10. Ibid., 249. 
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nimble advertisements, and the rise of American popular culture in general, overexposure to the 
tunes of Tin Pan Alley had caused listeners to lose the “capacity for conscious perception of 
music.”11 Contemporary audiences, Adorno asserts, listen “atomistically and dissociate what 
they hear,” a kind of listening that was unrecognizable to the elites and had more in common 
with “football” and “motoring.”12 Listeners are inattentive “pleasure seekers” (pleasure is bad, in 
case you’ve forgotten).13 Just in case Adorno’s contempt for the public is unclear, he insists that 
contemporary listeners are “childish; their primitivism is not that of the undeveloped, but that of 
the forcibly retarded. Whenever they have a chance, they display the pinched hatred of those 
who really sense the other but exclude it in order to live in peace, and who therefore would like 
best to root out the nagging possibility.”14 The solution—that “other” Adorno gestures toward—
is “the possibility of a different and oppositional music,” a (another) future music that had yet to 
be written.15 
It was Arnold Schoenberg who came closest to meeting Adorno’s oblique criteria, even if 
Adorno was not particularly interested in listening to his music. “How the music sounds is not 
the point,” the theorist proclaims in his Philosophy of New Music.16 A similar sentiment was 
expressed by Schoenberg himself: “[T]he performer, for all his intolerable arrogance, is totally 
                                                
11. Theodor Adorno, “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening,” in Essays on Music, 
trans. Susan Gillespie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 286. 
12. Ibid., 286. 
13. Ibid., 274. 
14. Ibid., 286. 
15. Ibid., 286. 
16. Theodor Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne Mitchell and Wesley Blomster (New York: The 
Seabury Press, 1973), 87. 
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unnecessary except as his interpretations make the music understandable to an audience 
unfortunate enough not to be able to read it in print.”17 Music is to be read and not heard.  
This is the nadir, the reductio ad absurdum of an unhappy relationship between composer 
and listener. Following actors like Schoenberg and Babbitt—the hardcore modernists, if you 
will—one might get the impression that listening to music was an activity in steady decline if it 
had not already become completely defunct. Do we have, in that case, a contender for the 
twentieth-century mausoleum of concepts? Among those supposedly “at rest” are man, God, the 
author, the avant-garde, and opera. Was the twentieth century witness to the Death of the 
Listener?18 
In contrast to efforts to silence or erase the listener, Schaeffer’s project suddenly seems 
radically situated at the other end of the spectrum. His work, which takes the listener more than 
seriously, provides us—thankfully—with a definitively negative answer to that question. In the 
years following the Second World War, advances in sound technology and technique allowed 
recorded sound to be manipulated to the extent that some of the old metaphysical baggage 
associated with the Western Art Music tradition was cast aside. No longer bound by the 
limitations of musical notation, composers began experimenting “directly” with sound. To put it 
simply, sound became “plastic.” Such a reorientation of musical practices could not help but 
                                                
17. Dika Newlin, Schoenberg Remembered: Diaries and Recollections (1938–76) (New York: Pendragon Press, 
1980), 164. 
18. Michel Foucault ends Les mots et les choses with the remarkable image of “a face drawn in sand at the edge of 
the sea.” He was writing about how “man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.” Nietzsche 
of course is routinely blamed for the death of God. Roland Barthes committed a double murder of the author and the 
avant garde. On opera, Mladen Dolar or Slavoj Žižek writes that “the more opera is dead, the more it flourishes.” 
See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994), 387; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 
1974); Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 
1988); Roland Barthes, “Whose Theater? Whose Avant-Garde?” in Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek, Opera’s Second Death (New 
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encourage musicians to stop reading their music and start making it; but as Schaeffer’s work 
shows, this reorientation was not simply an invitation to listen once more, but an opportunity to 
begin investigations—of a particular kind—into the very act of listening itself or, to put it 
another way, into the very experience of listening. 
The Irreducible Core of Experience 
What is this thing called experience? Let me be frank: I have not found a satisfactory answer to 
this question. Despite—or perhaps because of—this, it is a word or concept that I find both 
intellectually challenging and stimulating; as we shall see, it is also a term that both Tomatis and 
Schaeffer invoked at crucial moments.19 Moreover, it is the first word of this project’s title: 
expérience sonores. By using the French term I do not mean to be pretentious; rather, I want to 
capitalize on the double entendre—expérience can be translated as both “experience” and 
“experiment.” Thus, my title can be read as experiences of sound and experiments with sound—a 
nice shorthand (which I hope I have not just rendered redundant) that underscores the 
experimental nature of the subject at hand, that what we are dealing with here is experimental 
experiences. Sticking with experience for now, I want to consider the exigency of the term as 
well as clarify, as best I can, what I mean when I use it. I deal with the specifics of Tomatis’s and 
Schaeffer’s understanding in the main chapters. 
                                                
19. To give some cursory examples: a double special issue of La Revue Musicale was edited by Schaeffer, the tile of 
which speaks volumes. Pierre Schaeffer, ed., “De l’expérience musicale à L’expérience humaine,” La Revue 
Musicale 274-5 (1971). And here, while defending his controversial views on dyslexia, Tomatis turns to lived 
experience for support: “Only the fullness of a lived experience can supply the necessary feeling for the material.” 
Alfred Tomatis, Dyslexia, trans. Agatha Sidlauskas (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1969), 2. 
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The opening remarks of Michel Foucault’s debut publication, History of Madness, warn 
of the madness of attempting to write a history of experience.20 His task, he announces, was to 
discover “the rudimentary movements of an experience,” which meant seeking “madness itself, 
in all its vivacity, before it is captured by knowledge.”21 To retroactively capture, as it were, 
experience in history, Foucault offers the following pièce de résistance by asking his reader to 
listen: “We need to strain our ears, and bend down towards th[e] murmuring of the world, and try 
to perceive so many images that have never been poetry, so many fantasies that have never 
attained the colors of day.”22 This wide-eyed Foucault articulates what might be called the 
“problem of experience”: experience—of madness in Foucault’s case but perhaps also in a 
general sense—possesses or constitutes an “inaccessible primitive purity”;23 it is, again in 
Foucault’s words, an “obscure, equivocal region: pure origin.”24 
Deliberately seeking what cannot be found might strike some as a form of sophistry, but 
there are also practical reasons, if they are needed, for such a move. It is not just (a big “just”) 
the elusive, ineffable nature of experience that hinders Foucault’s access to a history of madness; 
a lack of documentary evidence, of the sort that might at least stand in for experience, leads him 
to the following conceptualization of his project: his job was to “draw up the archaeology of 
[the] silence” that surrounds the experience of madness.25 Turning to this paradoxical 
                                                
20. Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
21. Ibid., xxxi. 
22. Ibid., xxxi. 
23. Ibid., xxxiii. 
24. Ibid., xxxi. 
25. Ibid., xxviii. 
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formulation, Foucault himself seems lost for words, at least for a moment, as he resorts to citing 
poetry: “I will call desert this castle that you were, night this voice, absence your face.”26 
At this point, positing “experience itself” as an object of historical study might seem a 
fool’s errand, but please stick with me—we are in good company at the very least, and who can 
deny the charms of discussing what cannot be said? To explore these charms, the problem of 
experience needs further attention. One way to approach the problem is by linking experience to 
the idea of the ineffable more generally—indeed, it is in this sense that the term “experience” 
operates in what follows. The lure of the unsayable—whatever we call it will be insufficient, and 
perhaps the best we can do is point towards it—has enchanted perhaps a whole generation of 
scholars, in musicology and beyond, who have been sensitive to the call of the ineffable and 
have, in turn, passed on their penchant for negative capability to their students. The irreducible 
core of experience is especially appealing, but perilous also, because it represents a limit: the 
boundary beyond which language and rational thought have no currency. I must admit that using 
this language in the present context gives me pause; scholars, after all, have little more than 
language to rely on, and they’re all strict rationalists, aren’t they? 
Once you start to look for it, the numinous is everywhere. This should not be surprising 
where music is concerned; we all know that music has inspired millennia of unarticulated 
experiences, ones that are, for some, sacred to the point that—quite fittingly, I suppose—should 
not be discussed. The most serious engagement with this subject is Carolyn Abbate’s “Music—
Drastic or Gnostic?”27 Having translated Vladimir Jankélévitch’s La musique et l’ineffable of 
1961, itself a product of postwar Paris, Abbate introduced his potentially irreconcilable terms of 
                                                
26. Ibid., xxxi. Foucault quotes from Yves Bonnefoy’s poem “Vrai nom,” from the collection Du mouvement et de 
l’immobilité de Douve. Yves Bonnefoy, Poèmes (Paris: Mercure de France, 1978). 
27. Carolyn Abbate, “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3 (2004): 505-536. 
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the “drastic” and the “gnostic” to readers of the august interdisciplinary journal, Critical 
Inquiry.28 The “gnostic” refers to the intellectual habits of hermeneutics, the attribution of 
meaning through interpretation, what Abbate sees as the standard fare of musicological 
discourse; she describes as a “metaphysical mania” musicologists’ tendency to “scrutinize for 
supra-audible import” the musical work above all else.29 In contrast, the “drastic” concerns live 
music as performance in real-time, which involves “material acoustic phenomen[a],” and “entails 
seeking a practice that at its most radical allows an actual live performance (and not a recording, 
even of a live performance) to become an object of absorption.”30 Not insignificantly, Abbate 
links “experience” with the drastic, writing, for example, that “… it is in the irreversible 
experience of playing, singing, or listening that any meanings summoned by music come into 
being.”31 
It is not the minutiae of Abbate’s argument that are vital for understanding the ineffability 
of experience but her general call to arms for the drastic cause, for which she claims that “there 
is no a priori theoretical armor.”32 Abbate’s plan of attack, however, falters at a crucial moment, 
in a way that recalls Foucault’s deafening silence just discussed: “In practical terms,” she writes, 
“it would mean avoiding the tactile monuments in music’s necropolis—recordings and scores 
and graphic musical examples—and in the classroom this is nearly impossible. In some larger 
sense it might even mean falling silent, and this is difficult to accept because silence is not our 
                                                
28. Vladimir Jankélévitch, La musique et l’ineffable (Paris: Le Seuil, 2015). 
29. Abbate, “Drastic or Gnostic?”, 505-6. 
30. Ibid., 505; 506. 
31. Ibid., 505. 
32. Ibid., 510. 
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business, and loquacity is our professional deformation.”33 Once more we have arrived at the 
limit of what can be said, known, or understood through language. Must I too fall silent where 
experience is concerned? 
I hope not. In a small way, this dissertation is a response to this impasse. Is experience—
musical experience, moreover—barred forever from our scholarly remit? If so, why? If not, what 
are the options? Perhaps there is a problem of medium; perhaps the adage, to whomever 
accredited, is true: writing about music is like dancing about architecture!34 No doubt the 
confines of the academic genre make matters worse. While I do not presume to even come close 
to solving the problem of representation of experience, at the minimum this is a historical study 
about experience in the sense that the projects I have examined were themselves experiments in 
that domain. 
Vladimir Jankélévitch’s “ineffable”; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s “presence”; Brian 
Massumi’s movement and affect; Jean Luc Nancy’s connections of listening, touch, and 
resonance; Nina Eidsheim’s thick event and voice-as-action.35 I’m attracted to this drastic 
thinking not out of spiritual inclination, but because it encourages us to be cautious and humble 
where our theory is concerned. Rather than a Cultural Theory of Everything, I explore the 
                                                
33. Ibid., 510. 
34. A perfunctory Google search returns: “Writing about music is like dancing about architecture. Laurie Anderson, 
Steve Martin, Frank Zappa, Martin Mull, Elvis Costello, Thelonious Monk, Clara Schumann, Miles Davis, George 
Carlin and several other people have been credited with concocting this extraordinarily popular and enigmatic 
simile.” https://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/11/08/writing-about-music/ 
35. See Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford University 
Press, 2004); Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Duke University Press, 2002); 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007); and Nina Sun 





conviction (but also the desire) that there will always remain an indeterminate core to all 
experience, and to realities, and thus all histories. 
Square one for any cultural study of the senses is the thesis that the senses are constructed 
by social forces.36 In order to supplement the tried and tested tools—namely, the triumvirate of 
discourse, material, and practice—I view this dissertation as its own experiment, one exploring 
how actually lived experiences were lived, felt, and conceptualized by my historical protagonists. 
I do not expect to arrive at any solutions in this arena; I accept at the outset that the task of fully 
understanding and explaining the particular kinds of situated, sensory experiences that interest 
me is in fact impossible, and that it will—inevitably—exhaust all resources thrown at it. 
To engage sensory experience as a historical subject, I have found the anthropology of 
the senses to be particularly valuable. An article by Thomas Porcello, Louise Meintjes, Ana 
Maria Ochoa, and David Samuels provides an overview of the central assumptions of 
anthropologists of the senses since the 1980s: “[Numerous anthropologists’] work grapples with 
the materiality and sociality of the senses as culturally constituted and constitutes the sensorium 
as a cultural entity.”37 Elsewhere, the authors offer another distillation, one I find engaging for its 
directness and ambition: “Anthropological work focused on the senses is founded on the 
insistence that the senses are not merely a biological ground on which cultural meanings are 
constructed. Rather, the senses are always already fully cultural, and ‘sensory perception is a 
cultural as well as physical act.’”38 What we have here is a substitution (construction for 
                                                
36. See, for example, Constance Classen, “Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses,” International Social 
Science Journal 49, no. 153 (1997): 401-412. 
37. Thomas Porcello, Louise Meintjes, Ana Maria Ochoa, and David Samuels, “The Reorganization of the Sensory 
World,” Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 51-66; here, 52.  
38. Ibid., 52-3. The authors quote from Classen, “Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses,” 401. 
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constitution), an equivalence (biological and physical), and what seems like a contradiction 
(“fully” one thing yet also “as well as” another), in addition to some subtle maneuvering: the 
inclusion of “sensory perception,” “biological ground” (but “physical act”), and the invocation of 
a third party that shifts the responsibility somewhat. Elsewhere in the paper, the authors nod to 
the authoritative foundations of the anthropology of the senses in Marx, Levi-Strauss, and Freud. 
Marx’s quip is especially memorable: “[T]he forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire 
history of the world down to the present.”39 That labor never ceases; Tomatis’s and Schaeffer’s 
experiments are just two negotiations of what the senses are, can be, mean, have meant, and 
could mean. 
Paris after 1945 
Not for the first time, Paris provides the backdrop for a piece of historical theater. Paris in the 
postwar period was an intellectual hothouse, at least from our vantage point today, and yet it was 
said to be on its knees. Some believe that Culture (with a capital “C”) migrated from Paris to 
New York—a shift polemically described by Serge Guilbaut within the context of the Cold 
War.40 But that war was not high on France’s agenda. In the wake of De Gaulle’s decision to pull 
out of NATO in 1959, France was not considered as locked-in to the binary Cold War paradigm. 
This “outside” position became the default for French intellectuals who embraced this “third 
way” counterculture, a way of thinking outside of Cold War ideology. 
                                                
39. Karl Marx, “Private Property and Communism,” in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 of Karl 
Marx, trans. Martin Milligan, 99–114 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1988), 109. Quoted in Porcello et al., “The 
Reorganization of the Sensory World,” 52. 
40. Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold 
War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
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France’s post-war international relations, even with the US, were hardly straightforward. 
Irwin Wall has charted the different courses treaded towards détente by France and America 
during the Cold War, illustrating how, even if their paths occasionally crossed, both nations 
acted largely in their own self-interest.41 Wall reports that, while it is clear where the Cold War 
gaze of the USA was focused towards the East, France’s gaze was cast along the north-south 
axis, with concerns about the loss of empire in “Eurafrique” highest on the agenda. In what 
follows, Paris serves not simply as a geographical boundary; like most large cities, after 1945 
Paris became increasingly internationally connected and culturally diverse. 
Nevertheless, Paris provides an iconic backdrop that is saturated in historical meaning. A 
large part of its monumentality, for the current project at least, was the historical context of the 
postwar period. An important historiographical question to ask is to what extent explanations 
rely on or elude what I call the “postwar thesis”—the idea that experience was irrevocably 
changed by the Second World War, that 1945 represents a catastrophic epistemic and 
experiential break, and that culture—and indeed, the whole humanist project—had to be 
drastically rethought. How might the relationship between experimental sensory research and 
postwar experience more generally be understood? Paris, at this particular moment, was a 
crucible of experimental thought; under attack were the self, the subject, the Enlightenment 
project, the West, etc.—the city was in many ways the focal point of an intellectual crisis from 
which we are still all said to be reeling. 
Within this cauldron of crisis came a need for intellectual invention—radical changes in 
theory, and indeed the eventual invention and exportation of French Theory itself, were born out 
                                                
41. Irwin Wall, “France in the Cold War,” Journal of European Studies 38, no.2 (2008): 121-139. 
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of necessity.42 This, at least, is often the narrative assigned to the postwar period—the truism that 
1945 represents a historical rupture; the war ended, and culture was somehow irrevocably 
changed.43 This version of the postwar is a major organizing principle of twentieth-century music 
histories: most are split into two at 1945.44 Taruskin’s history is especially interesting in this 
regard; his “Starting From Scratch” chapter begins with an atomic bomb and a quotation from 
Jean-Paul Sartre.45 There is no denying the introspective, pensive mood of intellectual and 
cultural life in Paris in the aftermath of the war, but the extent of the 1945 dividing line is 
perhaps overstated.  
While one reading tells us that musicians, artists, and intellectuals began searching for 
new solutions to old problems, in many ways the modernists picked up where they left off. This 
is most evident among those composers who propelled the twelve-tone technique towards total 
serialism.46 Critically reevaluating the significance of 1945 is not only important for music 
history but also touches upon more general historiographical questions: How do we understand 
                                                
42. See François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Co. Transformed the Intellectual 
Life of the United States (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
43. See Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Richard Overy, 
“Interwar, War, Postwar: Was There a Zero Hour in 1945?” in The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History, 
ed. Dan Stone, 60-78 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
44. See Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vols. 4-5; Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Griffiths, 
Modern Music and After (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Robert P. Morgan, Twentieth-Century Music: 
A History of Musical Style in Modern Europe and America (New York: Norton, 1991); Alex Ross, The Rest is 
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45. Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vol. 5 1-54. 
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Schaeffer dispensed with the score and became “post-literate,” as Taruskin puts it. He is uniquely placed in this 
regard, since he regularly appears in histories of Western Art Music, even if it is not always obvious where he 
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historical “breaks,” “ruptures,” or “watersheds”? What are the historical conditions for such 
moments? What are their histories?47 
As European avant-gardes flourished, intellectual conviction became increasingly 
strained; according to many, the postwar heralded the arrival of many more “posts”—post-
modernism, post-humanism, post-structuralism.48 All of these “posts-” figure in one way or 
another in what follows, but they rarely concerned Tomatis and Schaeffer. Despite both men 
working experimentally with novel electronic technologies that they perceived as profoundly 
significant, neither sought out a nihilistic end to either the propagation of knowledge or the 
onward journey of human kind.  
Depending on who you read, this stance may not be as staid as it might seem. Giorgio 
Agamben, for example, borrows Roland Barthes’s dictum that “the contemporary is the 
untimely” to argue that “the contemporary is he who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as 
to perceive not its light but rather its darkness. All eras, for those who experience 
contemporariness, are obscure. The contemporary is precisely the person who knows how to see 
this obscurity, who is able to write by dipping his pen in the obscurity of the present.”49 With this 
remarkable metaphor, indebted to astrophysicists’ theories about darkness in the night sky, 
Agamben describes how the contemporary person is always distanced from the present: “In an 
expanding universe the most remote galaxies move away from us at a speed so great that their 
                                                
47. On history and events, see William Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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light is never able to reach us. What we perceive as the darkness of the heavens is this light that, 
though traveling toward us, cannot reach us.”50 To be able to view the darkness of one’s own 
time, Agamben suggests, is not easy because the dark light of the present is so obscure, so 
distant; contemporaries are thus rare and courageous.51 Studying in detail two characters—
prominent ones—who do not easily fit the accepted historical narratives of the period in which 
they worked offers a chance to challenge those narratives. In what follows there emerges a much 
more complex picture of postwar technological experimentation, one in which the human spirit 
remains front and center. 
Post-Humanism and the Cyborg 
I have felt it necessary to somewhat shield Tomatis and Schaeffer from two types of common 
“theoretical profiling” often enacted upon individuals working with technology, especially with 
technologies that interface with the human body: on the one hand, the technophobe, and on the 
other the technophile, which, taken together, make up the Janus-face of postmodernism. Two 
latter-day narrators may serve as exemplars of those positions: Jean-François Lyotard and Donna 
Haraway. Whilst Lyotard is most famous for his definition of postmodernism as an “incredulity 
toward metanarratives,” his analysis of human destiny was even darker; for him, knowledge, 
once the humanist product par excellence, was becoming technologized, commoditized and 
dehumanized for nefarious ends.52 Lyotard wondered: “What if human beings, in humanism’s 
                                                
50. Ibid., 15. 
51. Ibid., 15. 
52. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 4. 
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sense, were in the process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman … [and] … what if what is 
“proper” to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?”53 
Haraway’s “post-human” technophilia, on the other hand, welcomes the waning of the 
human embrace.54 Without the “ontological hygiene” (to use the social theorist Elaine Graham’s 
phrase)55 of humanism, Haraway witnesses the impossibility of drawing distinctions between 
humans and technology: “By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all 
chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. 
The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics.”56 For Haraway, listening to post-human 
hybrid machines would mean listening to ourselves. Or, as Haraway puts it: “Intense pleasure in 
skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an aspect of embodiment. The machine is not an it to 
be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our 
embodiment.”57 
Of course, both Lyotard and Haraway represent later thinking on technology’s 
relationship with the human; I include them here to give a sense of the trajectory of the post-
human/in-human narrative which, I claim, is not yet manifested in either Schaeffer or Tomatis. 
Both men were, however, alert to the burgeoning field of cybernetics, the study of closed 
feedback-loop systems—especially the work of Pierre de Latil in France and Norbert Weiner in 
                                                
53. Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991), 2. 
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the USA.58 The promise that technology held, especially in the domain of automation, seems to 
have not been shaken by any concern of inhumanity, nor was it viewed as an escape from 
humanity altogether. Instead, the projects undertaken by Schaeffer and Tomatis possibly 
represent some of the last flickers of humanism. 
Intellectual Contexts: Phenomenology, Existentialism, Psychoanalysis 
The experiments under the microscope here were not clandestine acts performed on the fringes 
of society, but were in many ways reflections of a broader intellectual sensibility (perhaps we 
could say mentalité) in which experience was front and center—a sensibility that pervaded 
French thought in particular, whose grip tightened around 1945, and which crystallized into 
some of the major philosophical movements of the twentieth century. To be summary, the 
proximate intellectual context for Tomatis’s and Schaeffer’s work included phenomenology, 
existentialism, and psychoanalysis. Each of these schools of thought developed unique 
vocabularies for describing if not explaining experience, while to greater or lesser extent 
exploring that thing Abbate calls the drastic, Jankélévich calls the ineffable, and what I am 
considering as the irreducible core of experience. It is both inevitable and especially relevant 
here that many of these explorations of experience also entailed explorations of the senses. 
The first of these, phenomenology, is known as the “science of experience.” While the 
roots of that discipline stretch back to the turn of the century, with Edmund Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations (1901), significant modifications were made in 1913 in what is known as his Ideas 
                                                
58. See especially Pierre de Latil, Introduction à la cybernétique: La Pensée artificielle (Paris: Gallimard, 1953); 
Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1965); Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (London: Free 
Association, 1989). 
	 22 
I.59 Phenomenology was a prominent mode of philosophical thought in the early postwar period; 
the two prominent phenomenologists in postwar Europe were Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Schaeffer quotes from the latter, as well as Husserl, at crucial moments in his 
writing. Although often opaque, the language of phenomenology points towards a broad 
intellectual concern with “situating” knowledge, qualifying it in relation to the contingencies of 
lived experience. 
Existentialism is another of the significant intellectual movements of the postwar period. 
Despite both Tomatis’s and Schaeffer’s Catholic religious beliefs, the spirit of existentialism was 
perhaps unavoidable. Their projects to rethink knowledge, their interest in understanding human 
nature anew, their sense of criticizing history and redirecting it for the better, and their highly 
articulate sense of living a moral life, certainly catch something of the existential wave. Both 
men were well-read and philosophically minded—and there is the not insignificant matter that 
Tomatis’s high-school teacher was none other than Jean-Paul Sartre himself.60 Sartre’s work has 
come to be synonymous with a certain kind of nihilism that is said to be idiomatic of the times—
a kind of “coming to terms” with the realities of the war, a reckoning, a part of the grieving 
process.  
It is not always clear where existentialism ends and other schools of thought begin, 
phenomenology being one example—Merleau-Ponty is often included alongside Sartre, with a 
coterie of other intellectuals, including Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, and Jean Wahl. 
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Despite the often negative perception, the existentialists, at least in the early postwar years, had 
not given up hope in humanity; given the turn to the inhuman that was to follow, they were in 
contrast some of the few humanists left, among whom Schaeffer and Tomatis would certainly 
feel welcome.61 
Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan was a key figure among Parisian intellectuals, not only for 
his therapeutic and psychoanalytical-theoretical work but also for his contributions to later 
intellectual movements including post-structuralism and even many academic disciplines such as 
Film Theory. His approach to psychoanalysis resonates in a number of ways with Tomatis’s 
work, not least because of his specialization in child development, and especially the reliance on 
a theory that posited the earliest experiences of life as an imagined “fall” from an uncorrupted 
state. For Lacan, both the entry into the Imaginary and the Symbolic realms—the mirror stage 
and the entry into language—constituted a loss of purity, an irrevocable break with the Real.62 
And that “Real” is yet another example of a realm of experience just out of reach, beyond 
signification.  
Also relevant to Tomatis’s work is the significance of the voice for Lacan; indeed, Lacan 
attributes to the voice one of those fundamental moments of loss just mentioned Lacan attributes 
to the voice. There is a pun in French that Lacan often used to explain this: “the cri pur, a pure 
scream, is turned into a cri pour, a scream for someone.”63 One of Lacan’s elaborations upon 
Freud, especially where the study of the arts is concerned, was to add to the partial objects (the 
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breasts, the feces and the phallus) the voice and the gaze.64 Mladen Dolar’s book, A Voice and 
Nothing More, has been vital for introducing Lacan’s theory of the voice to recent discussions 
about the voice in Anglophone musicology.65 
Useful Theories of Listening 
The terms “sense,” “sensation,” “sensorium,” and “sensory,” understood as the material organs 
of the body (the sense organs), are often separated from those relating to perception, but such a 
separation is always contextual and relies on an underlying understanding not of human anatomy 
but of an often-unstated ontological position. The examples I have gathered in what follows 
regard the ear as malleable, although we often have to look extremely closely at the details to 
understand exactly what kinds of manipulations are said to be desirable or taking place. Both of 
our key figures make the basic claim: we can change how you listen. 
In a fascinating tour of the legal history of musical plagiarism, arrangements and musical 
criticism, and technologies that have allowed private listening (from mechanical devices through 
to the CD player), Peter Szendy meditates on listening as a social practice: “… That listening—
and not hearing or perception—begins with this legitimate desire to be signed and addressed. To 
others.”66 By “signing” a listening, Szendy is writing of his desire to render communicable his 
own internal, idiosyncratic listening, to amplify the moments that he finds enjoyable or powerful. 
Szendy understands that the body itself has a history that binds listeners together, and that our 
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senses are not entirely our own. Here, Szendy describes listening as a bodily action over which 
he himself has little control—less to do with intentional cognition, and more with an historical 
affective residue: 
But to lend an ear is also a matter of a loan. Or even a graft. I sense that these 
pinnae that I turn and turn back in me like antennae are to a large extent 
determined, in their internal movements, by a whole body of laws, by a corpus of 
which I am neither the master, nor the proprietor, nor the inventor: rather I inherit 
them, I receive them, I borrow them without even having chosen them. This ear 
that I lend is certainly above all lent to me.67 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s poetic musings on listening consider the relationship between sound, 
meaning, the self, and others. Nancy dissolves the divide between hearing and listening, without 
either eliding the two or dispensing with one or the other: 
 If “to hear” is to understand the sense (either in the so-called figurative sense, or 
in the so-called proper sense: to hear a siren, a bird, or a drum is already each time 
to understand at least the rough outline of a situation, a context if not a text), to 
listen is to be straining toward a possible meaning, and consequently one that is 
not immediately accessible.68  
A similar logic is invoked when it comes to consider the relationship between the listener and 
sound: “Listening aims at—or is aroused by—the one where sound and sense mix together and 
resonate in each other, or through each other.”69  
There are countless complications to this theory of listening—listening is a “feeling-
oneself-feel [se-sentir-sentir]: or, if you prefer, sensing is a subject, or it does not sense,” or in 
other words, listening is involved in an ongoing movement towards subject formation—too 
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many to deal with here.70 But it is resonance—a mutual resonance between listener and sound—
that is the take-home message from Nancy’s meditation on listening. Nancy’s project places 
listening in a slippery relationship with meaning and sense; there is no neutral level of 
perception, for example, and there is no stable self. Through resonance—in the ear, in the 
(human) body, in the (sonorous) body, in the air—one enters a relationship between the world 
and the self. Objects and subjects, bodies and world, are messily intertwined. 
Veit Erlmann’s ideas provides a concrete grounding for Nancy’s discussion of resonance. 
Erlmann attempts to write a history of modernity that critiques and corrects the common claim 
that the ear (or listening) has been systematically excluded since the enlightenment in favor of 
visual culture: “While reason implies the disjunction of subject and object, resonance involves 
their conjunction. Where reason requires separation and autonomy, resonance entails adjacency, 
sympathy, and the collapse of the boundary between perceiver and perceived.”71 Scientific 
inquiries into resonance have provided corroboration for Erlmann’s claim that at the heart of 
modernity is an unstable conjunction with the world through resonance.72 Erlmann’s argument 
“proceeds from the assumption that the story most commonly offered about the making of 
modern rational selves as the progressive silencing of sensation and emotion as inherently 
incompatible with thought is only half the story.” He continues: 
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The other, untold half ... [which includes] Romanticism and twentieth-century 
phenomenology being just two of the better-known examples ... [posits] the 
simple fact that truth and knowledge do not exist independently of the way in 
which they are acquired and that subjectivity is not merely the impure other of 
objectivity. The acoustic and physiological phenomenon of resonance, I suggest, 
played a constitutive role in the history of modern aurality and rationality. It was, 
for all intents and purposes, modernity’s second science.73 
The history of this “second science” remains to be told. How can a history of the modern subject 
be told that includes affect, rather than pushes it to the side in favor of the tyranny of reason, and 
rationality. Or, put differently, how can questions concerning Enlightenment, reason, and 
rationality, be reopened to sound and sense? 
Benjamin Steege’s historical study of the emergence of modern listening practices, 
concentrates on Hermann von Helmholtz’s theories and experiments, and in particular his 1863 
treatise Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der 
Musik (On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music). Steege 
considers how popular scientific discourse shaped a listening public.74 Most importantly for our 
purposes, Steege offers a urgent reminder of the importance of the senses, and of perception, in 
listening practices that are otherwise described as disembodied and abstract. In doing so, he 
emphasizes a disconnect between a conventional “aesthetic” model of listening associated with 
modernity and a more realistic picture that (of course) involves the senses. The following 
historical reevaluation is crucial for my purposes: 
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 [we should seek] a view of modernism that does not restrict itself to accepting a 
“merely” aesthetic conception as a historical given, but instead analyzes how what 
has perhaps always been the core engagement of the Aesthetic—that is, 
perception itself, or, even more fundamentally, sensation—was at once discovered 
and manufactured, altered and prolonged, regimented and liberated (all of these) 
in the context of a broad experimentalization of hearing.75  
I share similar concerns here. Listening—even listening at a level of discernment that 
distinguishes between consonance and dissonance—was, for Helmholtz, an embodied process; 
taste, value, and sensation were physical reactions, not musical conventions or cognitive acts. 
Indeed, while describing Helmholtz’s distance from traditional music theory, Steege goes as far 
as suggesting that Helmholz’s preoccupation with the bodily sensation of sound is evocative of 
much later interests in sound studies. Calling this preoccupation an “emancipation of sensation,” 
Steege reports on Helmholtz’s insight that, though a turn towards sound, a listener’s sense of 
sound can be altered:  
For Helmholtz, sensation was to be invested, as if on its own merits, with an 
enormously fortified attention and observational effort. Indeed, the disposition of 
attention to tones and to the particularity of their sensory qualities could go so far 
as to reproportion the perceived intensities of a tone’s upper partials in 
comparison to the fundamental. To call for renewed attentiveness to sound as 
sound—to listen with unprecedented strain and even skill—was to call for a 
change in the object of study itself.76  
As an investigation into sound for sound’s sake, Helmholtz’s theories of sensation are intimately 
connected to the experiments considered in this project. 
Jonathan Sterne’s historical examination of listening as a technique, and its consideration 
of the affective power of sound reproduction technology, is a key example of the entwined 
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history of technology, the ear, and the cultivation of listening practices.77 Sterne’s description of 
listening offers an insightful account of the relationship between technology, technique, and 
sensation:  
Listening involves will, both conscious and unconscious—perhaps a better word 
than will would be disposition or even feel. Orientations toward and styles of 
listening are part of what sociologists and anthropologists have come to call the 
habitus. Following Pierre Bourdieu, habitus denotes a set of dispositions, what he 
calls a feel for the game. The habitus is socially conditioned subjectivity: it 
combines all those forms of informal knowledge that make up social life. Habitus 
is a mix of custom, bodily technique, social outlook, style, and orientation.78 
The particular “habitus” that Sterne traces is, of course, associated with modernity. 
Listening techniques coming out of the medical profession were employed in 
telecommunications, and were eventually deployed for sound-reproduction purposes. These 
listening techniques, for Sterne, are commensurate with the modern “gaze.”79 It is interesting, 
though not necessarily contradictory to the definition of listening just offered, that Sterne goes on 
to write that “the history of audile technique … offers a counter narrative to Romantic or 
naturalistic accounts that posit sight as the sense of intellect and hearing as the sense of affect.”80 
When Sterne turns to the public’s reactions to sound technologies, he reports a curious love affair 
between human and machine: “in [the] early moments of sound reproduction, not only did the 
eros of communication radiate from person to person ... it also radiated from people to machines. 
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If there is a story of love and longing in these early performances of sound reproduction, it is 
love and longing for the machine and the process that it enacted.”81 Couched in the language of 
love, or as John Peters (quoted by Sterne) puts it, the “eros of communication,” Sterne stresses 
the social power of the medium of communication, rather than what is merely being 
communicated. 
Don Ihde’s project is a vital study of phenomenology and listening.82 When it comes to 
listening, he oscillates between “Husserlian” and “Heideggerian” phenomenologies, siding with 
the Heideggerian approach in the end. The distinction between the two is worth considering. 
According to Ihde, Husserlian phenomenology requires a listener to focus on sound with a “ray 
of attention” (the visual terminology of this approach is not lost on Ihde).83 Heidegger, instead, 
emphasized the notion of “letting be,” a kind of passive acceptance of the world.84 With attentive 
modes of listening, where the goal of grasping the wholeness of experience (although always 
falling short) often becomes an “all or nothing” pursuit—either you listen “correctly” and grasp 
the object at hand, or you fail entirely. 
I have found Alain Corbin’s study of bells particularly useful for thinking about the 
senses and listening as historical objects. By focusing on listening, his project shows how “The 
rural peals of the nineteenth century, which have become for us the sound of another time, were 
listened to, and evaluated according to a system of affects that is now lost to us.”85 A turn to 
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sound means, for Corbin, to accept, in a radical way, historical subject matter in all of its alterity; 
he unearths “a different relation to the world and to the sacred as well as to a different way of 
being inscribed in time and space, and of experiencing time and space.”86 “The reading of the 
auditory environment,” he continues, “constitute[s] one of the procedures involved in the 
construction of identities, both of individuals and of communities.”87 In that quotation, I am 
particularly fond of his “one of...” qualification. Corbin is attuned not only to those aspects of 
history that we can easily identify in the archive, and those that elude the historian’s grasp. 
Corbin concentrates on the sensual experience of sound in a historical context and, by doing so, 
offers a genuine attempt to theorize those elusive experiences of sound within a specific 
historical moment. 
Listening is often uncritically discussed in terms of an individual, ideal, ahistorical 
listener. Yet listening rarely takes place in such isolation. The act is invariably mediated by 
technology, and should be thought as a social practice all the way through. Is listening sensory, 
perceptual, cognitive, or bodily? What is the relationship between listening subjects (whether 
singular or multiple) and objects of attention? What distinctions can and should be made between 
listening, hearing, sense, and perception? 
I am primarily interested in the senses from an historical perspective, confronting the 
problems that a history of listening experiences presents to the historian. Corbin, Steege, Sterne, 
Erlmann, and Szendy have all offered valuable examples of historical listening. Recovering the 
senses in history has, however, received more attention lately; Mark Smith’s edited volume, 
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Hearing History: A Reader is just one example.88 For an historical understanding of listening 
practices, the senses are perhaps only part of a puzzle that includes perception, cognition, history, 
meaning, mediation, and an endless list of other factors. Historical studies of listening that 
acknowledge these factors must account for complex configurations of bodily understanding, 
technological and technical knowhow, philosophical beliefs, ontological commitments, ethical 
and moral stances, all of which could, at any given historical moment, have been different. 
Chapter Overviews 
In Chapter 1, “The Ear Goes Electric: Alfred Tomatis’s Experiment in Sensory Prosthetics,” I 
examine the material and epistemological resources required to make material the sense of sound 
in order to manipulate and reshape it, to externalize a sense that is an otherwise intimate, 
inaccessible, and imagined zone of experience. With his Electronic Ear, Tomatis claimed he 
could open the black box of the senses and access the inner wiring of individual experience. His 
experiments with human subjects’ ears and minds cannot be explained within the confines of 
otolaryngology alone; they cast the net much wider.  I treat the Electronic Ear as a network, and I 
explore the different realms of knowledge mobilized by the Ear, from capital-S-Science to 
contemporary audio technology, cybernetic theory, psychoanalysis, and spirituality and 
alternative medicine.  
In Chapter 2, “Who Cares How You Listen? Pierre Schaeffer’s Doctrine of Audile 
Technique,” I turn to Schaeffer’s theory of reduced listening and consider how the senses fit into 
his at times loose rhetoric concerning the “deconditioning” and “reconditioning” of his listeners. 
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I show how there is ambiguity where his imagined future audience is concerned—one minute he 
addresses his research colleagues, at another moment he has grand designs for the entire 
population of planet earth. In this chapter, I also raise some important historiographical issues 
that have been associated with Schaeffer; namely, an association with nineteenth-century 
Romantics and proponents of absolute music.  
I return to Tomatis in Chapter 3, “Post-Mortem on Caruso: Alfred Tomatis Listens to 
Caruso Listening to Himself,” where I examine one of Tomatis’s particularly creative projects 
that is central to his experiments with the Electronic Ear: his analyses from the early 1950s of 
Enrico Caruso’s (recorded) voice, through which he was able, he claimed, to discern the 
frequency response of the famous tenor’s ears. Thereafter followed the doctor’s diagnosis, which 
I shall not disclose at this juncture. 
Chapter 4, “In Search of Concrete Listeners: Pierre Schaeffer in the Public Ear,” looks 
more closely at Schaeffer’s real and imagined publics. I attempt to flesh out his more strictly 
theoretical musings by looking at his actual engagements with the public. Among the sources for 
this chapter are two video-taped conversations—one with media theorist Marshall McLuhan, the 
other with academic Anthony Wilden. Schaeffer’s conversation with the latter is especially 
intriguing because it raises the topic of Schaeffer’s efforts, before decolonization, to shore up 




The Ear Goes Electric: Alfred Tomatis’s Experiment in Sensory Prosthetics 
 
Figure 1.1: The Philips Pavilion at Expo 58, the World’s Fair in Brussels, 1958 
Expo 58, said to be the first World’s Fair after the Second World War, marks an important 
moment in the history of the “cultural cold war.”1 It is also a keystone of twentieth-century 
music history, with two canonic pieces of electronic music, Iannis Xenakis’s Concret PH and 
Edgard Varèse’s Poème électronique, looping continuously inside the hyperbolic paraboloids of 
                                                
1. This often-repeated label—the first postwar World Fair—is in fact inaccurate. The Exposition internationale du 
bicentenaire de Port-au-Prince was held in Haiti in 1949 but was not paid much attention. On the history of Expo 58 
and its Cold War politics, see Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War 1945-
1961 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997); Robert Kargon, Karen Fiss, Morris Low, and Arthur Molella, World’s Fairs 
on the Eve of War: Science, Technology, and Modernity, 1937-1942 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2015); Lewis Siegelbaum, “Sputnik Goes to Brussels: The Exhibition of a Soviet Technological Wonder,” Journal 
of Contemporary History 47, no. 1 (2012): 120-136. See also Howard Taubman, “Brussels: American Mistakes and 
Lessons,” New York Times, June 1, 1958; Walter Waggoner, “U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. At Brussels Fair Too,” New 
York Times, April 27, 1958. 
	 35 
the Philips Pavilion, Xenakis’s and Le Corbusier’s architectural brainchild.2 Some musicologists 
might also be familiar with Expo 58 because a corner of folio 99r/45r of Mozart’s Requiem 
manuscript was forcibly removed by a still-unidentified vandal. Thankfully, Mozart scholar 
Simon Keefe has reassured us that “the tear is a neat one, affecting no material at all on any 
stave, not even a bar-line, as if demonstrating deep respect for Mozart’s score even in the act of 
mutilating it.”3 Some believe the missing piece contained the composer’s last written words, but 
in that case we should be disappointed: they were “Quam olim d:C:,” an instruction referring to 
the fugue of the “Domine Jesu.”4 
 
Figure 1.2: (Most of) folio 99r/45r of Mozart’s Requiem manuscript 
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The architect (in a different sense) of what became known, in the 1990s, as the “Mozart 
Effect”5 was also at the Fair, where Parisian otolaryngologist Alfred Tomatis presented his 
oreille électronique (Electronic Ear), for which he received the Gold Medal for Scientific 
Research.6 Following the war, Tomatis had spent his time researching industrial noise in French 
armory factories for the ministry of defense.7 Around the same time, he began working with 
opera singers suffering from vocal maladies; his father Umberto, a well-known Parisian opera 
singer, supplied the introductions. In 1955, Tomatis helped Maria Callas through a rough patch, 
and before long he was moving in circles far beyond the opera house and factory; his high-
profile clients included Gerard Depardieu, Sting, and—to connect some dots—Le Corbusier.8  
Tomatis worked primarily, however, with children with learning, behavioral, and mental 
disorders. More recently (and controversially), Tomatis’s name has been associated with the 
treatment of autism.9 Experienced by many, from opera divas to sufferers of an ever-growing list 
of non-medical disorders (and many in between), the Electronic Ear has remained the core 
technological apparatus upon which was built the now-trademarked Tomatis® empire—a multi-
million-dollar industry built around one idea: “Well-tuned listening can change your life.”10 
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Figure 1.3: The Tomatis® logo (source: www.tomatis.com) 
How did the Ear function within this empire, or network, as I will now call it? And how 
did the device enable, support, and sustain the network’s smooth operation? Tomatis’s 
technological experiments with human subjects’ ears and minds cannot be explained within the 
confines of the field of otolaryngology; his experiments cast the net much wider, into domains of 
knowledge far beyond what is conventionally understood as medical science. I examine not only 
the differences and translations from one domain of knowledge to the other but also the 
interactions and interdependent relations between them. In a narrow sense, this chapter examines 
a doctor’s attempts to transform the lives of fellow human beings using electronic sound 
production technology. More broadly, I want to elucidate the power of the domain of the 
“technological” itself and its ability to bring together strange hybrid machines caught between 
fact and fiction, science and magic, matter and spirit, and certainty and wonder. 
With his Electronic Ear, the doctor claimed that he could open the black box of the senses 
and access the inner wiring of an individual’s experience. Such bold claims were not sustained 
through scientific proof alone, but have also relied on a panoply of modes of existence that 
complement and complicate each other. This chapter shows how notions of “validity” and 
“legitimacy” are meaning effects, produced piecemeal out of a “mangle” of contradictory and 
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surprising discursive practices. Tomatis believed that listening—led by the (singular, dominant) 
ear—is a full-bodied experience, one that is fundamental in shaping human behavior and 
psychology: “Prompted by listening,” he writes, “the ear takes over the body and organizes all 
the connections necessary for communication. Humanity’s intense desire to live in community 
has produced singing and speaking. The internal organization that acts on phonation depends 
solely on the induction brought about by listening.”11 
Establishing Les Bases scientifique 
Sociologist of science Bruno Latour has spent his career splitting the difference between two 
scientific worlds. The first, “capital-S-Science,” he describes in terms of “certainty, coldness, 
aloofness, objectivity, distance and necessity.”12 The second, “research,” is “uncertain, open-
ended, immersed in many lowly problems of money, instruments, know-how, unable to 
differentiate yet between hot and cold, subjective and objective, human and non-human … a 
collective experimentation.”13 For Latour, neither is more or less “scientific”; both are two sides 
of the same coin. In order to construct its facts, Latour shows, capital S-Science must pass 
through the research stage, from the fabrication of facts in practice in the laboratory to 
decontextualizing and universalizing them into cold, hard, objective knowledge. “Science has 
two faces,” Latour writes elsewhere: “one that knows, the other that does not know yet.”14 It was 
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perhaps these two faces that Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze had in mind when they coined the 
“royal” and “nomadic” styles.15 
Reading his memoir, it is clear that Tomatis understood this difference: “My story is 
above all one of groping in the dark, of trials and errors—the daily bread of a researcher.”16 
Research was not only Tomatis’s day job but also a way of life: “Every quest, every search, and 
every piece of research (however scientific it may appear to be) only has value in so far as it 
leads to the divine.”17 While evoking, perhaps with more hostility than Latour, the idea of two 
incommensurate worlds, in practice science and research are in Tomatis’s work complexly 
interwoven, often to the point where discerning a difference is difficult. 
The “official” versions of Tomatis’s professional life invoke peer-reviewed articles, 
replication of research by colleagues, honors and medals from august institutions, and medical-
profession affiliations. The following information, for example, can be extrapolated from one of 
the more conspicuous Tomatis® websites: He received his doctorate from the Paris School of 
Medicine and has been abundantly decorated, winning a Knighthood of Public Health (1951), 
Medal of Honor Society for Promoting Arts and Letters (1967), a Gold Medal of the Society of 
Arts, Sciences and Letters (1968), and the Commander’s Cultural and Artistic Merit (1970).18 
Between 1957 and 1960, he presented to the Academy of Sciences in Paris what would become 
known as the “Tomatis Laws.” But it is not only the Law that adds gravitas to Tomatis’s name: 
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there is the Tomatis Effect, the Tomatis Technique, the Tomatis Method, the rather awkward 
“Electronic Ear with the Effect of Tomatis,” or simply just Tomatis—have you tried Tomatis?19 
Serious business must also deal in acronyms, which in France are very often (at least to this 
reader) abstract and unmemorable: Tomatis has APP, the “scientific field” of Audio-Psycho-
Phonology, of which he is the founder. 
Most of the official biographical blurbs on Tomatis seem guarded. Absent are his many 
run-ins with the French medical establishment, which culminated in a life-long ban from the 
Academy of Medicine in 1977 and a precipitous move to Canada where, under increasing 
scrutiny from the North American scientific community, his standing, at least in relation to 
mainstream medicine, declined.20 The reasons for the skirmishes are many—“suddenly the 
Medical Faculty was roused: I was accused of violating the sacrosanct rules against 
advertising”—but they essentially stem from Tomatis’s unwavering faith in his research, which, 
as will become increasingly clear, he could not separate from his personal, everyday experience 
of the world.21  
Reflecting on his arrival in Toronto, and with more than a hint of irony, he writes that 
“the clinical and therapeutic results obtained in Europe over many years satisfied me and allowed 
me to plunge into new studies. I forgot that I had no statistics—an unpardonable omission.”22 
But the troubles with establishment Science seem to have energized Tomatis: 
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History teaches us that an innovator always disturbs deep-rooted structures, 
vested interests, and those firmly established in the status quo. An innovator is 
above all looked upon as s trouble-maker, making people approach problems from 
a different angle and sometimes forcing them to make a totally new beginning. So 
it has occurred in every age and every place.23 
Recently, popular neuroscientist Norman Doidge has revived Tomatis’s work while 
managing to somewhat airbrush away the controversies. According to Doidge, in addition to the 
many accomplishments he is already known for, Tomatis was a visionary who had intuitively 
understood the principles of neuroplasticity: “Tomatis was so far ahead of his medical colleagues 
that he was all too often depicted as a quack who dishonored his profession by performing ‘non-
medical acts’ with mere sound.”24 (To be generous to Doidge, let’s assume that the choice to 
surround “non-medical acts” with scare quotes but to leave “mere” unmodified was a stylistic 
one). 
Another established fact about Tomatis concerns the establishment of facts themselves. 
Between 1957 and 1960, his website claims, Tomatis presented to the Academy of Sciences in 
Paris the “Tomatis Laws” mentioned above.25 The “fact” of this presentation is the bedrock of 
hard evidence for Tomatis’s work, and it is presented as a formal acceptance of the truth of 
Tomatian Law—the moment when any doubt was settled.26 This was no longer research—this 
was Science. The paper trail leading to this claim is worth following. The “presentation” to the 
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Academy consisted of the following: a short article, “Audio-vocal Conditioning,” published by 
Tomatis in the Bulletin de l’Académie Nationale de Médecine; a write-up of an experiment with 
the Electronic Ear by ENT doctor Raoul Husson in the same journal, and a paper of Husson’s 
presented at a meeting of the Academy of Science. The air of finality suggested by that word 
“presentation” is not felt in the pieces themselves except in the statement of the laws, but even 
there the tone reflects an excitement about possibilities for future exploration rather than having 
discovered the immutable laws of nature. 
Solidity of some sorts was added to Tomatisian law later, in 1974, when the International 
Association of Audio-Psycho-Phonology collated and reproduced a dossier containing these 
three texts. The dossier is titled “Les bases scientifiques de l’audio-psycho-phonologie,” which is 
slightly misleading because the field of Audio-Psycho-Phonology had not yet been inaugurated 
when the original articles were published.27 It is no coincidence that these documents were 
collated around the time that Tomatis was running into trouble with the medical establishment 
for playing loose with the facts. Imagine the brochure lying around in Tomatis® listening centers 
around the world, admired by patients and parents, most likely without being opened. It’s ok, the 
dossier whispers, we’ve got science on our side. The laws and their scientific basis were 
presented by Husson as follows: 
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Analyzing closely defects in hearing that result in a decreased sensitivity to 
certain frequencies, [Tomatis] found that these frequencies poorly heard by the 
ear were precisely those that were deficient in the voice of the subject. It was the 
first fundamental discovery, the first law of Tomatis, which he phrased as: the 
voice contains only what the ear hears. 
 
Tomatis demonstrated then that if one restores to the traumatized ear the ability to 
correctly hear the poorly heard frequencies, they are restored instantly in the vocal 
emission without the knowledge of the subject. This is the second law of Tomatis. 
 
The third is a generalization of this audio-phonatory relationship applied to 
normal ears. It can be expressed as: the ear imposes on the voice the 
modifications of hearing that are imposed upon it artificially.28 
The Electronic Ear 
 
Figure 1.4: Tomatis in 1950 with an early prototype of the Electronic Ear 
In the process of formulating these three commandments, Tomatis submitted eleven patents to 
the Ministere de l’industrie et du commerce, six of which directly concern the Electronic Ear and 
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its component parts: two for an “Apparatus for the Re-education of the Voice” (the first 
submitted in 1953, the second 1957) and four for devices that provide a visual representation of 
sound.29 These technologies of sound measurement—audiometers and spectrographs—are 
crucial components of the Electronic Ear, which relies on accurate measurement of a patient’s 
hearing range as well as the spectral composition of their voice. As documents, the patents offer 
formal and precise presentations of the inner workings of the Electronic Ear. While a patent is 
usually a provisional document of science in the making, the genre also demands the applicant 
engage with science as matters of fact: technical language, established facts, and objective 
knowledge are de rigueur. Tomatis does not disappoint in this regard. He explains the Ear as 
follows: 
The invention includes the following features and their possible combinations: 
 
1. Apparatus for the re-education of the voice, characterized by the combination 
of a microphone and that isolate the frequency bands in the voice received by the 
microphone and headphones for listening to the spoken voice as it is modified by 
passing through the frequency filter 
 
2. The apparatus comprises switchable low-pass and high-pass filters, which 
isolate frequency bands determined by the user 
 
3. The amplifier stages, including the power stages, are designed to eliminate 
distortion 
 
4. Plugs for a recording device such as a magnetic tape-recorder are fitted before 
and after the filters.30 
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This early version, from 1953, is extremely simple, but it contains in essence the main 
function of the Ear: to allow a patient to hear their own voice through headphones, in real time as 
they speak, with either the low or high frequencies subtracted. Hearing their modified voice, with 
normally dulled frequencies—their “problem” frequencies—effectively boosted, a patient’s 
experience of listening to their altered selves cause a change in their voice which, in turn, would 
alter their ears, which, in turn, would alter their lives. Also of note in the design of the Ear at 
various stages is the presence of inputs for a tape recorder; this would be crucial for 
incorporating external sounds into Electronic Ear therapy sessions—sounds recorded to magnetic 
tape. 
Tomatis’s Electronic Ear would cure vocal problems by treating the listening faculty: 
problems of voice were in fact symptoms of aural disorder. Unappealing voices might miss 
certain frequency bands, which a listener’s hearing would also lack; because (Law 1) the voice 
can only produce sounds the ear can hear, Tomatis would stimulate the ears in the problem 
frequency range. There are medical explanations for this that are reflected by an important 
mechanism built into the second generation of the Electronic Ear (1957), namely that the two 
channels corresponding to the high and low pass filters are “applied at precisely determined 
times and also for determined durations.”31 The Electronic Ear allows the filters to be switched 
periodically, which exercises the muscles of the inner ear; one Tomatis practitioner calls this 
kind of treatment, “micro-gymnastics”—short bursts of stimulation equivalent to performing 
“reps” and “sets” in the gym.32 
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Figure 1.5: Tomatis’s figures 1-5 for an “Apparatus for the Re-education of the Voice,” 1953.33 
 
Figure 1.6: Circuit diagram for an “Apparatus for the Re-education of the voice,” 1958.34 
                                                
33. Tomatis’s caption reads as follows: “La figure 1 représente schématiquement l’appareil de la figure 1; La figure 
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And yet, the Electronic Ear’s filters tell another story. For patients with disabilities and 
mental disorders, maladies whose symptoms are caused (claimed Tomatis) by a damaged 
communication system, Tomatis looks to their early childhood for signs of developmental 
problems. In fact, he looks back further, all the way back to the womb. The Electronic Ear’s 
filters do not merely alter sound; for Tomatis, they simulate the aural experience of prenatal life, 
the experience of sound from within a mother’s body—her voice, her heartbeat, her flowing 
blood. At four months—perhaps even earlier—Tomatis claims the sense of sound is fully 
developed.35 Tomatis views being born as a traumatic fall from grace—the title of his book Neuf 
Mois au Paradis perhaps indicates when he believes he was at his happiest—and it was a 
potentially damaging auditory event. Another of his book’s title illustrates how his entire 
cosmology is sound-based: Écouter l’univers: du big bang À Mozart.36 
Picture Tomatis in his laboratory in Paris, pondering “intrauterine listening.” Fascinated 
by ethologist and Nobel Prize winner Konrad Lorenz’s research into the singing abilities of birds 
and their pre-hatch experience, he decides to experiment.37 He builds himself an artificial womb: 
“I had put a loud speaker in water surrounded by a rubber diaphragm. By playing a tape recorder, 
I injected the recorded voice via the immersed loud speaker into the water medium. I then 
registered the resulting sounds via a microphone also plunged in the water and similarly 
protected.”38 From a period of experimentation—for example, he used a “large sheet of India 
rubber [to avoid] as much as possible the effects of air pockets”—Tomatis reached an 
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approximation of what he considered intrauterine listening must sound like.39 His account of 
such an imagined auditory environment is remarkable:  
The fetus hears a whole range of sounds, most of which contain low frequencies. 
Due to the way the human ear is constructed, it acts as a filter. When the ear is 
filled with water, it carries out a selection of these frequencies. The universe of 
sound in which the embryo is submerged is remarkably rich in sound qualities of 
every kind. The fetus experiences internal rumblings, the movement of chyle 
[chylothorax] at the time of digestion, and cardiac rhythms at a sort of gallop. It 
perceives rhythmic breathing like a distant ebb and flow. And then its mother’s 
voice asserts itself in this context.40  
The Electronic Ear was modeled after these experiments, making it “capable of reanimating even 
more strongly the acoustic experiences of the fetus.”41 
On the one hand, Tomatis strives to produce a coherent, unified theory that explains all 
human behavior in terms of listening, all human beings in relation to their ears. But on the other, 
he fleshes out his ideas with so many autobiographical parables that his theory becomes deeply 
personal. These two impulses are perhaps one and the same—the division between public and 
private, personal and professional seem not to have concerned Tomatis. In fact, the mundane—
which is not to say ordinary—anecdotes Tomatis relies on are useful rhetorical tools that provide 
an intensified sense of coherence to his entire person; they seem crucial to him on the level of 
identity. This illusion of coherence is nowhere more prominent than in his autobiography, whose 
dedication reads “To my parents I am indebted—to one I owe my existence, to the other I owe 
my life.”42 Mother and father, existence and life, sound and music; here Tomatis’s most intimate 
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personal history is colored by his most speculative theoretical work. This becomes starkly 
apparent in an account that he gives of his own birth, where he “recalls” hearing his first words: 
“‘It is useless to bother with him. He’s dead.’ These were the first words my ears heard when I 
left my mother’s womb, though I certainly did not understand them. I was a premature baby of 
six and a half months, weighing just under three pounds. I was such a wretched specimen that the 
midwife seized me by my right ear, leaving a mark I still bear, and discarded me in a basket.”43 
Immediately we have Tomatis’s motifs: in utero experience, the centrality of the 
anatomical ear, language, listening, birth, developmental problems, entry into a world hostile to 
the organism, whose true “home” it seems is the womb. The sonic experience of being born: 
speculating on this event occupied much of Tomatis’s thought. Here’s how one commentator 
summed it up: “It’s in the womb that hearing develops: the fetus picks up only high frequency 
levels of the mother’s voice and other sounds; the Tomatis therapy is designed to replicate those 
sounds heard in utero in order to reawaken the ear’s natural ability to listen and ultimately 
stimulate the brain’s desire to communicate.”44 This description was not uttered by a disciple of 
Tomatis’s but by news anchor Katie Couric on NBC’s Today Show, where the Tomatis Method 
received a positive, if not entirely accurate, coverage. 
A Prosthetic Sense? 
The Electronic Ear is a good example of sensory prosthesis. In an engaging article, Sarah Jain 
examines “hum an-technology interfaces, ‘technology as prosthesis’ [the study of which] 
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attempts to describe the joining of materials, naturalizations, excorporations, and semiotic 
transfer that … go far beyond the medical definition of ‘replacement of a missing part.’”45 Jain 
examines what she sees as the dual nature of prosthesis—the idea that it extends, but it also 
wounds.46 The wounding concerned the lack of fit that prosthesis have, while enabling obviously 
concerns the intended benefits a person would hope to experience from a prosthetic device. 
Linked to enabling and disabling, lurking behind prosthetic thinking is the idea of a body that is 
made whole again but lacking somehow; indeed, it is (understandably) through disability studies 
that prosthetics has been explored most thoroughly. Some of this “lack” is, Jain claims, foisted 
upon us by the forces of capitalism: you are un-whole but don’t worry, there’s something you 
can buy to fix it. Also raised in Jain’s article is the question of cui bono: in whose interests are 
prostheses adopted? In what ways do the users feel comfortable, empowered, and in what ways 
do these tools grate, cause pain and discomfort? Of course, when we think of prosthetic ears we 
might think of hearing aids. But Jain’s article offers a warning: prostheses abound everywhere 
among everyone. 
Especially important is where Jain connects the concept of prosthetics to mind-body 
dualism in order to reveal the privileged nature of one over the other: According to Freud, who,  
Jain writes saw “consciousness itself [as] a prosthetic attachment,”47 “the body is always already 
a prosthesis of the mind, the mind of the drives; and the semantic content of mind, body, and 
prosthesis is evacuated.”48 Indeed, the body undergoes complete erasure as it takes on the 
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nuances of the super being, as in Freud’s ideal of the ‘prosthetic god.’”49 Indeed, Freud was 
interesting in this connection; here he is invoking that most provocative of phrases, “prosthetic 
god” (note also the specific reference to the senses): “With every tool man is perfecting his own 
organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning … Man has, as it 
were, become a prosthetic god. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent: 
but those organs have not grown on him and they still give him much trouble at times.”50 
A particularly short-sighted view of technological prosthetics is one that sees that a 
“microscope [is] just more vision, or a printing press just faster, permanent speech.”51 She 
continues: “Furthermore, the metaphors of prosthetic extension are presented as if they are 
equivalent in some way, from typewriters to automobiles, hearing aids to silicone implants, 
allowing each of us to extend ourselves into the world on the liberal premise of free choice.”52 
This idea of just “more” points towards another problem: the lack of specificity where 
programs of listening are concerned. Jain’s prime concern is important for considering Tomatis’s 
Electronic Ear; she raises the point that thinking of technology in terms of prosthetics, and then 
in terms of ability and disability, places an unnecessary and harmful burden of “bodily 
expectations” upon a prosthetic user.53 Moreover, the prosthetic idea raises the question: 
prosthetic of what? Tomatis’s quasi-anatomical description of the cybernetic relationship 
between the ear and the voice is just one way in which the two are thought both separate and the 
same. Thus through the link between the ear and the voice, a prosthetic output soon becomes a 
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prosthetic input. Such a compensatory device as the Electronic Ear might be understood as a 
negative prosthesis, in the sense that it does not replace a body part once possessed and now lost. 
All this said, what kinds of limits and affordances does the Electronic Ear allow for Tomatis and 
his patients? 
It is almost inevitable that, once we get into questions about technology and prosthetics, 
the tone darkens as we theorize the erosion of the human and the imposition upon them by 
technological prosthetics—in other words, one is usually forced to pick a side. I want to avoid 
this by asking to what extent a technology that is not physical but directly conceived as a 
perceptual augmentation or intervention changes matters. In some sense, this raises a more 
pressing question about the material (or otherwise) ramifications on the human being, and it 
forces us to ask the question: What exactly was Tomatis’s understanding of the human being? In 
a simple sense, perhaps Tomatis was a physicalist.  
As we will see shortly, there are myriad ways in which Tomatis’s professional work and 
his spiritual beliefs collide, not least because he was an ardent Catholic. But it is perhaps a cheap 
shot and not particularly enlightening move to refuse to acknowledge the difference between 
Tomatis’s medical training and his personal faith—even if, as I say, the two are often presented 
as one in his writing. It is worth it to understand the nature of what Tomatis viewed as malady 
(was it a psychological one?) and what the cure was (a physical, muscular remedy?). Must these 
two align, and if not, what status does that accord to the theory and practice? Underneath this lies 
deep and probably unanswerable ontological issues—for example, the simple fact that a 
symptom and its relief need not exist in the same “mode,” as it were. A psychological problem, 
after all, can be and has been treated with chemicals or with electric shocks. Or, as Friedrich 
Kittler puts it in his book Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, “The computer and the brain are 
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functionally compatible, but not in terms of their schematics.”54 Another almost unanswerable 
question emerges: Isn’t music itself already “prepared” to do the kind of work Tomatis does? 
Isn’t music a workout enough for the ears? 
“When I described the audio-laryngeal loop in 1946-1947,” Tomatis remarked in 1991, “I 
was using cybernetics without knowing it. Cybernetic science officially began with Norbert 
Wiener in the United States in 1949. All my subsequent work has been based on the discovery of 
this loop, which I have stated as a law.”55 This most forceful of Tomatis’s “laws” offers a 
fascinating angle for theorists of voice, one from which we will peer in the next chapter. For 
now, we will concentrate on cybernetics in Tomatis’s theory. 
The most important cybernetic component of Tomatis’s theory is that of the connection 
between the ear and the voice, and yet there are no fewer than twelve cybernetic relationships—
described as “loops”—that Tomatis identifies: the audio-facial loop; the audio-mandibular loop; 
the audio-larynx loop; the audio-pharyngeal loop; the audio-lingual loop; the audio-thoracic 
loop; the audio-mouth and the audio-nasal loops; the audio-recurrential loop; the audio-lumbar-
sacral loop; the audio-cervical loop; the audio-corporeal loops.56 
Models of human consciousness have proliferated since the Second World War. The 
information age did not start with the internet but with Communication Studies, Information 
Theory, and explorations into computing. The internet, as we know it, is merely a singular, and 
incredibly successful, consequence of this more generalized Information Age. Beginning in the 
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late 1940s, the discipline of cybernetics caught fire, with foundational texts published by Norbert 
Wiener.57 Cybernetics is the postwar theoretical paradigm of technology par excellence. In 
addition to Wiener’s work, in France Pierre de Latil was a widely read cyberneticist with whose 
work Tomatis was familiar.58  
Influencing a multitude of disciplines and leading to innovations in technology and 
computing, the influence of cybernetics cannot be overstated. Cybernetics is perhaps the most 
pervasive example of a shift in the late 1940s and 1950s towards a science of systems, ones 
including (but not restricted to) human sciences. In fact, cybernetic theory has been bound up 
with various methodological innovations, some more recent than others. It is a theory of 
automatic self-regulating systems that operate through feedback loops. It is a language of science 
that could be applied to organic matter. The term’s first use is, famously, attributed to a 
Frenchman, physicist André-Marie Ampère, in his Essai sur la philosophie des sciences.59 In his 
recent history of cybernetics, Andrew Pickering has shown the extent to which the field spread 
its tentacles throughout the intellectual world.60 There are different schools of cybernetics—
mainly categorized into three main philosophies—UK, USA, French—but they have much in 
common. 
                                                
57. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1965); Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (London: Free 
Association, 1989). 
58. Pierre de Latil, Introduction à la cybernétique: La Pensée artificielle (Paris: Gallimard, 1953). 
59. André-Marie Ampère, Essai sur la philosophie des sciences, ou, Exposition analytique d’une classification 
naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines (Paris: Chez Bachelier, 1834). 
60. Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010). For a related study, see Mara Mills, “On Disability and Cybernetics: Helen Keller, Norbert Wiener, and the 
Hearing Glove,” Differences 22, nos. 2-3 (2011): 74-111. 
	 55 
Conclusion 
The turn to cybernetics complicates both Tomatis’s theory and the status of the Electronic Ear. 
His therapy intervenes into what he views as a “natural” loop of the body. Human biology, from 
the cybernetic perspective, can be imagined as a circuit diagram, a relay of processes, events, and 
information. For Tomatis, this meant diverting the signal outside of the body’s usual boundaries, 
as the listening faculty becomes redirected and effected through the Electronic Ear. Tomatis’s 
aim was to infiltrate these informational, communicational loops. The Electronic Ear allows the 
voice-ear loop to be modified—or “hacked,” if you will. Breaking down the barrier between the 
hidden electronic world of information loops in the body promised new ways of modifying 
behavior, biology, and psychology. The senses themselves could be understood as cybernetic 
systems. Thus, the Electronic Ear was not only a prosthetic sense but a cybernetic sense too. 
For Tomatis, the ear-voice cybernetic connection places the voice in direct relationship to 
the listening apparatus, process, and experience. This is a fascinating claim, and one that is 
beginning to be explored theoretically today.61 Instead of imagining isolated parts—voice, ears, 
body, mind, cybernetics understands the human being as a complex system. Is the voice an 
output or an input for the ear? The voice is shaped by the ear while the ear’s ability to hear is 
shaped by the voice. But can the ear be “corrected” by interfacing directly, in some way, with the 
voice, by stretching the vocal chords or by other means? 
Tomatis did not explore this option; therefore, the cybernetic loop is not mutually 
defining; it has inputs and outputs. In some sense, the Electronic Ear is an ear that speaks: it is 
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not, or not only, an ear that listens. The Electronic Ear could also be thought of as an electronic 
voice. The cybernetic loop between ear and voice perhaps makes this distinction unnecessary; for 




Who Cares How You Listen? Pierre Schaeffer’s Doctrine of Audile Technique 
This is Pierre Schaeffer describing what he calls a “conspiracy of silence”: 
Can it really be that we have just discovered all manner of ways to create and 
assemble previously unheard sounds, and nothing in music has changed, that we 
merely work on what we already know, what we already do? For fifteen years we 
have had a sound film that allows us to slow down, speed up, expand, contract, 
and, above all, fix sound, which until then was ephemeral, and there is nothing to 
be drawn from this except a few strange works of secondary importance? These 
same recordings, coming from all points of the compass, give rise to extraordinary 
comparisons among different human ways of perceiving, and there is not one new 
thought to be had about the problem of musical languages?1 
Schaeffer was hardly breaking news with his faux-naïf characterization of an unheard-of “sound 
film.” As these lines were published, George Harrison’s reversed guitar solo on “Taxman” 
echoed around the world; Pet Sounds made waves as (in Brian Wilson’s words) one of the first 
“production concept album[s]”; and the “thin, wild, mercury sound” of Bob Dylan’s Blonde on 
Blonde shimmered like quicksilver.2  
Deafened by electronically produced sound, Schaeffer’s conspirators’ silence was of a 
different sort: like their counterparts in popular music, elite experimenters were flying blind, 
toiling away in sound laboratories without rhyme or reason (or perhaps with a bit too much of 
the latter). Theoretical support was needed urgently to understand what Schaeffer believed was a 
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profound moment in the history of music, and even of humankind. It was not an absence of 
sound he heard but a silence of articulated knowledge—a silence in (music) theory. No doubt the 
volume of silence was exaggerated; but here was Schaeffer in any case to break it with his 
magnum opus, the Traité des objets musicaux.3 The year was 1966, although the TMO4 had by 
that point been in progress for over a decade. 
We know Schaeffer as the founder and director of state-sponsored research programs 
surrounding the genre with which his name is synonymous, musique concrète: the Groupe de 
Recherche de Musique Concrète (GRMC), established in 1951 and which became, in 1958, the 
Groupe de Recherche Musicales (GRM). In this capacity he was an early proponent of what we 
refer to today as “sound processing”—transforming an audio signal, often (but not always) after 
the recording process, and usually by electronic means.  
The ability to alter sounds in post-production was foundational to Schaeffer’s inquiry into 
the potential impacts that contemporary sound technology has on human listeners. Never afraid 
of hyperbole, Schaeffer set out on a quest to construct, from the ground up, an entirely new 
musical sensibility, one organized around the perception and sensation of sound rather than the 
ancient ratios out of which the pitch-centric musical tradition we know as Western Art Music 
emerged, and one that he could only explain by calling in the heavy artillery of phenomenology, 
one of the most significant philosophical movements of the twentieth century. The new musical 
culture that Schaeffer envisioned would make little sense to listeners who lacked an ear for this 
new sonic art; an ex nihilo music would demand new listeners, ones that would need to be (in 
                                                
3. Pierre Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux (Paris: Seuil, 1966). All quotations from this work refer to the recent 
translation into English by Christine North and John Dack.  
4. I adapt the convention, which until now has only been applied to the French edition, of abbreviating its title; 
therefore, I will call the treatise the TMO. 
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Schaeffer’s words) “deconditioned” out of their existing listening habits and “reconditioned” 
with new ones.5 This rebooting process would, Schaeffer believed, provoke in his audience 
sensory experiences as novel as the sounds he was (in)famous for producing. 
While the initial shock brought about by sound reproduction technology had, by the  
’50s, dissipated, Schaeffer’s ear was honed on the equally profound effects of sound production 
technology—a shift of attention that reflects a crucial disjuncture in the history of sound 
technology, one that has hardly been acknowledged in music studies outside of popular music 
studies.6 In what follows, I focus on Schaeffer’s engagement with sound production—sound 
processing or manipulation; call it what you will—in order to clarify the aims of his 
experimentation as it relates to his (real and imagined) audience. 
Most significant in this regard is Schaeffer’s commitment to the processes of (in his own 
words) “deconditioning” and “reconditioning” his audience’s sense of sound, a process detailed 
in the TMO. I call this commitment and its associated actions (in word or deed) Schaeffer’s 
doctrine of audile techniques. Schaeffer’s sound experiments were also sensory experiments—
his manipulations of sound were designed to manipulate the senses of his listeners. And 
Schaeffer’s experiments with “different human ways of perceiving” (as he phrased it in the 
                                                
5. Schaeffer, TMO, 382-384. 
6. The contrast between musicology’s (slow) acceptance of sound reproduction technology as an object worthy of 
study and its relative silence on sound production might be explained by the deep-rooted understanding of musical 
performance as a reproductive act that is subordinate to the musical work. Sound production has received more 
attention in popular music studies. See, for example, Simon Frith and Simon Zagorski-Thomas, eds., The Art of 
Record Production: An Introductory Reader for a New Academic Field (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012); Simon 
Zagorski-Thomas, The Musicology of Record Production (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
Richard James Burgess, The Art of Music Production: The Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Richard James Burgess, The History of Music Production (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Peter Doyle, Echo and Reverb: Fabricating Space in Popular Music, 1900-1960 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2005); and Virgil Moorefield, The Producer as Composer: Shaping the Sounds of Popular Music 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
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passage quoted above) led him to experiment with experience itself; in many ways, the stakes 
could not have been higher. 
In the Ear of the Beholder: The Sense of objets sonores 
To grasp Schaeffer’s doctrine of audile techniques, we must venture briefly into the world of 
phenomenology. It is through the phenomenologist’s gaze that Schaeffer peered at his “sound 
objects”—the main focus of the TMO. Phenomenology, the “science of experience,” is a 
philosophical method for conceptualizing and analyzing lived, subjective experience. According 
to the phenomenologist, experience is qualified as conscious experience, where consciousness 
has a fundamental property: a subject is not simply conscious but conscious of something. That 
“something” is the object of phenomenology. A phenomenological analysis seeks to understand 
these objects as they appear to the subject in conscious experience.7 
Schaeffer claims he came to phenomenology by accident: “for years we have time and 
again been doing phenomenology without realizing it, which is better, all things considered, than 
talking about phenomenology without doing it.”8 He details his understanding of phenomenology 
at the beginning of the fourth book of the TMO, where he invokes Edmund Husserl’s work, 
especially the philosopher’s Logique formelle et logique transcendantale (published in 1929) and 
                                                
7. For a comprehensible if not comprehensive overview of the phenomenological method, see Robert Sokolowski, 
Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also see Dan Zahavi, ed., The 
Oxford Handbook on Contemporary Phenomenology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
8. Schaeffer, TMO, 206. 
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what is referred to as Ideas I (published in 1913).9 The core of Schaeffer’s conceptual and 
practical project is based on Husserlian phenomenology. Three closely-related concepts 
borrowed from Husserl are particularly significant: the subject-object entanglement, the 
“transcendence” of the object, and the concept of epoché. 
The first of these—subject-object entanglement—concerns the way that 
phenomenologists treat reports from their subject with the same seriousness as a scientist might 
treat their objects. In this regard, phenomenology might be thought of as a kind of inverse 
idealism; to put it in extreme terms, rather than regarding the world as a mere subjective 
projection (a charge often levelled at phenomenologists), subjective experience is acknowledged 
as a real part of the objective world, no different from typical, uncontestable real objective 
objects. However, since it is experience that concerns phenomenologists, objects are considered 
only as they appear in subjective experience. In this account, any knowledge of worldly objects 
can only be gleaned by an experiencing subject; objective reality itself is out of bounds, perhaps 
eternally.  
Whether phenomenologists ever manage to escape the allure of this “objective reality in 
itself” is debatable. In many ways, the entire phenomenological enterprise is built on the pursuit 
of this supposedly inaccessible, transcendent reality. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Schaeffer 
never gives up on the idea of reducing subjective experience in order to approach—
asymptotically—this inaccessible realm. While phenomenology might seem to dissolve or 
deconstruct (to use an anachronistic term) the subject/object binary, as subjectivity gains a 
                                                
9. For the former, published in German as Formale und transzendentale Logik, see Edmund Husserl, Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). For the latter, see Edmund 
Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 
1931). 
	 62 
degree of objectivity (and vice versa), this is sleight of hand. Schaeffer’s quotations of Husserl 
(perhaps unintentionally) reveal a loophole that manages to retain good old “real” objectivity 
after all: “[The object is] the pole of identity immanent in particular personal experiences, and 
yet transcendental through the identity that goes beyond these particular experiences.”10 A great 
deal rests on the meaning of that “transcendental,” which Schaeffer takes his time to explain. 
According to Schaeffer’s gloss, by “immanent” Husserl meant that an object “constitutes 
an intentional unit, involving acts of synthesis.”11 “These many experiences,” Schaeffer 
continues, refer to “the many visual, auditory, tactile impressions that follow each other in a 
never-ending flux [which are] directed toward it, and they organize themselves around it so well 
that I cannot account for the structure of my consciousness except by perpetually recognizing it 
as ‘consciousness of something.’ To this extent the object is contained in it.”12 At the same time, 
an object is “transcendental” insofar as it “remains the same, throughout the flux off impressions 
and the diversity of modes. For example, the perceived object never merges with the perception I 
have of it.”13 It appears, then, that the phenomenological method studies two distinct objects: one 
experienced as an object of consciousness, another as an object “in the world.” This, at least, is 
how it appears from the outside; prominent phenomenologists, however, go to great lengths to 
clarify and rectify this confusion.14 
                                                
10. Schaeffer quotes from Husserl’s Logique formelle et logique transcendantale. For a translation, see Husserl, 
Formal and Transcendental Logic. Schaeffer, TMO, 206. 
11. Emphasis in original. Schaeffer, TMO, 207. 
12. Ibid., 206-207. 
13. Emphasis in original. Ibid., 207. 
14. It is not atypical in Schaeffer’s writing, at the very moment he switches into clarification mode, that a fog of 
ambiguity rolls in. But in this case, the language of phenomenology must share the blame. Borrowing from Husserl, 
Schaeffer has described two meanings, or attributes, of the object that are clearly in opposition. In fact, it might be 
argued that the classical subject-object pair are simply substituted by two new words, the objective object becomes 
“transcendent,” the subjective subject “immanent.”  
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Schaeffer’s reading of Husserl seems about right, but the term “transcendence” can be 
particularly finicky to pin down, especially as it is understood within the phenomenological 
jargon. In an introduction to the field, phenomenologist Robert Sokolowski warns us that the 
everyday meaning (if indeed there is one!) of “transcendental” does not cover its 
phenomenological use. I will leave it to the specialist to explain:  
The word means “going beyond,” based on its Latin root, transcendere, to climb 
over or go beyond, from trans and scando. Consciousness, even in the natural 
attitude, is transcendental because it reaches beyond itself to the identities and 
things that are given to it. The ego can be called transcendental insofar as it is 
involved, in cognition, in reaching out to things. The transcendental ego is the ego 
or the self as the agent of truth. The transcendental reduction is the turn toward 
the ego as the agent of truth, and the transcendental attitude is the stance we take 
up when we make this ego and its intentionalities thematic.15 
Having cleared up the confusion, Sokolowski writes, amusingly, that “when we enter into the 
phenomenological or transcendental attitude, we have to make appropriate modifications in the 
words that we use. The new context, since it is so unique, requires adjustments in our natural 
language. Let us call the new language that results from these changes transcendentalese, and let 
us call the language we speak in the natural attitude mundanese.”16  
I have lingered on the phenomenological use of the word “transcendent” because I would 
like to return to it shortly. But in true phenomenological fashion, I would like to “bracket” it for a 
moment. Speaking of which, the third important Husserlian concept to bring into the fold 
involves exactly that: the “bracketing” or suspending of an idea or attitude. Husserl’s theory of 
epoché was revealed in 1913; in large part it represented a response to a number of charges—of 
psychologism, idealism, Cartesian dualism, naive realism. Husserl explained epoché as follows: 
                                                
15. Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 58. 
16. Ibid., 58. 
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We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural 
standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of 
Being: this entire natural world therefore which is continually “there for us,” 
“present to our hand,” and will ever remain there, is a “fact-world” of which we 
continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets. If I do 
this, as I am fully free to do, I do not then deny this “world,” as though I were a 
sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the 
“phenomenological” epoché, which completely bars me from using any 
judgement that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein).17 
It is through the epoché that Schaeffer’s doctrine aligns most accurately puts into practice the 
fundamental concept of Husserl’s philosophy. But to be precise, we need to acknowledge a 
wrinkle in the phenomenological jargon: the term epoché is often used interchangeably with the 
word “reduction.” There are disciplinary debates about the distinction between epoché and the 
phenomenological reduction, but the issue does not much affect the matter at hand; I propose that 
we leave that discussion for the specialists.18 In any case, Schaeffer called his proposed 
technique of listening reduced listening; he also refers to the concept of epoché in similar if not 
identical contexts. What is reduced listening? Or, how did Schaeffer conceive of the epoché? 
 
 
                                                
17. Emphasis in original. Husserl, Ideas I, 110-111. 
18. Here is Dan Zahavi’s explanation: “Husserl also speaks of the transcendental reduction in this context, and even 
though the epoché and the reduction are closely linked and parts of one functional unity, Husserl occasionally 
speaks of the epoché as the condition of possibility for the reduction; consequently, it is necessary to distinguish the 
two: The epoché is the term for our abrupt suspension of a naive metaphysical attitude, and it can consequently be 
likened to a philosophical gate of entry. In contrast, the reduction is the term for our thematization of the correlation 
between subjectivity and world. This is a long and difficult analysis that leads from the natural sphere back to (re-
ducere) its transcendental foundation. Both epoché and reduction can consequently be seen as elements of a 
transcendental reflection, the purpose of which is to liberate us from a natural(istic) dogmatism and to make us 
aware of our own constitutive (that is, cognitive, meaning- giving) contribution.” Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s 
Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 46. 
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Figure 2.1: Pierre Schaeffer’s Schema of Reduced Listening (Source: Schaeffer, TMO, 114). 
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Schaeffer’s approach, which is also Husserl’s, is to first describe in some detail the two 
attitudes—ontological commitments, if you will—that epoché aims to avoid: “realism” and 
“psychologism,” where the first is a belief in an objective, external world and the second, the 
idea that such an external world is “represented” in a subject’s mind, behind which lies the 
inaccessible “thing in itself.”19 Taken together, these commitments are referred to as the “natural 
attitude.” Such an attitude relies on a so-called “‘naive faith in the external world”—naive (at 
least in one sense) because that faith has been taken for granted without question.20 While the 
epoché or the reduction is fundamentally a Husserlian concept, Schaeffer turns to 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception when describing this 
widely held attitude, this every day, pretheoretical ontology.21 To get a sense of the concept, it is 
worth reading the Merleau-Ponty quotation in full: 
I suppress the consciousness I had of my gaze as a means of knowing, and I 
consider my eyes to be fragments of matter. Now they take their place in the 
objective space in which I am trying to situate the external object and I think I am 
creating the sight perceived by the projection of objects on to the retina. In the 
same way, I consider my own perceptual history to be a result of my relationships 
with the objective world; my present, which is my viewpoint on time, becomes 
one instant in time among all the others; my duration, a reflection of or an abstract 
space in universal time, like my body, a mode of objective space … In this way an 
“objective” thought (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is formed—belonging to common 
sense, to science—which ultimately makes us lose contact with the perceptual 
experience of which it is nevertheless the result and the natural continuation.22 
                                                
19. See Schaeffer, TMO, 208-209. 
20. Ibid., 208. 
21. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
Schaeffer, TMO, 209. 
22. Quoted in Schaeffer, TMO, 209. See also Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 82. 
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Schaeffer parodies the natural attitude as “the height of scientific cautiousness,” and claims that 
“the highly developed discourse of science is based on this initial act of faith.” The approach is 
naive because it cannot not see, from its “realistic” perspective, the raw materials of “perceptual 
experience.”23 Schaeffer’s invocation of the technique of epoché or reduction can be understood 
in this sense as an attempt to avoid such naivety and to include in his analysis the conditions of 
perceptual experience itself. 
We can now more easily address Schaeffer’s doctrine of audile technique, his aural 
utopia of reduced listening. Schaeffer’s reduced listening requires “returning to perception, not to 
reject it, not to criticize it, but to become aware of it, which implies that we stop being 
immediately interested in its results, the information it gives us about the perceived object.”24 In 
order to achieve this, Schaeffer declares, emphatically, that “I must disengage myself from the 
world.”25 Usually a listener can glean from a sound information about its cause, its source, its 
location, its distance, and any associative meanings that may or may not be relevant. In order to 
uncover or reveal the sound object, Schaeffer wanted to remove all of this information; such a 
removal had to be performed by the listener, who must pay attention not only to the sound but to 
their perception of it.  
One of Schaeffer’s examples involves a galloping horse, which should be attended to 
with the following attitude:  
                                                
23. Schaeffer, TMO, 209. 
24. Ibid., 210. 
25. Emphasis in original. Ibid., 210. 
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Compared with these referential listening modes … listening to the sound object 
necessitates a new awareness: “What are the perceptions from which I derived 
these indicators? How did I recognize that voice? How, purely in terms of sound, 
can I describe galloping? What precisely did I hear?” I have to go back to the 
auditory experience, take hold of my impressions again, to discover, through 
them, information about the sound object and not the horse.26  
These rhetorical questions are supposed to provide a route towards a “new awareness” 
and are designed to steer attention towards the elusive sound object that our poor horse obscures. 
The questions themselves are not particularly profound, but perhaps more importantly, they do 
not obviously address the central existential/ontological question that phenomenology is 
supposed to “bracket” through epoché. But they do point towards the level of analysis on which 
Schaeffer is working; his aim here is to isolate the perceptual processes that shape a listener’s 
experience of sound. But those too must be ultimately disposed of, since the goal is not to stop at 
the perceptual level but to continue on towards the sound object itself (without ever “reaching” 
it). 
Schaeffer refers to perception, not sensation. It is difficult to disentangle the two terms, 
but here is Schaeffer, elsewhere in the TMO, articulating a rough distinction while, at the same 
time, claiming that he is abreast of cutting-edge research into such matters: 
After the gestaltists’ rather perfunctory clearing of the decks, fifty years ago, 
everyone knows that “sensation” does not come first, is not prior to perception, 
that perceptual structures inform our entire sensory stock. Merleau-Ponty 
considers that the classical antinomies—soul-body, external-internal, mentalism-
materialism—are out of date in modern philosophy.27 
                                                
26. Ibid., 212. 
27. Ibid., 104. 
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 Rather than certainty, the phrase “everyone knows” more often than not indicates that matters 
are less settled than the spokesperson for “everyone” wishes to convey.28 Also noteworthy is the 
immediate appeal to authority (Merleau-Ponty) and the introduction of an impossibly general 
philosophical claim. To his credit, however, Schaeffer is articulating the very real difficulty of 
defining sensation and perception in relation to one another. Untangling sense and perception, 
Schaeffer suggests, has usually relied on those persistent binaries—the senses are material 
conduits that lead to immaterial perceptions—which, he claims, are no longer valid. Instead of 
those binaries, instead of imagining the senses as primary to, and autonomous in relation to, 
perception, they are part of a single complex system that cannot be reduced to either sensation or 
perception alone. Or, to put it in Darwinian terms, human ears and human experiences of sound 
evolved in tandem, each shaped by the other.  
Schaeffer’s understanding of the senses is further complicated when the 
phenomenological method is added to the mix. Philosopher Tom Sparrow has argued that one of 
the major pitfalls of phenomenology is its incompatibility with the senses: “Sensation … is 
unsuitable for proper phenomenological investigation. It does not present itself phenomenally as 
an object of consciousness, or as what Husserl calls an intentional object. Sensation is something 
that happens below the phenomenal level, so at best it is a mediated datum of consciousness.”29 
How, then, does sensation register in phenomenological analysis? Sparrow again: “We 
                                                
28. Debates surrounding the issue of sensation versus perception continue today, most interestingly under the rubric 
of affect studies. An instructive example is Ruth Leys’s incisive critique of Brian Massumi’s theory that affect—for 
Massumi, bodily reactions to stimuli—is autonomous, disconnected from cognitive processes. Leys holds the 
opposing position, giving an account of an integrated system in which affect is shaped (and to some extent within 
the control of) the experiencing subject. See Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 
(2011): 434-472; Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2002). 
29. Tom Sparrow, Plastic Bodies: Rebuilding Sensation after Phenomenology (London: Open Humanities Press, 
2015), 21. For a fierce critique of this book see Dan Zahavi, “The End of What? Phenomenology vs. Speculative 
Realism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 3 (2016): 289-309. 
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experience it primarily through its effects and can thereby think it on the basis of these effects. 
Perception, passion, cognition, consciousness, identity, and freedom are some of these effects. 
These are indeed accessed phenomenally, but as products of sensation.”30 Despite being “below” 
the level of consciousness, the senses are nevertheless crucial to the process of experiencing 
objects; in Sparrow’s description, the effects of the senses (among which he includes perception) 
can be registered by phenomenological analysis. We might wonder if there is a difference 
between these effects and the senses “in and of themselves” (to use the common 
phenomenological phrase). This distinction without a difference seems to suggest that the senses 
are indeed part of a phenomenological analysis; furthermore, it suggests that the 
phenomenological postulate that all experience must be conscious experience need not be as 
exclusionary as it seemed on first glance. Sparrow’s intervention reminds us of the potential for 
blind spot within this philosophical method.   
Does this mean that Schaeffer is not a phenomenologist à la lettre? Do his sound objects 
present a special case? Possibly. But as we have seen, Schaeffer’s project is based on the premise 
that the “media” of the senses are not transparent, but shape the overall listening experience in 
significant ways. He includes the senses within a broader perceptual system that ultimately leads 
to (but perhaps does not arrive at) the ever-elusive experience of experience. And this is the 
crucial point: despite his predilection for favoring the terminology of perception over sensation, 
Schaeffer’s doctrine of audile technique is aimed at neither sensation or perception in particular 
but at the listening experience in toto. In short: while the senses are by no means excluded from 
                                                
30. Sparrow, Plastic Bodies, 21. 
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Schaeffer’s theory of reduced listening, we must read between the lines to fully appreciate their 
significance.31 
While we may be slightly closer to understanding Schaeffer’s phenomenological sound 
objects, they remain hazy and distant. The overall purpose of reduced listening—listening like a 
phenomenologist—remains vague, intentionally so on Schaeffer’s part. But here he gives us a 
hint in the most general terms: “The fact remains that the decision to listen to a sound object with 
no other intention than to hear better, and more, every time we listen is more easily said that 
done.”32 To hear “better” and “more.” Better in what way? More what? This statement hardly 
clarifies matters. The phenomenologist’s answer might be: to better hear the sound object in and 
of itself. But of course, in reality, this is impossible—the reduction is never total. As 
phenomenology teaches, human beings cannot experience transcendental objects without being 
… well … human. We cannot escape the fundamental conditions of our being, however we 
choose to define them. 
Unheard Histories, Unseen Sounds  
The stripping away of knowledge and associative thinking—meaning, to be summary—that 
reduced listening demands has raised the hackles of Schaeffer expert Brian Kane. In Sound 
Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice, Kane walks through a potentially 
                                                
31. A healthy amount of scholarship on Schaeffer’s relationship with phenomenology has been produced without 
any trouble from this potential impasse. See Brian Kane, “L’Objet sonore maintenant: Pierre Schaeffer, Sound 
Objects and the Phenomenological Reduction,” Organised Sound 12, no. 1 (2007): 15-24; Francisco Rivas, “What a 
Sound Object Is: Phenomenology of Sound in Pierre Schaeffer,” paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Pierre Schaeffer (mediArt, Rijeka, 2011); and Mitchell Herrmann, “Unsound 
Phenomenologies: Harrison, Schaeffer and the Sound Object,” Organised Sound 30, no. 3 (2015): 300-307. 
32. Schaeffer, TMO, 212. 
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devastating critique: the rejection of Schaeffer’s “ahistorical” explanation of reduced listening, 
combined with Schaeffer’s corresponding omission of the historical lineage between reduced 
listening and the Romantics’ concept of absolute music.33 Kane believes that acousmatic34 
listening should be understood as a cultural practice with a history, one that he partially supplies. 
A relatively recent part of that history, Kane claims, involves the very culture Schaeffer 
explicitly attempts to avoid; the Romantics and their conception of absolute music—in many 
ways, the ne plus ultra of the history of Western Art Music. Kane’s critique deserves 
consideration for many reasons: because of the notorious reputation of absolute music (more on 
this in a moment); because it raises questions concerning inconsistencies between Schaeffer’s 
theory and practice; and because it is indicative of a broader, humanities-wide phobia of all 
things metaphysical. 
The tradition within which Schaeffer situates himself begins and ends with a solitary 
figure, one whose theoretical work is often considered foundational to the Western Art Music 
tradition in general and the history of absolute music more specifically: our old friend, 
Pythagoras of Samos.35 Possibly with intentional irony, Schaeffer associates himself with a 
figure whose mathematical theories serve as a point of origin for the entire unfolding of the 
history of Western Art Music but (and here’s the twist) with an aspect of Pythagoras’s work that 
is more practical than theoretical and that is not even directly concerned with music in an 
                                                
33. Brian Kane, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 37-41. 
34. As Kane acknowledges, acousmatic listening is not exactly reduced listening by another name, but in the present 
context the difference is negligible enough. 
35. Susan McClary memorably invokes Pythagoras’s name as a metonym for mathematical, abstract, or theoretical 
thought about music and as an antonym to the historical method. See Susan McClary, “The Blasphemy of Talking 
Politics During Bach Year,” in Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception, ed. 
Richard Leppert and Susan McClary (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 13-62. 
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obvious sense. Schaeffer’s origin myth revolves around Pythagoras’s habit of lecturing from 
behind a curtain, in order to be heard but not seen, thus encouraging his audience to focus 
without distraction on his words. Thus, Schaeffer’s loudspeakers fulfil an ancient purpose first 
explored in ancient Greece: the apparent splitting of sound and its source, an essential condition 
for reduced listening. 
This history of reduced listening proposed by Schaeffer is “mythical,” Kane claims, 
which is his polite way of saying that it is not historical at all. Here is Kane with the gist of the 
“ahistorical” narrative: “Modern audio technology does not create acousmatic experience; rather, 
acousmatic experience, first discovered in the Pythagorean context, creates the conditions for 
modern audio technology. Radio, records, the telephone, and the tape recorder exist within the 
horizon first opened by the Pythagorean veil.”36 Appealing in its simplicity, this is an inadequate 
historical explanation for either the invention of twentieth-century sound technologies or 
Schaeffer’s doctrine of audile technique. Having said that, perhaps Kane asks for too much, 
expecting Schaeffer to provide an accurate and detailed historical account of his work while, 
simultaneously, doing that work. I am unsure why Schaeffer would (or should) have concerned 
himself with such a task. 
Kane rejects Schaeffer’s myth-making in favor of an historical account that draws out 
similarities between reduced listening and nineteenth-century listening practices surrounding 
absolute music. Kane’s cast of nineteenth-century proto-Schaefferians includes Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, and Richard Wagner, all of whom had much to 
say about the cultivation of good listening habits. Schopenhauer, for example, wrote of  
                                                
36. Kane, Sound Unseen, 4-5. 
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the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception, 
to remove from the service of the will the knowledge which originally existed 
only for this service … the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, 
our willing, and our aim … in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye 
of the world.37  
Schopenhauer, again: 
The state required for pure objectivity of perception has in part permanent 
conditions in the perfection of the brain and of the physiological quality generally 
favorable to its activity; in part temporary conditions, in so far as this state is 
favored by everything that increases the attention and enhances the susceptibility 
of the cerebral nervous system, yet without the excitation of any passion.38  
Finally, here is Schopenhauer’s practical advice on how to attain the desired “state” for 
listening to absolute music: “a peaceful night’s sleep, a cold bath, and everything that furnishes 
brain-activity with an unforced ascendency by a calming down of the blood circulation and of 
the passionate nature.”39 
Kane’s alternative history of acousmatic listening is intriguing, and the parallels between 
his nineteenth-century sources and Schaeffer’s writing are obvious enough. But not only does 
Kane situate Schaeffer’s phenomenological listening within a broader cultural history of 
practices of listening where modifications to listeners are deemed necessary, he simultaneously 
offers an “alternative” history of nineteenth-century listening practices. Rather than retelling the 
same-old story about absolute music’s pretentions toward transcendence, universalism, 
abstraction, and purity (as the story goes) Kane’s history emphasizes the embodied nature of 
Romantic aesthetic experience, focusing on practical techniques and physical and mental 
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exercises designed to condition a listener before the act of listening, an act often characterized as 
will-less—disembodied, even—aesthetic contemplation.40  
This revised history of nineteenth-century musical reception, by no means unique to 
Kane, is certainly welcome; with its inclusion, however, Kane paints himself into corner as far as 
his broader critique is concerned. His focus on the bodily preparations encouraged by the 
Romantics lessens Schaeffer’s guilt by association: the Frenchman is no longer the inheritor of 
an abstract, disembodied, idealistic, and transcendent conception of music while, at the same 
time, absolute music is depicted as a just one more cultural practice. 
The “nothing” that absolute music is is rarely as resistant to meaning as it is often 
presumed. In fact, that “nothing” is not nothing at all, but it is transcendent. There is a rich 
vocabulary for addressing the ineffability of music. Remember, for example, ETA Hoffman’s 
pyrotechnic imagination in his review of Beethoven’s fifth symphony, where the composer “... 
opens up to us also the realm of the monstrous and the immeasurable. Burning flashes of light 
shoot through the deep night of this realm, and we become aware of giant shadows that surge 
back and forth, driving us into narrower and narrower confines until they destroy us.”41 This is 
hardly language devoid of meaning. The problem, it seems, is quite the opposite: music is too 
meaningful. But it is, of course, transcendent—and this is another of those connected terms that 
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is often accompanied with red flags. Hoffman famously asserted that music is the most Romantic 
of the arts; its “sole subject is the infinite.”42 
Kane’s double revision is informed by a broader intellectual concern prevalent in 
contemporary musicology and the humanities more generally, but this concern has sunk in so 
deep that it is rarely articulated fully—namely, a distrust of all things metaphysical, including 
terms associated with aesthetics. Opposition to these ideas can found in many places: Richard 
Taruskin’s long-form diatribe against German Idealism is a good place to start, not to go into any 
depth on the countless humanities sub disciplines styled as novel “turns” away from the tired old 
grand narratives of modernity and, very often, towards studies of material culture.43  
For Kane, aesthetics is a dirty word; it is the antithesis of history; it is history’s nemesis.44 
Aesthetics—writ large—traffics in exactly the kind of “empty” forms that Schaeffer’s reduced 
listening seeks to reveal, and that’s a big problem. Kane defines Schaefferian reduced listening 
as  
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a way of attending aesthetically to sounds as such, apart from their worldly 
causes. The purpose of the acousmatic experience in the Schaefferian tradition is 
… to draw attention away from the source of the sound … and onto its intrinsic 
audible properties. The source of the sound is severed from its audible effects, so 
that the latter can be studied separately, placed into morphological categories or 
systematically integrated into musical compositions. The separation of the senses 
[that reduced listening is said to produce] is purposive, a way of discarding the 
sonic source in order to orient attention toward aesthetically appreciated sonic 
effects alone.45  
The vocabulary surrounding aesthetics here—“as such”; “intrinsic properties”; “sonic effects 
alone,” etc.—denigrates the “aesthetic orientation” (Kane’s phrase) for its denial of the historical 
circumstances within which the entire conceptual apparatus of aesthetic theory was cultivated. 
The antidote to this historical blindness is Kane’s preferred method, his history of acousmatic 
sound as a cultural practice. 
 While thought provoking, I would argue that Kane’s aesthetics/cultural history binary is 
built on an unstable foundation. He seems to confuse arguing for a suitable scholarly method 
(“orientation”) with arguments against Schaeffer’s ideas as a historical actor. Surely the target of 
Kane’s ire—if ire there must be—should be scholars of Schaeffer’s work, not Schaeffer himself 
(who, don’t forget, is long dead). Read in this light, Kane’s insistence to raise red flags wherever 
aesthetics comes up, is itself anti-historical; it is an attempt to change the conversation when the 
initial conversation has barely begun. To be clear: I am not suggesting that critical engagement 
with Schaeffer’s ideas should be off limits, far from it. It is precisely because critical 
engagement with Schaeffer’s ideas is important that we must be attentive to the content of 
Schaeffer’s work as it presents itself to us; we should not misdirect the historical record just 
because those themes happen to be unfashionable within the academic community. How 
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Schaeffer adopted and translated aesthetic theory for his own ends deserves close attention, 
especially from the cultural historian. As we have already seen, Schaeffer’s “aesthetic 
orientation” (if indeed his has that), is routed in the presence of the human subject, it not only 
acknowledges the subject-specific. 
Deconditioning and Reconditioning 
What kind of instruction and call to action to prospective listeners does Schaeffer offer? To 
answer this question we must look to places in the TMO where Schaeffer proposes techniques 
and exercises designed to enculturate reduced listening. Chapter 28 of the TMO, titled “Musical 
Experience,” sees Schaeffer disclose what he means by “deconditioning” and “reconditioning.” I 
should acknowledge at the outset that the passages concerning deconditioning and reconditioning 
are not directed towards a public in general; rather, the exercises are targeted at his colleagues—
his fellow experimental travelers who carry out research into sound. Nevertheless, at certain 
moments, Schaeffer intimates his desire to address an audience outside of this elite minority; 
these moments of slippage reveal the grandiosity of Schaeffer’s overall mission: the 
establishment of a new musical culture based on a new kind of listening that targets sound 
objects instead of meaning.  
Moving between these two audiences—the one highly specialized, technically up-to-
speed, and even ideologically aligned with Schaeffer; the other, a dream of a future global 
public, whose commitment to reduced listening would, quite miraculously, mirror Schaeffer’s—
indicates the provisional, utopian nature of Schaeffer’s doctrine, the trademark avant-gardist 
promesse de bonheur, the deferment of acceptance in the present to the future. It is in this spirit 
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that Schaeffer’s proposal to decondition and recondition his colleagues should be understood; as 
just a first step in the establishment of a new culture at large:  
Until now our engineers have been lone men or men with a single technique or 
from a single culture. This is why their progress, focusing on establishing a new 
musical society, demands an initial dialogue to prepare for that society, the 
importance of which goes far beyond simple experimentation on perceptions: the 
promise of a language depends on this discipline.46  
If we take Schaeffer seriously—and why shouldn’t we?—then the following interpretation would 
be by no means an exaggeration: here is a call, from an individual presiding over the media 
apparatus of the French state to establish a new society through "experimentation on [the] 
perceptions" of the imagined members of that society. This is no mere “theory”; it is a manifesto, 
a roadmap for social engineering through sound engineering. His intentions, in as much as we 
might be able to discern them, may well have been benign, but this is beside the point: the most 
rudimentary understanding of human cultures tells us that such a project is doomed from the start 
because, of course, culture is socially negotiated, is emergent, and cannot be invented ex nihilio 
by an individual alone without dire consequences. We have a shorthand for imposed cultures that 
fail to recognize the other; without the “you” (or, if you will allow, the “your”) culture takes on a 
much darker meaning: cult.  
There is, indeed, something pernicious in the language employed by Schaeffer; especially 
the terms “deconditioning” and “reconditioning,” and also the use of “discipline” found in the 
above quotation of Schaeffer. At the same time, however, the specifics of the processes of re- 
and deconditioning amount to a practical description of the phenomenological epoché, of the 
practice of reduced listening. Under the title of Reconditioning Exercises, Schaeffer writes:  
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New researchers, who in an introductory session are invited to undergo a 
deconditioning process before entering a new society, will be asked to describe 
the sounds they hear in terms of their temporal evolution, if they lend themselves 
to this, or by comparison with neighboring sounds ... this simple experiment will 
have demonstrated that there is a lot to be said about sounds and that everyone 
hears them with quite remarkable accuracy, though no one has an adequate 
vocabulary to describe them.47  
Establishing an adequate vocabulary will be a social enterprise, something that will emerge from 
a process of group verification. Schaeffer suggests the terms grain, allure or thickness—all 
concerned with matters of timbre—as potential contenders for entry into his new lexicon. In 
order for such terms to gain purchase, Schaeffer’s listeners must all agree to listen specifically 
for certain qualities of to establish common ground. 
Establishing a mutual vocabulary is, at least at first, the job of Schaeffer’s team of 
researchers and experimenters. Under the heading of Reconditioning Exercises, Schaeffer 
describes the “beginnings of a convention positing an additional form of communication, in 
which hearing yields, or almost yields, to understanding. A metalanguage must now precede, 
clarify, and comment on the language being tried out; in simpler terms, participants must define 
their common listening intention.”48 According to this passage, it could be argued that 
Schaeffer’s doctrine of conditioning is explicitly aimed only at his colleagues, but even if we 
grant that conceit, and even if eventual listeners of the new society do not themselves perform 
these exercises, at the very least they would be required to listen for the qualities established, by 
the professionals, during the reconditioning process. In this sense, Schaeffer seems to propose a 
listening practice that requires not only sound objects—sound recordings on whatever media; 
LP, tape, CD, MP3, etc.—but a rubric derived from the metalanguage, a “key” to the discovery 
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of sound objects. Establishing a metalanguage that would allow people to communicate their 
“listening intention,” does not seem too far away from that alluring and elusive “composerly 
intention”; Schaeffer’s sound objects might not have as much to do with absolute music after all; 
it is program music; in the same sense that a “lullabies” are “about’ sleep, or a “nocturne” is 
about “nighttime”, or a dance suite is about dancing, Schaeffer’s sound objects, according to his 
suggestions could be about grain, about allure, about thickness.   
Schaeffer outlines his research agenda: “If our activities take the form of research, it is 
because they have a group discipline and reject individual whim. But we must not forget their 
ultimate aim: to lead to possible musics. At base, it amounts to a new awareness and a 
deconditioning process with a view to creating something.” Here we see Schaeffer articulating 
both a rejection of the omnipotent composer (and their intentions) in favor of collaboration and 
an endorsement of that other mainstay of modernism: to seek out the new--perhaps it's time, 
however, to decouple the notion of novelty and the modernists; experience by its very nature is 
"new" every time. There is little difference between novelty and difference. 
Schaeffer sees the process of “group verification” as way to avoid solipsism, and to 
ensure that creative efforts will be palatable to its audience. "Even for the most reclusive 
composer [or] the most retiring writer or painter," he writes, "the work has no meaning unless it 
is communicated." Communication is the end for even those modernists who "appear indifferent 
to success or failure ... whether he has in mind a contemporary audience or ideal interlocutors in 
a culture or a time that is still to come." Group "verification" or collaboration was even more 
crucial for Schaeffer's experiments because of the new demands that his material made of its 
audience!49 With the value he places on communication, Schaeffer's characterization of "group 
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verification" reveals more than it may seem initially. Is the only audience Schaeffer intends to 
communicate with made up of his colleagues? It is more likely that his reliance on group 
verification is required precisely because he wishes to communicate with a broader audience. 
This search for an audience made up of the common man on the previous page, where he 
explicitly addresses the “fundamental social dimension of music,” writing that “man cannot do 
without others, [but] not to help him, not as guinea pigs, which would not be enough, but as an 
essential interlocutor, a generator of experience.” He rounds this out, writing that “faced with a 
collection of sounds, I may inspire my thinking, enrich my analysis with them; but nothing 
proves to me that this analysis is the same as other people’s, that I am not dreaming.”50 
Sensible Aesthetics 
A re-evaluation of aesthetics has been proposed by Jacques Rancière in The Politics of 
Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible.51 To put it simply, Rancière suggests that there is no 
contradiction between politics and aesthetics; most pertinently, his historical periodization 
(“regimes,” as he calls them) are described as representing different configurations (or 
“distributions”) of the senses (or the “sensible”) themselves. Rancière conceives the distribution 
of the sensible as “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously 
discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective 
parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the 
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same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts.”52 In this formulation is an 
important reminder: while experience itself may be universal, there are certain kinds of 
experiences from which particular groups of people are excluded. Schaeffer’s new culture was 
imagined on a global scale, but with the basis of that culture rooted in a metalanguage concocted 
by a select few experimenters with access to expensive equipment, it is not difficult to imagine 
Schaeffer’s doctrine falling on deaf ears.  
Like so many theorists, Rancière divides his history into three parts, three dominant 
distributions of the sensible: The Ethical Regime of Images, the Poetic/Representative Regime, 
and the Aesthetic Regime. Each of these corresponds to a well-established epoch in the history of 
modernity. For the first, Rancière has in mind the spread of Christianity and the of the church. 
“In this regime,” he writes, “it is a matter of knowing in what way images’ mode of being affects 
the ethos, the mode of being of individuals and communities. This question prevents ‘art’ from 
individualizing itself as such.”53 I think this regime refers to the idea of understanding images as 
being manifestations of the divine, as in some sense touching the very things that (we would say) 
they represent. Understanding images in this way would rely on a certain ideological context, a 
distribution of the sensible where such an interpretation is not an interpretation at all, but an 
obvious fact of reality—a fact felt rather than understood, a fact sensed with/through/by the 
senses, which are in this instance defined, delimited, distributed by the church. While Rancière’s 
example mentions images, broadly speaking the ethical regime could equally apply to music, 
especially that of the medieval period.54  
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The second regime—the poetic/representative—relates to a distribution of the sensible 
that concerns “fine art.” During this regime, there developed “forms of normativity that define 
the conditions according to which imitations can be recognized as exclusively belonging to an art 
and assessed, within this framework, as good or bad, adequate or inadequate.”55 Because art 
drew “partitions between the representable and the unpresentable,” this regime does not produce 
art for art’s sake, which has most often been portrayed as a portal to an unknown transcendent 
world.  This regime makes a 
distinction between genres according to what is represented; principles for 
adapting forms of expression to genres and thus to the subject matter represented; 
the distribution of resemblances according to principles of verisimilitude, 
appropriateness, or correspondence; criteria for distinguishing between and 
comparing the arts; etc.56  
Again, at risk of oversimplification, this regime can be considered in relation to music, in this 
case we are dealing with that troublesome watershed moment concerning musical “works,” one 
that Lydia Goehr offers the date of “around 1800.”57 
Next comes the aesthetic regime, with which we can certainly identify musical works as 
well as absolute music, and which can most productively help rethink the history of aesthetics in 
terms of the senses rather than solely in terms of vague notions of aesthetic perfection achieved 
in the transcendent realm and accessed through mute abstraction. “I call this regime aesthetic,” 
writes Rancière, “because the identification of art no longer occurs via a division within ways of 
doing and making, but it is based on distinguishing a sensible mode of being specific to artistic 
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products.”58 More specifically, again in Rancière’s words, “aesthetics means, insofar as it is a 
regime of the functioning of art and a matrix of discourse, a form for identifying the specificity 
of art and a redistribution of the relations between the forms of sensory experience.”59 This 
(re)distribution of the sensible that the aesthetic regime enforces is also “a ‘politics’ of art 
…[that] consists in suspending the normal coordinates of sensory experience.”60 
In a way, Rancière’s most important point for our purposes could be aligned with Kane’s 
alternative history of nineteenth-century listening practices: artistic cultures that revolve around 
notions of the aesthetic have always been informed by sensory experience, have always involved 
mediation by individual bodies at particular moments in time and in particular spaces. Aesthetic 
experience is also sensory experience, or at the very least it involves the senses. Thus, Rancière’s 
assertion that “aesthetics and politics” (politics here, can serve as a proxy for historical; meaning, 
for our purposes, of this world) are not separate. For Rancière, Schaeffer would be the 
aesthetician par excellence, not because of his signaling towards the transcendent (although 
there’s plenty of that) but because his life’s work was to investigate ways to enact the suspension 
of “the normal coordinates of sensory experience.” Once more, the historiographical take-way is 
to identify a deep continuity between Schaeffer and practitioners of the nineteenth century. With 
the benefit of Rancière, however, both Schaeffer and his Romantic descendants work is cast 
specifically in terms of the senses, as part of the cultivation of experiences that demand their own 
kind of sensory response. 
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At this point, I could write: Schaeffer is a romantic; or, Rancière is a romantic, and be 
done with it. This is especially tempting because Rancière equips the aesthetic regime with the 
ability to negate itself, much like classic interpretations of the avant-garde: it channels disruptive 
forces, turning the current order on its head. Because it challenges “normal” everyday sense 
perception, it is adaptive and can renews itself; this is why Rancière could be called Romantic—
his history implies that today’s distribution of the sensible, the horizons of sensory experience, 
can be subsumed under the rubric of the aesthetic regime. The logic here echoes, probably 
intentionally, that found in debates about the ends of modernity and the idea of the postmodern. 
That which is modern, so the story goes, has the capacity to renew itself; thus postmodernity is 
just another stage in the history of modernity—to account for this, some like to refer to “late” 
capitalism.61 Squabbles between modernists and postmodernists seem to have waned, by this 
point, but I raise the topic to point towards the difficulty of discussing moments of rupture 
throughout history. 
In relation to Schaeffer, the question becomes: does his reduced listening impose a 
distribution of the sensible different to the aesthetic regime? (And, I would suppose, if “yes,” 
shall we lump him in the “postmodern” category?). There is, I would argue, little doubt that 
Schaeffer’s work represents a significant departure from music that preceded him, most 
concretely in his (eventual, but not immediate) disposal of traditional notation in favor of sounds 
recorded onto tape. And, yes, there is also little doubt that Schaeffer’s work inherits a great deal 
from his predecessors—not only from Pythagoras and the Romantics, but also from pre-war 
twentieth century modernists, as well as members of a group he is loosely associated with: the 
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postwar avant-garde. Because of both these similarities and differences, I hesitate to offer a 
definitive answer to the question just posed; I see no reason to pick a side. The most important 
point here is that, if Schaeffer’s reduced listening is a technologically mediated type of listening 
dependent on the aesthetic orientation, then we needn’t demonize that orientation because of 
widely circulating and deeply suspect preconceived ideas of the aesthetic; instead, we can 
consider the particulars of his proposal as offering an alternative distribution of the sensible, 
which is to say an alternative horizon for sensory experience. 
Listening as Spiritual Exercise 
A different argument against the Romantic Connection is to challenge the supposition that the 
“transcendental” is the exclusive property of the Romantics (and their legacy movements). It is a 
tricky line of questioning because it seems to suggest a universal notion of the transcendental 
that operates across time and space, culture and tradition. How could the transcendental operate 
without the discourse that proliferated during the nineteenth century? To answer that question, 
we would have to deny (or at least diminish the potency of) much of the cultural theory that this 
dissertation is, in large part, informed by. To speak of the transcendental outside of the context of 
the Romantics would be to question the deep-seated orthodox position we all share that the 
transcendental is itself a construction of discourses, practices, and materials—the holy trinity of 
current humanities-speak. Why would we even entertain such foolishness? 
One reason might be to reject the equally totalizing claim that everything can be 
explained by our trusty toolkit, that nothing lies beyond the triumvirate of Mr. Discourse, Mrs. 
Practice, and Dr. material. I went into detail on this issue in the introduction to this dissertation, 
where I discussed the difficulties of writing about experience. To explain away the 
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transcendental—which, in its most basic sense, is a placeholder for that which lies outside of the 
very limits of human knowledge—with the same methods we employ to represent, describe, and 
explain all that is knowable, seems to me to miss the point, and not by a slight margin. In some 
ways, whether one’s imagination is stimulated by the unknown might boil down to 
temperamental disposition; but I would argue there is an embarrassment of evidence, that we 
could draw from different cultures, that suggests the Romantics were not the first, nor the last, to 
contemplate the deep mysteries of the universe. The Romantics certainly had a rich vocabulary 
to discuss the transcendental, but they too have a history. Explanations are always partial, and we 
cannot assume to explain away phenomena completely. Dispensing with the safety valve of the 
unknown is, I believe, a mistake for scholars in the humanities, but even more so for those of us 
who study music. In an important way, then, Schaeffer’s doctrine is transcendental not only in a 
phenomenological sense, and not only in a Romantic sense; it is, ultimately, an exploration into 
the unknown. 
There is, in other words, a spiritual dimension to transcendentalism that only the 
staunchest atheist-materialist would be unable to comprehend. Countless human societies—
including our own—have developed highly sophisticated stories about the mysteries of the 
universe. Does this mean that I must make a universal claim? I don’t think so: let’s just say, to be 
safe, that the Romantics’ transcendental realm has its parallels in many other cultural contexts, 
even if other cultural contexts exist in which there is absolutely no feel for the spiritual. 
Schaeffer himself was no stranger to spirituality. Recall the televised discussion between 
him and Marshall McLuhan. There is a moment where Schaeffer chides McLuhan, suggesting 
that they both share a sense of mysticism because they are both Catholics—McLuhan rejects idea 
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immediately. But Schaeffer was serious, and he uses spiritual language as frequently as he uses 
scientific terminology. Take, for instance, this passage translated by John Dack: 
The miracle of musique concrète [...] is that during experiments things begin to 
talk by themselves, as if they were bringing us messages from a world unknown 
to us. If I gather together fragments of noises, cries of animals, the modulated 
sound of machines, I myself also strive to articulate them like words of a language 
that I would practise without even understanding and without ever having learned 
it: I am deciphering hieroglyphics. Does the difficulty of this conversation arise 
from the fact that the person with whom I am speaking does not have the same 
faith as me in the secret correspondence between man and the world of which 
music is one of the keys? So this is what art is: a translation whose exactness is 
periodically monitored by experiment; establishing by groping around, rigorous 
correspondences between man and the world, the two universes similar in every 
respect, separated only by the surface of our skin.62 
This passage captures something fundamental about Schaeffer’s enterprise: it points to the close 
relationship between mysticism and technology, one that is by no means exclusive to Schaeffer. 
 As the TMO winds down, Schaeffer throws up the subheading Spiritual Techniques, 
under which he describes the mysticism of his endeavors: “If it [for our purposes, the unknown] 
can direct us from behind and beneath, from below and above, it is because it is forever hidden 
from our overt investigations, which are perfectly inadequate in any case. The condition of this 
power is to be above knowledge. The expression of this power is music.”63 If Schaeffer’s project 
is, at heart, spiritually inclined, then his reduced listening could be thought as a kind of spiritual 
exercise. It is no surprise that, like Schaeffer’s doctrine, phenomenology itself has frequently 
been attacked for its penchant for the mystical, despite the technical, scientific language it puts to 
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use. In many ways, Kane’s critique of Schaeffer’s transcendental attitude is also a critique of his 
spirituality—and it is here that I believe I am most at odds with Kane. 
 It is useful to consider Schaeffer’s mystic attitude in its broader historical context. 
Not only was Schaeffer a prolific writer, but he was a seasoned speaker on the academic 
conference circuit. In 1967, in Paris, Schaeffer gave a paper, titled “On the Deconditioning of the 
Ear,” at a conference organized by the Centre d’études et de recherches.64 The conference had a 
broad theme—Man and Knowledge—and had speakers from a diverse array of disciplines. 
Among the other papers given at the conference were such gems as: “Yoga without postures”; 
“Towards a Spiritual Atheism”; and “The Ocean of Clouds in Spiritual Ascension.”65 Years later, 
in 1983, Schaeffer delivered another paper—“The Three Levels of Listening: Sound, Music, and 
Meaning”—at the Congrès mondial de musicothérapie, organized by the French Association of 
Music Therapy.66 This is an intriguing context for Schaeffer’s work. Even more intriguing is one 
of the after-hours activities arranged for attendees of the conference: an excursion to the Centre 
Tomatis. Unfortunately, I have not been able to verify whether Schaeffer tagged along, but this is 
an important connection nevertheless. (Schaeffer and Tomatis were both in attendance at an 
earlier conference, in 1953, but that time the subject matter was more firmly scientific).67 Here 
                                                
64 Pierre Schaeffer, “Sur le déconditionnement de l’oreille,” paper presented at “L’homme et la connaissance,” 
Centre d’études et de recherches, meetings held on various dates between September and December, 1967. 
65. Philippe de Miric, “Yoga sans postures”; Pierre Lance, “Vers un spiritualisme athée”; and Hamza Boubakeur, 
“L’océan des nuages, dans l’ascension spirituelle,” papers presented at “L’homme et la connaissance.”  
66. Pierre Schaeffer, “Les trois niveaux de l’écoute: le sonore, le musical et le sens,” paper presented at the 
“Congrès mondial de musicothérapie, Association Francaise de Musicothérapie, 4-8 July, 1983. 
67. Pierre Schaeffer, “La voix comme matériau musicale,” paper presented at the Cours International de Phonologie 
et de Phoniatrie, Faculté de Médecine de Paris, March 6 1953; Alfred Tomatis, “La correction de la voix chantée,” 
paper presented at the Cours International de Phonologie et de Phoniatrie, Faculté de Médecine de Paris, March 6 
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we see how Schaeffer’s work intersected not only with broad spiritual concerns, but also with 
practitioners of music therapy.  
We can situate this spiritual dimension within the postwar context more precisely. 
Although writing predominantly about American music, Richard Taruskin ends his history of 
Western Art Music noting a turn towards the spiritual; importantly, his focus is specifically on 
the listeners of music. The “spiritual,” enjoyed in many forms today and often portrayed in sharp 
relief to “rational,” Western and “modern” modes of being, is inculcated in the discourses of 
postmodernism, multiculturalism and the left more generally. The spiritual quest to “find 
oneself”—through alternative medicine, new-age therapy, yoga, to say nothing of the adoption of 
many variants of religious traditions, especially the non-Western—is exactly the agenda of what 
Taruskin, after David Brooks, and under the subtitle of “The New Spirituality,”  calls the “Bobo” 
generation that Taruskin adumbrates Taruskin writes that the “Bobo” audience’s “essential 
dilemma is that of reconciling the need for spirituality with the even more pressing need for 
personal autonomy and unlimited choice, since ‘real’ religion imposes obligations and demands 
sacrifices.”68  Taruskin sees this contemporary spiritual need reflected in the music of Pärt, 
Górecki and Tavener: music that is, despite elite music’s waning popularity, in great demand 
today (relatively speaking). But perhaps this “spiritual” listening has pervaded “elite” music 
more generally (or, more probable, has always been there); the need today for “purifying 
experiences,” as Taruskin puts it, can surely be satisfied beyond the realm of the strictly sacred. 
But just like the Romantics, the New Age ethos that gathered apace during the 1960s is 
no point of origin. Schaeffer’s proclivity for mysticism precedes the explosion of the New Age 
more generally, although he was certainly touched by it. Schaeffer had an intriguing relationship 
                                                
68. See Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, vol. 5, 526. 
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with the George Gurdjieff, the Russian mystic guru. In an excruciatingly short account of 
Schaeffer’s meetings with the spiritual leader during the Second World War, Évelyne Gayou 
describes Gurdjieff as a formative influence on Schaeffer, and lists the intriguing company that 
Schaeffer would keep at Gurdjieff’s meetings. On the mystic himself, she writes:  
Gurdjieff is a guru who organizes a course of his spiritual ideas, based on artistic 
gestural practices and music close to the rituals of the Turkish whirling dervishes, 
but also yoga to help the followers to liberate themselves and awaken themselves 
to things and the world of matter … He recommends a daily practice of 
“movements,” a kind of gymnastics for the body and mind in which the 
practitioner must seek a form of self-surrender, a kind of humility.69 
Schaeffer’s reduced listening, just like Gurdjieff’s movements,  requires this self-
surrender. Schaeffer’s work can be considered in terms of spiritual exercises—through a non-
denominational spirituality, the entrainment (or disciplining) of the mind and the body, and the 
practice of self-reflection and cultivation of self-control. Here’s Schaeffer once more, 
proselytizing his message:  
If we vigorously push all that [all kinds of meaning] aside—and what diligence, 
what repeated exercises, what patience, and what new rigor we will need!—could 
we, by freeing ourselves from the ordinary, “throwing out the natural” as well as 
the cultural, find an authentic sound object, the offspring of the epoché, that, if 
possible, would be accessible to every listener?70  
What emerges from Schaefer’s descriptions is not so much a rigorous philosophical method 
pertaining towards an albeit limited and qualified objectivity, but a set of instructions that 
                                                
69. “Gurdjieff est un gourou qui organise un enseignement de ses idées spirituelles, fondé sur des pratiques 
artistiques gestuelles et musicales assez proches des rituels des derviches tourneurs turcs, mais aussi du yoga, pour 
aider les adeptes à se libérer d’eux-mêmes et s’éveiller aux choses et au monde de la matière … Il préconise une 
pratique quotidienne des “mouvements”, sorte de gymnastique du corps et de l’esprit au cours de laquelle le 
pratiquant doit rechercher une forme d’abandon de soi, une forme d’humilité.” Évelyne Gayou, Le GRM, Groupe de 
recherches musicales: cinquante ans d'histoire (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 19. 
70. Schaeffer, TMO, 214. 
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resembles meditation practices—which today are ubiquitous but might still be associated with 
one form or another of non-Western thought. Schaeffer’s doctrine can be explained in multiple 
ways, as relating to different schools of thought: phenomenology and a broader sense of 
spirituality. Beneath Schaeffer’s explicit methodology lurks a desire for purification. 
Conclusion 
If Schaeffer’s reduced listening, as a phenomenological and/or spiritual exercise, purports to 
reveal the inner workings of sense perception, if it reimagines the horizon of what is perceptible, 
it does so vaguely, at least in theory. But we must not ignore that the Schaefferian reduction does 
not stop at the senses but is supposed to continue the reduction until the sensing subject no 
longer exists; the reduction is supposed to reveal the transcendental sound object in all its glory. 
Or just about. The phenomenological method sets absolute reduction as its goal but it also 
concedes—and it is a major concession—that it can never achieve this goal in reality. 
Nevertheless, this total reduction—or, this self-sacrifice—is worth considering; what does the 
ultimate purpose of reduced listening look like? In a way, Schaeffer’s doctrine requires a subject 
to erase the self to the point that there is no longer any self there listening at all. Thus reduced 
listening is literally that: it reduces listening itself. And this is where the Romantic Connection 
makes sense: Schaeffer’s is not s scientific experiment with the senses but an attempt to eradicate 






Post-Mortem on Caruso: Alfred Tomatis Listens to Caruso Listening to Himself 
Towards the end of her husband’s biography, Dorothy Caruso remembers hearing the inevitable 
for the first time following Enrico’s death: 
I knew that one day I would have to hear his voice again on a record. The thought 
that it might come from a strange house, through an open window, was 
unbearable—I could prepare myself for this anguish only by first facing it here, 
and alone. One afternoon I sent all the servants out of the villa and went to the 
music room. I chose one of the gayest of his songs, “Luna d’estate,” and put it on 
the Victrola. Once again his voice was in the room, but I sat listening almost 
without recognition, my heart locked in ice, until I saw Gloria stumbling through 
the doorway, holding out her arms and calling, “Daddy! Daddy!”1 
Mrs. Caruso closes her account imagining words from beyond the grave: “This book has been 
finished on his birthday—he would be seventy-one today. I have been sitting by the radio, 
listening to his voice singing gloriously on a memorial program. He would have liked this 
tribute. He would have said, ‘So kind of them to remember, after so long.’”2 
These vignettes reproduce two well-travelled Caruso tropes. The first is the theme of 
immortality, which in Caruso’s case is often invoked in a more literal sense than the usual idea of 
the Great Artist living on through their work. Many have lauded Caruso’s recordings for 
containing an uncanny presence, as if they have preserved a trace of the singer’s vital energies—
a trace of life itself. Part of the mystique surely emanates from a sense of astonishment at the 
mere possibility of sound reproduction, a technology still in its infancy as Caruso’s recordings 
                                                
1. Dorothy Caruso, Enrico Caruso: His Life and Death (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 277. 
2. Dorothy Caruso, Enrico Caruso, 283. 
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went viral, but even when compared to other singers’ records, Caruso’s are held aloft for their 
death-defying magic.3 The second trope is the image and idea of Caruso listening to himself. 
Figure 2.1, a photograph showing a “listening” Caruso, theatrically illustrates the novel 
opportunity that the phonograph provided for self-reflection and self-appraisal. And here, in a 
1917 issue of New Victor Records, an anonymous reviewer recounts watching Caruso listen to 
himself: 
To watch Caruso’s face, as he listens for the first time to a new Victor record of 
his voice … [one witnesses] the case of Caruso listening to Caruso, and Caruso 
exacts infinitely more from Caruso than will any or all of the millions who will 
hear that record … With the opening notes he moved quickly to the piano and 
struck a chord. The least bit of a nod of his head showed that he found the pitch 
correct, and then slowly paced the floor, lips moving slightly, as he followed the 
record tone by tone. Eyebrows, the quick Caruso smile and eloquent shoulders, 
passed judgment of every word, every phrase, every slight nuance. Once, listening 
to a high note sung pianissimo, he even made a gleeful “face,” for Caruso the boy 
is never far away from Caruso the artist.4 
Perhaps the first performer whose recording career eclipsed his live performances, 
Caruso had an enduring and complicated relationship with the phonograph. He famously called it 
“the machine,” but he himself would also receive that moniker as his voice mimicked the quality, 
accuracy, and unrelenting stamina of the phonograph. The intimate knowledge he possessed of 
                                                
3. For example, Claudia Cassidy in the Chicago Tribune writes that “Caruso is as urgent in communication as if he 
had closed the door of a room, not of life”; and, in a review of Caruso’s Faust, she writes of “another treasury of 
immortal performances” and that “the other voices [those of other singers under consideration] are heard, but 
Caruso’s is alive.” Claudia Cassidy, “On the Record: Conjured and Sometimes Conjuring Voices Out of the Past,” 
The Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1953. 
4. New Victor Records, March 1917, 18-19. 
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his own instrument was in many ways facilitated by the audile mirror that sound reproduction 
technology held up to his ear.5 
 
Figure 3.1: Enrico Caruso, three-quarter length portrait, standing, facing left, listening to his own 
voice on a Victor phonograph machine. 1913. (Source: Library of Congress). 
The two tropes just adumbrated collide and interact in complex ways in Tomatis’s work. 
Beginning in 1946, Tomatis embarked on a quest to excavate the “oreille Carusienne” through 
detailed analyses of Caruso’s recordings. Applying his professional knowledge to Caruso’s 
                                                
5. Caruso’s “throat specialist”: William Lloyd, “The Perfect Singing Machine,” Daily Mail, August 3, 1920. Quoted 
in Enrico Caruso, Jr. and Andrew Farkas, Enrico Caruso: My Father and My Family (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 
1990), 340-341. 
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voice, he would make a staggering and original diagnosis of Caruso’s hearing, one that will be 
revealed shortly.  
The first trope—Caruso’s uncanny presence caught on record—is reflected in Tomatis’s 
work in the way that he accepts, almost without question, the unadulterated presence of Caruso’s 
voice that his record collection provides. Tomatis understands the recordings as transparent 
reproductions of the voice to the extent that he makes no significant distinction between the two. 
The second trope—the image of Caruso listening to himself—is felt everywhere in Tomatis’s 
work; a concern with a patient’s or singer’s ability to listen to themselves is at the heart of his 
therapeutic method. For Tomatis, the recordings are not just reproductions of the sound of 
Caruso’s voice but also a record of Caruso listening to himself. 
Focusing on Tomatis’s postmortem analysis on Caruso, this chapter explores the doctor’s 
central theoretical postulate: namely, that there is a cybernetic connection between ear and the 
voice, one that dictates that “the voice contains only what the ear hears.”6 This relationship of 
exact correspondence between audition and vocal production suggests an eerie yet tantalizing 
prospect: not only does Tomatis claim to reveal how Caruso heard himself, but he also expands 
the popular desire to “sing like Caruso” to include the even more remote possibility that now you 
can also hear like Caruso.  
However, interpreting Tomatis’s vocal-auditory loop in terms of absolute autonomy 
would overstep the mark; Tomatis understood the ear and voice as communicating with each 
other not in a vacuum but in the world as part of a complex biological system and equally 
complex social system, at a particular time and in a particular place, in their own sonic 
                                                
6. Raoul Husson and Alfred Tomatis, Les bases scientifiques de l’audio-psycho-phonologie (Geneva: Association 
internationale d’audio-psycho-phonologie, 1974), 19. 
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environment. It is this broader historical soundscape, and its influence on both vocality and 
listening, that opens up a gap between ear and voice. Tomatis’s analyses invite questions about 
the historicity of technologies of mediation: what lies in the gap between ear and voice? What 
kinds of mediations disrupt the (imagined) seamless exchange of information between ear and 
voice? How does the idea of listening—and listening to oneself—change in the age of 
mechanical (and eventually electric) mediation? 
Caruso’s popularity, among both the record-buying public and specialists such as 
Tomatis, probably has no singular explanation. His career, the flourishing of recording 
technology, and the emergence and growth of a public appetite for recorded music all coincided 
to form the perfect storm, earning the Italian the title of “voice of the century.”7 Caruso’s 
recording career coincided with the heyday of acoustic recording, his discs in many ways 
representing the pinnacle of that technology. He was positioned on the threshold of the electronic 
era: electric recording began in 1925, only four years after Caruso’s death. As the first superstar 
of sound recording, but one who missed out on microphones and electric amplification, there has 
always been a sense that Caruso’s recordings, despite the previously mentioned discourse on 
their uncanny quality, are somehow incomplete, that they contain secrets, and that they might be 
improved upon or upgraded using the latest audio technology. Surely there must be a secret, a 
reason why Caruso rose to such prominence, Tomatis thought. And he believed that he had 
found the answer, a definitive explanation for the greatness of the “voice of the century.” 
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Tomatis’s Analyses 
At the First International Conference of Phonology, hosted by the Faculty of Medicine at the 
University of Paris in 1953, Tomatis delivered a paper in which he claimed to have discovered 
the underlying causes of vocal problems among singers. As remedy, he suggested his therapy, 
including sessions with the Electronic Ear.8 Among anecdotes of patients with singing 
difficulties, Caruso makes more than a cameo appearance; in fact, of the many voices under 
scrutiny, only his is named. Later in life, Tomatis was unequivocal about his interest in Caruso, 
writing in his memoir that “I sought an answer to the question ‘What differentiates a bad voice 
from a good one?’”9 Guided above all else by his clinical experience, Tomatis had few qualms 
distinguishing between voices in such black and white terms; his task, as he saw it, was to return 
deficient or damaged voices to their full health. But, as his central question intimates, this task 
was not only (or not even) a medical matter, but an aesthetic one. 
Caruso’s voice is key to this aesthetic inquiry, where it represents the very best in terms 
of sound and technique. Tomatis reaches frequently for this exemplar of vocal virtuosity, 
describing the “voix Carusienne,” the “son Carusien,” and—significantly, as we shall see—the 
“oreille Carusienne.” While to the question of what makes a good voice good? Tomatis’s short 
answer is Caruso, his longer answer would have been complicated by his broader theory of the 
ear-voice cybernetic connection. Tomatis’s logic might be expressed in syllogistic terms: in 
order to sing well, one must sing like Caruso; in order to sing well, one must listen well; 
therefore, in order to sing well, one must listen like Caruso. As well as a gold standard, Caruso’s 
voice was for Tomatis also an object worthy of attention in less instrumentalized terms. A third 
                                                
8. Alfred Tomatis, “La correction de la voix chantée,” paper presented at the Cours International de Phonologie et de 
Phoniatrie, Faculté de Médecine de Paris, March 6, 1953. 
9. Tomatis, The Conscious Ear, 45-66. 
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of the paper’s 30 figures address it, and the extensive coverage the singer receives in the doctor’s 
later book-length publications suggests a curiosity that goes far beyond the need to establish a 
paragon of vocal (and auditory) health. 
The analyses themselves comprise ten audiograms—two-dimensional graphs with 
frequency (hertz) and amplitude (decibels) plotted on the x and y axes, respectively—of single 
notes sung by Caruso into a recording horn at one time or another, along with an accompanying 
commentary. The ten audiograms discussed below are included in Appendix A of this 
dissertation.10 The use of the term “audiogram” is significant; in mainstream audiometry it 
describes graphical representations of the frequency curve of a subject’s hearing capabilities. 
Such graphs were not typically derived from the sound of a subject’s voice, but rendered from 
carefully calibrated tests involving a subject’s responses to audible stimuli—pure tones 
transmitted over headphones. In the very presentation of his data, Tomatis’s theory of the ear-
voice cybernetic connection is busy at work; producing audiograms from the frequency content 
of a voice is to treat the voice itself as an audiometer. Eliding the voice and the technology used 
to measure it reveals how, despite a deep humanist concern with restoring a patient’s vocal 
“essence” (finding their “healthy” voice), Tomatis had a lively anthropotechnical imagination in 
which the human-technology relationship is complex, reciprocal, and mutually constitutive. 
Using a “sonic analyzer,” Tomatis was able to, as he put it, “take genuine photographs of 
the voice.”11 These photographs were, in reality, rather cursory hand-drawn graphs, transcribed 
                                                
10. Specific information about the Caruso notes under Tomatis’s microscope is frustratingly sparse. Tomatis does 
provide, however, the year in which they were recorded, their pitch, and (in some cases) the vowel being sung, but 
there are no song titles or any other details concerning the recordings themselves. Tomatis does claim, however, to 
have had access to “original master recordings,” whatever that might mean. Tomatis, The Ear and the Voice,  “La 
correction de la voix chantée,” 28. 
11. Tomatis, The Conscious Ear, 46. 
	 101 
from a visual representation of sound projected by a cathode-ray oscillograph. The oscillograph, 
Tomatis claims, would “supplement the failures of our judgment and the imperfection of our ear 
in the appreciation of the qualities of the voice.”12 Later in life, Tomatis revealed more details 
about his apparatus: “The analyzer enables one to project on a cathode ray tube the distribution 
of frequencies of a voice. They are then spread out in the same way as a prism disperses the 
component parts of light in the spectrum of a rainbow. My analyzer was a hand-operated 
apparatus arranged in a series of filters.”13 Studying sound captured on tape with an oscillograph 
provided “a valuable document not only for judging the subsequent evolution [of Caruso’s 
voice], but also for allowing us the immediate analysis, in a way the decomposition of the 
different elements that constitute this voice.”14 The audiograms assume (or are given, by fiat) an 
air of cool objectivity by Tomatis; they stand in for Caruso’s voice “itself”—however 
problematic that reflexive pronoun may be. By translating sound into visual information, 
Tomatis was able to produce a static representation of an idealized object; one that, without the 
aid of technological magnification, would be difficult if not impossible to imagine. This process 
of objectification strips the voice down to isolated phonemes made up only of a fundamental 
pitch and a series of overtones; the reduction of the voice in this manner reflects, once more, the 
entangled relationship of human physiognomy and the technology used to observe and measure 
it in Tomatis’s work. 
                                                
12. “Un examen oscillographique qui supplée aux défaillances de notre jugement et aux imperfections de notre 
oreille dans l'appréciation des qualités de la voix.” Tomatis, “La correction de la voix chantée,” 3. 
13. Tomatis, The Conscious Ear, 46. 
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de l'évolution ultérieure, mais encore pour nous permettre l’analyse immédiate, en quelque sorte la décomposition 
des différents éléments qui constituent cette voix.” Tomatis, “La correction de la voix chantée,” 2. 
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Although Tomatis represents Caruso’s voice with static images, he uses those images to 
chart a narrative that reflects the development of Caruso’s voice over the course of the singer’s 
career. He divides the singer’s career into three periods—an early, formative period, a “belle 
époque,” and a later decline.15 This narrative will be all too familiar to musicologists: the 
“emergence” of a self able to express itself in an individual style (in Caruso’s case, the “belle 
époque”), a subsequent retroactive attribution to the earlier style an embryonic status that shows 
signs of later development, and a significant change of course later in life. Unlike their composer 
counterparts, however, singers are perhaps less likely to experience an elevated late style in old 
age; instead, the voice ages in tow with the rest of the body, leading to a compromised late style 
characterized by decline. 
The sweet spot of the “son Carusien”—the tenor’s belle époque—lasted from 1904 to 
1906—an excruciatingly short period that is hard to reconcile with the singer’s sustained appeal 
over more than twenty years of active performing and recording.16 During this period, Caruso’s 
voice was characterized by an abundance of high frequency upper partials. It was, Tomatis 
elaborates, a “shower of harmonics high above 2000 c/s [hertz]” that led to the “extremely 
dense” and “extremely rich” sound;17 other adjectives include “ethereal,” “velvety,” and 
“resonant.”18 The characteristic Carusian sound is explained by Tomatis as follows:  
                                                
15. Ibid., 5. 
16. Ibid., 5. 
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son Carusien qu’elle en est la caractéristique, ne pouvait que lui échapper.” Ibid., 5. 
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The real power in decibels of the high harmonics is always two or three times 
greater than that of the fundamental sound. So it seems that all sounds of good 
quality emitted by Caruso present a fundamental that never exceeds 30 or 40 
decibels, even for sounds sung at full power; singing strongly only results in an 
increase in the shower of high harmonics.19 
The earliest audiograms Tomatis includes are reportedly from 1901, a time when Caruso 
was not yet Caruso; examples from that era lack the pronounced upper harmonics of the belle 
époque. Of these notes, Tomatis remarks: “Sound quality: there are no predominant harmonics. 
Carusian quality is not yet recognized.”20 The audiograms he provides show an almost uniform 
distribution of fundamental and harmonics; the fundamental and its harmonics, in other words, 
are weighted equally in terms of perceived volume. Caruso’s “decline,” began in 1910, which 
perhaps extends his belle époque up to this point, although Tomatis’s designations suggest that 
the deterioration was a gradual one. Tomatis’s explanation once more concerns the balance 
between fundamental frequencies and their harmonics: “[Caruso’s decline involves] the relative 
increase in the fundamental sound in relation to the shower of the high harmonics, which is 
decreasing.”21 Other descriptions include: “Its appearance is of poor quality, it is hard, tight, 
painful. We see the considerable increase of the fundamental sound, while the harmonics are 
reduced to a single point of intensity scarcely equal to that of the fundamental sound”;22 
                                                
19. “On note au passage que la puissance réelle en décibels des harmoniques élevés est toujours deux ou trois fois 
plus importante que celle du son fondamental. Ainsi semble-t-il que tous les sons de bonne qualité chez Caruso 
présentent un fondamental qui ne dépasse jamais 30 ou 40 db; même dans les sons lâchés en pleine puissance: 
chanter fort répond seulement à une augmentation de la gerbe des harmoniques élevés.” Ibid., 13. 
20. “Ces deux spectres n'offrent aucune caractéristique du son de qualité: il n'y à pas d’harmoniques prédominants; 
On ne reconnaît pas encore la qualité Carusienne.” Ibid., 12. 
21. “Plus tardivement vers 1910-1912, le déclin se signifie par l’augmentation relative du son fondamental par 
rappaort à la gerbe des harmoniques élevées qui va en décroissant.” Ibid., 16. 
22. “... à l'audition ce son apparaît de mauvaise qualité, il est dur, serré, pénible. On voit l'augmentation du son 
fondamental, tandis que les harmoniques sont réduits à une seule pointe, d'intensité à peine égale à celle du son 
fondamental.” Ibid., 15. 
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“thickening of the zone of the low, testimony of the appearance of the sounds of throat”;23 “the 
appearance of the bass sounds by spreading the fundamental sound to the left of the spectrum, is 
translated to the hearing by throat sounds”;24 “the fall of the treble which diminish in their 
intensity, the increase of the fundamental sound, and especially the very important appearance of 
the traumatic throat sound.”25 
The cause for the various distributions of frequencies found in Caruso’s records from 
different moments—and here we arrive at Tomatis’s critical diagnosis—is described in 
Tomatis’s conference paper as follows: “It seems that the development of the voice at the 
beginning is done by increasing the muscular tone until obtaining a specific vocal volume: the 
singer having at that moment, the real notion of the magnitude of his voice.”26 He continues: 
“Then progressively by the loss of the hearing of high harmonics, that is to say by the loss of 
control at this level, the individual makes a translation of his vocal volume towards the bass, 
which is characterized by the loss of head tone with progressive increase in traumatic throat 
sounds.”27 This postmortem diagnosis is more bluntly addressed in The Ear and the Voice, where 
Tomatis announces that “Caruso’s right ear was deaf to the transmission of low sounds!”28 We 
                                                
23. “On note un épaississement de la zone des graves, témoignage de l’apparition des sons de gorge.” Ibid., 16. 
24. “Nous notons au passage que l'apparition des sons graves par étalement du son fondamental vers la gauche du 
spectre, se traduit à l'audition par des sons de gorge.” Ibid. 
25. “La chute des aigus qui diminuent dans leur intensité, l'augmentation du son fondamental, et surtout l'apparition 
très importante du son de gorge traumatisant.” Ibid., 17. 
26. “Il semble que l’élaboration de la voix au départ se fait par une augmentation du tonus musculaire jusqu’à 
l’obtention d’un volume vocal déterminé: le chanteur ayant à ce moment-là, la notion réelle de l’ampleur de sa 
voix.” Ibid., 18. 
27. “Puis progressivement par la perte de l’audition des harmoniques élevés, c'est-à-dire par la perte du contrôle à ce 
niveau, l'individu procède à une translation de son volume vocal vers les graves, ce qui se caractérise par la perte de 
la sonorité de tête avec augmentation progressive des sons de gorge traumatisants.” Ibid. 
28. Tomatis, The Ear and the Voice, 28. 
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also learn in those pages how the doctor verified his hypothesis by asking some of Caruso’s old 
friends in Paris to corroborate his hypothesis:  
All [of them] told me that Caruso always asked them to stand on his left side 
when they were talking because he heard badly from the right. The range of 
frequencies in conversation occupies the mid-range, lower than singing range. 
This fact further proves his deafness to low frequencies. His right auditory nerve 
only allowed him to hear the frequencies located in the zone required for singing. 
One might therefore attribute Caruso’s singing to his inability to hear sounds of 
poor quality.29 
The Caruso Paradigm 
Tomatis explained his diagnosis—that Caruso was, as he put it, “fortunately deaf” to certain low 
frequencies—differently at different moments.30 In the 1953 paper, for example, little 
explanation is offered for the cause of the deafness. Tomatis enumerates other factors, many of 
them physiological: “Caruso had a sound all his own, no doubt related to the shape of his body 
and his massive face, and a powerfully developed thorax, 140 cm around with only 4.05 liters of 
moving air. The factors certainly contributed to his vocal quality, but they are secondary to his 
principal gift, an exceptional ability to listen to himself in order to control his voice.”31 
Elsewhere, Tomatis goes on to reveal his remarkably extensive knowledge of the singer’s body, 
noting that “People who knew Caruso well told me that when one tapped his skull, it returned a 
sound that was quite extraordinary.”32 He continues: 
                                                
29. Ibid., 28-29. 
30. “The Fortunate Deafness of Enrico Caruso” is the title of a chapter in The Conscious Ear. 
31. Alfred Tomatis, The Ear and the Voice, trans. Roberta Prada and Pierre Sollier (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2005), 27. 
32. Alfred Tomatis, The Conscious Ear: My Life of Transformation through Listening, trans. Stephen Lushington 
and Billie M. Thompson (Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press, 1991), 47-48. 
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Caruso—always Caruso—had no need to exercise his larynx much. In fact, this 
organ was probably in a state of total relaxation when he sang, at least during his 
great years before 1915. What sang was his whole body, and to the bones of his 
body he added his thorax, all of it. The latter was very much expanded, since 
Caruso measured 55 inches around his chest. Four liters of air passed through this 
great chest, although other singers of apparently less power took in up to ten liters 
of air.33 
Finally, the doctor offers a “medical” explanation for Caruso’s deafness, which is no 
more informed than his previous comments: 
 At the end of 1901 or early 1902, he underwent a surgical operation in Spain on 
the right side of his face … I imagined what might have happened. His Eustachian 
tube had been damaged, causing a partial deafness which resulted in his 
transformation from that [sic] a gifted singer to becoming the greatest vocalist in 
the world!34 
The Mimetic Machine: Caruso’s “Phonogenic” Voice 
Tomatis’s basic claim is: when Caruso sang, he listened. His more elaborate claim is that Caruso 
“sang with his ear.” Part of Caruso’s trademark sound, however, comes from neither his voice 
nor his ears but from the phonograph. How could this be? 
One way to view Caruso’s relationship with the phonograph is through the lens of 
mimesis: a concept that Michael Taussig sees as foundational to human culture.35 The webs of 
imitation that humans weave—without which there would be no culture insomuch as culture is a 
collective enterprise—have become increasingly anthropotechnic: the “extensions of the body” 
have become so dispersed, so disconnected from actual living bodies (or “live” musical 
                                                
33.  Ibid., 47-48. 
34.  Ibid., 53. 
35. Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
	 107 
performances for that matter) that we might ask whether significant changes to the way that 
mimesis works among cultures in the West have occurred and whether they represent in any 
sense a discontinuity with what has for so long been called “nature.” 
Taussig explains the mimetic faculty as follows: “… the nature that culture uses to create 
second nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and 
become Other.”36 The mimetic feedback loop, like all feedback loops, is productive of difference 
through its mimetic operations. To put it another way: the phonograph, as a mimetic technology, 
produces a feedback loop between a performer and their performance, which they can now listen 
to “offline,” as it were, out of time; but because this mimetic loop involves subjects and non-
subjects (objects, technologies, etc.), something other than “pure” subjectivity is produced—
something hybrid. Thus there arises a certain kind of self-consciousness in musical performance, 
the absence of which is now hard to imagine. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Caruso makes a cameo appearance in Taussig’s book. A scene 
from Werner Herzog’s Fitzcarraldo is, according to Taussig, based 
around the fetish of the phonograph, so tenaciously, so awkwardly, clutched by 
Fitzcarraldo, the visionary, its great ear-horn emerging from under the armpit of 
his dirty white suit, Caruso flooding the forests and rivers, the Indians amazed as 
Old Europe rains its ecstatic art form upon them. Bellowing opera from the ship’s 
prow, it is the great ear-trumpet of the phonograph, an orchid of technology in the 
thick forests of the primitive, that cleaves the waters and holds the tawny Indians 
at bay as the patched-up river-steamer wends its way into this South American 
heart of darkness.37  
Again, we are confronted with feedback loops between selves and others: “What seems 
crucial about the fascination with the Other’s fascination with the talking machine is the magic 
                                                
36. Ibid., xiii. 
37. Ibid., 203. 
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of mechanical reproduction itself.”38 Taussig wraps up the scene by reminding us of the awe that 
reproductive technologies can—and perhaps should—instill in all of us:  
To take the talking machine to the jungle is to emphasize and embellish the 
genuine mystery and accomplishment of mechanical reproduction in an age when 
technology itself, after the flurry of excitement at a new breakthrough, is seen not 
as mystique or poetry but as routine. Taking the talking machine to the jungle is to 
do more than impress the natives and therefore oneself with Western technology’s 
power, the Elto outboard motor compared to the wooden paddle; it is to reinstall 
the mimetic faculty as mystery in the art of mechanical reproduction, 
reinvigoration the primitivism implicit in technology’s wildest dreams, therewith 
creating a surfeit of mimetic power.39 
When Caruso listens to himself on a record, this might lead to a situation where he is imitating 
an imitation. Caruso imitates an imitation of himself; he listens to himself listening to himself 
singing. These descriptions are not intended to simply complicate something into a play of 
tautological language; instead, they suggest a certain way into thinking about how creativity 
happens in the world, in relation to the self. 
The (In)fidelity of Mediation: The Sound of Historical Sound 
Tomatis dismissed the “technical limitations of early recordings” in his Caruso experiments. If 
the distancing effect of technological mediation was only begrudgingly acknowledged, the other 
distancing effect—the fact that Caruso was long dead—seems not to have deterred Tomatis at 
                                                
38. Ibid., 207. 
39. Ibid., 208. 
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all.40 In their article on “deadness,” Jason Stanyek and Benjamin Piekut discuss a different 
example of the “revitalization” of Caruso’s voice, one that took place only eleven years after the 
singer’s death. Following improvements in recording quality and an updated aesthetic of “high 
fidelity,” some of Caruso’s original recordings were stripped of their piano accompaniment using 
filters and refitted with new orchestral “underdubs,” as Piekut and Stanyek call them.41 This 
Caruso remake, the authors suggest, may well be the first “inter-mundane” collaboration in 
popular music. Piekut and Stanyek point out that the temporal gap—between the deadness of 
Caruso’s voice and the superimposed “contemporary” (in 1932) orchestra—speaks to a larger 
gap that is always present in sound capture apparatus.  
Of course, there is a larger discourse (one that continues today, even in the academy) 
concerning the “schizophonic” (to use R. Murray Schafer’s phrase) split between sound and its 
original source, as though we still believe a kind of magic operation to have taken place. 
Caruso’s voice, in other words, was immediately separated from his body; thus, in a naive realist 
sense, what we have on record is exactly what we think it is: a recording, encoded physically in 
whatever medium happens to contain the recording, which is then “literally” actualized by a 
certain playback system that will cause air to vibrate in certain ways. Our ears react accordingly. 
                                                
40. The idea that “post-mortem” examination and analysis can reveal secrets otherwise hidden is nothing new. In 
July of 2015, musicologist Ralph Locke provoked a lively discussion on the American Musicological Society’s 
listserv on the subject of post-mortem diagnoses, specifically those made by music historians. The email chain ran 
for nine days and consisted of 17 posts contributed by 15 authors. Beginning as a specific inquiry under the subject 
of “retrospective diagnosis: Mozart, Martinů,” the thread soon turned to general principles. Questions like Did 
Mozart have Tourette’s syndrome? and Did Martinů suffer from Asperger syndrome? were soon quelled by Richard 
Taruskin, who, following a lengthy response by Michael Beckerman, felt compelled to interrupt his retirement with 
the following terse statement: “If I may attempt to summarize Mike Beckerman’s very sensible post, attempts at 
medically diagnosing the dead are all of them flagrant examples of confirmation-biased research, and therefore 
fruitless. Richard Taruskin. UC Berkeley emeritus.” See “Retrospective Diagnosis: Mozart, Martinu,” forum post on 
the American Musicology Society’s listsev, July 2015. The archive of this  discussion group can be located at 
https://listserv.unl. 
41. Jason Stanyek and Benjamin Piekut, “Deadness: Technologies of the Intermundane,” The Drama Review 54, no. 
1 (2010): 14-38. 
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Tomatis’s analyses are attempts in another way at an inter-mundane collaboration, one between 
Doctor and patient. 
As Piekut and Stanyek remind us, productive sound technologies are not only 
articulative—the addition of sound to a signal—but also disarticulative: subtraction, in other 
words. But even when crossing a one-way street, looking both ways is a good idea. Accounts of 
music reproduction or recording all too often concentrate on neither addition (the articulate) nor 
subtraction (the disarticulate). The hold of realism is strong, and the search for what has been 
retained (similarity) is usually the object of study. What is curious is that for Tomatis, the parts 
of the voice that can indicate the way in which a subject hears is intact, captured on these 
recordings. This is an insightful distinction on his part; of course, any kind of capture which 
necessarily involves translation disarticulates its subject (to use their term). Scholars of sound 
production must pay attention to what has been taken away and not simply what has been added. 
In the case of the Caruso video, the articulative is the orchestra—in other words, it is what has 
been added. Can we ever say exactly with certainty what is “taken away”? The disarticulative is 
the equalization, the filters. 
The 1932 film, “Voice Grafting: The Latest Miracle of ‘Sound’ Science,” provides a 
remarkable example of how the fascination with Caruso’s voice on record and the charm of sonic 
resurrection revolves around technological mediation, understandings of individual listening 
affective capacities, and a kind of audio archeology that has all the charms of the most audacious 
historical pursuits. At issue in the movie are the “revitalizations” of Caruso’s voice that consisted 
of adding an orchestra to previously piano-accompanied performances. This is another 
overlooked aspect of sound recording technology: the almost instant idea of not only improving 
technology and “remaking” (remastered albums spring to mind) previous efforts and updating 
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their appeal, but also the notion of historical technology: something that the Electronic Ear 
evokes. The video demonstrates how ideas of high fidelity can change even over only a short 
space of time.42 
The opening shot sees a rather stiff, mustachioed British man wedged awkwardly 
between two machines: a phonograph to his right and a more modern, electric device to his left. 
Perhaps to evoke a sense of domesticity (this, after all, is a commercial of sorts), a bouquet of 
flowers has been placed prominently behind our presenter; the hefty furniture-style of the record 
player only adds to the effect. “The most wonderful voice the world has ever known was 
undoubtedly that of Caruso,” our host declares. He continues: “His most popular record, and as a 
matter of fact the one which made him famous, was and still is ‘On with the Motley’ from Il 
Pagliacci. This record was made in 1905, and I’m going to play you a few bars on an instrument 
of the period.”43 He then stares intently at the phonograph and the record begins to spin.  
Following this brief excerpt, the images cut to a laboratory scene: sound engineers in 
white coats, tinkering with wires, levers, and buttons—a vast array of machinery reminiscent of a 
space launch. “All ready,” a man announces down the telephone then the orchestra begins to 
play. The conductor wears headphones, through which he can hear the original Caruso recording. 
We are then told: 
                                                
42. “Voice Grafting: the Latest Miracle of Sound Science,” video (London: Pathé Pictoral, 1932). 
43. Ibid. 
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Now for years recording engineers have been attempting to find some way by 
which the voice of Caruso could be revitalized and the true beauty and dramatic 
fervor brought out. And at last they have succeeded. With a new orchestral 
accompaniment, grafted onto the voice of the immortal tenor, which now rings 
forth in all its true richness, with the same fervor which brought countless 
audiences thronging to every opera house in the world.44 
This video is suggestive on many levels, not least because the aria that we hear, “Vesti la 
giubba” (often referred to as “On with the Motley” but which more literally translates as “put on 
the costume”), from Ruggero Leoncavallo’s 1982 one act-opera Il Pagliacci, comes at the 
pivotal moment in the opera where Canio uncovers his wife’s infidelity—an infidelity of a 
different kind, but along with the tropes of masking, certainly thought provoking. Here is the 
presenter’s most astonishing claim: “Well, that will give you a very good idea of how Caruso’s 
voice sounded to his own ears 27 years ago, and played on an instrument which, incidentally, 
belonged to himself.”45 By hearing a so-called period instrument, asserting a “high fidelity” idea 
of “how Caruso’s voice sounded to his own ears” is to take the radical line where the senses and 
technology are concerned, as distinct from a more prosaic reading to the effect that the presenter 
simply meant to say “how Caruso’s voice [on record] sounded to his own ears 27 years ago.” 
 It is striking how positively hi-fi the “revitalized” version sounds in relation to the 
original 1905 recording; but clearly, in comparison to our recordings today, which I am 
accustomed to, they don’t come close. Before coming across this video, I had always enjoyed the 
“electronic” versions of Caruso for the opposite reason, namely, the disjuncture between the 
obviously old-time, telephone sound of the vocal track and its eerie accompaniment played by an 




orchestra from a future beyond the singer’s life. But next to the crackling original, Caruso’s 
revitalized voice sounds convincingly alive.46 
Aural Presence in the Electronic Era 
For Tomatis there is no question about the production of self, the access to pure experience, that 
listening, and listening alone, provides: “[W]e sing with our ear, to speak with our ear, stand 
upright and walk thanks to the ear. We perhaps even live thanks to our ear!”47 The idea of 
creating the sound of an ear is an immensely provocative and, perhaps even impossible one. The 
acoustics of the ear are complex and cannot be reduced to a curve, but of course, Caruso’s voice 
is already disarticulated in the sense that it was insufficient enough to require refitting with an 
orchestra—and are we to imagine that this occurred because the accompaniments were 
insufficient, but the recordings of the voice were somehow true? This also, in a sense, 
transgresses boundaries, of the body, of subjectivity, and even of life and death. 
Is Tomatis’s theory more radical than it might at first seem? He is pointing out that there 
is no voice without listening: a co-dependence between the ear and the voice. Consequently, 
listening to a voice means listening to more than just a voice: it means listening to a subject listen 
to themselves sing or speak (or vocalize). In order to produce a singing/vocal-act, Caruso had to 
listen to listen to himself. This is what Nina Eidsheim has recently called for, although her 
primary focus is on the material body and the scope of her theory of voice is much wider: 
                                                
46. See Murray Dineen, “The Historical Soundscape of Monophonic Hi-Fidelity,” Current Musicology 97 (2014): 9-
20. 
47. Tomatis, The Ear and the Voice, 25. 
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Sound has been so powerful and seductive that it has directed our attention away 
from that to which it is indeed only supplemental: the action of the body … 
Singing happens before the sound; it is the action that produces the sound. 
Listening, then, takes place in the shared activity of singing—the shared actions 
of moving and being moved.48 
The mention here of the “supplement,” which invokes Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence ascribed to the voice and the subsequent devaluing of writing as 
medium, a critique that is perhaps complicated by the kind of aural presence that Tomatis is 
identifying through Caruso. How might we take Derrida’s critique into sound studies, where too 
often sound technologies are discussed in terms of reproduction rather than of production? How 
does this critique intersect with discourses on the relationship between senses and technological 
media. In Otobiography, Derrida explores differences and resonances between Oto- and Auto-
biographies; but his argument is to caution against the temptations of the illusion of self-presence 
through listening: “Is it a question of the same ear, a borrowed ear, the one that you are lending 
me or that I lend myself in speaking? Or rather, do we hear, do we understand each other already 
with another ear? The ear does not answer.”49 
Perhaps at the heart of the Derridean impasse is the equation of voice with exteriority and 
listening with interiority. This binary division is evident everywhere but it has perhaps not been 
more eloquently expressed than in this quotation from Roland Barthes, writing in 1976 an essay 
entitled “The Romantic Song.” He gives a characteristically intimate account of one of his 
listening experiences: “The lied’s space is affective, scarcely socialized: sometimes, perhaps, a 
few friends—those of the Schubertiades; but its true listening space is, so to speak, the interior of 
                                                
48. Nina Eidsheim, Sensing Sound: Singing and Listening as Vibrational Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2015). 
49. Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, trans. Avital Ronell (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1985), 35. 
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the head, of my head: listening to it I sing the lied with myself, for myself.”50 This wonderfully 
describes the indescribable feeling of living a life of inhabitation “inside” a body that is the same 
but yet different as the self—the familiar and enduring experience of Cartesian dualism. Barthes 
continues: “I address myself, within myself, to an Image: the image of the beloved in which I 
lose myself and from which my own image, abandoned, comes back to me. The lied supposes a 
rigorous interlocution, but one that is imaginary, imprisoned in my deepest intimacy.”51 
Precariously close to solipsism, circling the loneliness of interiority and impossibility of 
communication, Barthes’s experimental and revelatory prose in fact shows a way of 
imaginatively transcending the impossibility of externalizing the interior; he makes visible the 
sense of sensing, the feeling of being, the singularity of a drastic experience; and he attends to 
the pain—of individuality, of the knowledge that, whether experiencing joy or sadness, nobody 
but him can truly experience and know that moment in that particular, embodied way. Does 
Tomatis’s work attempt the same: the Electronic Ear externalizes an otherwise intimate zone of 
experience. It is not the eyes but the ears that are the window to the soul. 
Conclusion 
Tomatis’s experiments involve a way of thinking about music that resonates with ideas ascribed 
to many of the main protagonists of twentieth century music history (as it is taught in the 
academy): an explicit agenda to engage the language, practices, and prestige of work carried out 
in the name of Science, one that relies on conceptual constructions such as sound-as-object, 
                                                
50. Roland Barthes, The Responsibility of Forms (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985). 290. 
51. Ibid. 
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objectivity, rationality, depersonalized facts that are not only philosophically “true” and 
intellectually defensible but also observable, measurable, material, and, perhaps a consequence 
of all the above, fundable. But the ghosts of human fragility and uncertainty—subjective 
experience as opposed to objective experiment—never tire of haunting the hygienic fantasy of a 
world of truth untouched by human’s hands, an unchanging material, objective reality that 
provides its believers with a sense of security and permanency. 
Around the concept of empiricism lurks a striking contradiction: while scientific practices 
valorize empiricism as the method through which ontological verification can be performed—i.e. 
the production of truth and facts by invoking the world of objectivity—in reality, “pure” 
empiricism, the practice which Tomatis would call “research,” is often treated with suspicion. In 
the absence of underlying theoretical explanations, experimental data is suddenly vulnerable, and 
where a science of the experience of human beings is concerned, of course objectivity is strained. 
Who in their right mind would expect that a science of subjective experience (psychoanalysis, 
psychotherapies of all kinds, Tomatis method) could be expressed in solely objective terms? 
The Ear-Voice loop, which Tomatis casts in terms of cybernetics, prompts us to think of 
human experience in hybrid, relational terms; it steers us away from dissecting experience, 
especially on anthro-anatomical-philosophical grounds. Extracting the “voice” in theoretical 
terms has led to a lot of theoretical speculation; adding listening to the voice, in order to resist 
this tendency towards anatomization of the human, is just one way of tackling “human concerns” 
once more.  
Historically, Tomatis’s experiments, which began in 1946, point both forwards and 
backwards: first, backwards, to a long history of interest in aesthetic objects (though this object 
is more immediate than musical scores). In this sense, Tomatis’s musicological stance is 
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relatively familiar to us today, and was certainly unusual for his time. He looks back to a long 
humanist tradition, both in medicine and in thinking about notions of life-force, energy, 
vibration. At the same time, we can detect a certain forward-looking faith in the technology of 
the day, a faith that for many complex reasons including the idea that recording technologies 
today are productive rather than reproductive, has somewhat declined as production techniques 
became ever more elaborate. But while proximity of sound is crucial, also important is distance: 
the distance between Tomatis and Caruso, and between Caruso’s records and the imagined—
mythical, almost—performances that they are said to reproduce, is crucial in raising the stakes of 




In Search of Concrete Listeners: Pierre Schaeffer in the Public Ear 
The calm and serene image of the night 
soon becomes a noisy and destructive world 
The city is slowly covered 
by colors and noises 
A sound wakes up! 
Invisible hands throw missiles 
which go up in smoke 
Strange shapes move around all 
A man is hunted 
My eyes see a dream and I am taken 
It’s no longer a dream 
But a reality 
A great bird passes through the sky 
Each cloud is pierced by a beam of light 
What is this silence? 
Is it happiness perhaps? 
 
L’image calme et sereine de la nuit 
laisse bientôt place à un monde 
bruyant et destructeur 
La ville s’habille lentement 
de couleurs et de bruits 
Un bruit se réveille 
Des projectiles parent de mains invisibles 
qui s’en vont en fumées 
Des formes étranges se meuvent autour de tous 
C’est la chasse à l’homme 
Des yeux m’épient un rêve m’emporte 
Ce n’est plus un rêve 
mais une réalité 
Un grand oiseau passe dans le ciel 
Chaque nuage est percé par la flèche 
Quel est ce silence? 
C’est le Bonheur peut-être?1 
                                                
1. Textes écrits par des enfants à l’écoute de “Études aux objets” (author unknown), 1975, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, 
B105 D1037, L’Institut Mémoires de l’édition contemporaine (IMEC). L’abbaye d’Ardenne, Caen, France. 
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In June of 1975, Pierre Schaeffer received a letter, accompanied by 22 poems, from a Madame 
Gagnard, a music teacher at the Lycée de Sèvres, a Parisian high school: “Sir, I send you texts 
written by my students. They wrote these poems while listening to your piece ‘Étude aux objets’ 
… I hope this work will interest you; the texts are uneven, sometimes naive, as you will see … I 
would like to know what you think.”2 Schaeffer responded warmly, writing that he was “flattered 
and touched deeply” by the gesture. But he was also keen to collaborate, writing that “with 
regard to the ‘research and experimentation’ aspect of a study on the work of these children, I 
would like to know more about the passages from ‘Étude aux objets’ that your pupils heard.”3 (A 
selection of these poems is included, with translations, in Appendix E of this document.) 
Five years later, following a similar scenario but this time with Symphonie pour un 
homme seul under the spotlight, Schaeffer was inspired to type some notes (unpublished, as far 
as I can tell) under the heading of “La Vérité sort de la bouche des enfants” (The Truth Comes 
from the Mouths of Children).4 But instead of a lyrical response, these children were asked to 
react to the following prompts: 1) give a description of the work; 2) describe the place of the 
work; 3) guess the composer; 4) offer a criticism of the work. Schaeffer took the responses to 
                                                
2. “Monsieur, Je me permets de vous envoyer des textes écrits par des enfants, des élèves du Lycée de Sèvres où je 
suis professeur à l’éducation musicale. Ceci à l’écoute de votre musique ‘Etudes aux objets.’ Dans un premier 
temps, les enfants écrivent chacun de leur côté, puis ensuite ou écrivent les phrases choisies par les enfants eux-
mêmes. J’espère que ce travail vous intéressera: ces textes sont inégaux, parfois naïf, comme vous le verrez. 
J’aimerais savoir ce que vous eu pensez. Je vous envoie mes sincères salutations, M Gagnard.” Correspondance 
Madame Gagnard (professeur de musique)/PS, June 18 1975, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, B105 D1037, IMEC. 
3. “Madame, Je vous remercie pour votre lettre et pour ces textes de vos élèves qui, en tant qu’auteur, me flattent et 
me touchent profondément. Cependant, en ce qui concerne l’aspect ‘recherche et expérimentation’ d’une étude sur le 
travail de ces enfants, j’aimerais en savoir davantage, notamment sur les passages de ‘Études aux objets’ que vos 
élèves ont entendus. C’est pourquoi je vous propose volontiers de reprendre contact avec mois dès la rentrée 
prochaine. Dans cette attente, je vous prie de croire, Madame, en l’assurance de mes sentiments les meilleurs. Pierre 
Schaeffer.” Correspondance Madame Gagnard (professeur de musique)/PS, July 7 1975, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, 
B105 D1037, IMEC. 
4. Expériences dans un collège parisien, classe de musique de Laurent Grynszpan, 1980: Lettres mss de Laurent 
Grynszpan à PS; Réactions d’élèves à l’écoute de ‘Symphonie pour un homme seul’; Pierre Schaeffer, “La Vérité 
sort de la bouche des enfants ou: les délices du masochiste,” Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, B105 D1037, IMEC.  
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heart, reproducing many of the remarks; here are a few highlights: “an accident has occurred and 
is happening in a hospital,” “scratched records and broken plates and cries,” “crazy and mad 
scream, a tam tam, then a noise of scrap metal,” “this totally silly song gave [me] a headache 
after one minute, 43 seconds,” “the composer is a caveman,” “crazy music that does not please 
me, but we do not discuss tastes and colors.”5  
Schaeffer singles out one response as exhibiting a “good ear”: “Description: ‘composed 
of multiple noises, without being those of an instrument. Noises of bowls, plates and repeated 
voices. And criticism: ‘In this music, there is no stage, there are too many starters.”6 Another is 
scathing: “That of a big malignant (or a small malignant, the answer is anonymous). The work is 
attributed to the professor, and the critic says: ‘it’s not music, the composer does nothing.’ In 
other words, return to sender.”7 Schaeffer’s overall conclusion is that “the response, in total, is 
massive: total rejection.”8 
It is not difficult to see why Schaeffer found these unsolicited reviews so moving; they 
are indeed precious. And while there is no perfect reception history source document medium, 
this is about as good as it gets. With wild imaginations, open minds and ears, and instinctive 
responses, perhaps children like these were the closest to Schaeffer’s “ideal” listener; 
                                                
5. “Un accident s’est produit et ça se passe dans un hôpital”; “Aussi bien ‘disque rayé,’ ‘assiette cassée’ que des 
‘crie’; “cri fou et dingue puis tamtam voix bizarre bruit de ferraille”; “ce ‘chant totalement débile’ lui a donné mal à 
la tête en une minute 43 secondes”; “On se croirait au homme des cavernes”; “Une musique de fou qui ne me plaît 
pas, mais on ne discute pas des goûts et des couleurs.” Schaeffer, “La Vérité sort de la bouche des enfants.” 
6. “Celle s’une bonne oreille. Description: ‘composée de bruits multiples, sans être ceux d’un instrument. Bruits de 
gamelles, de tôles et de voix répétées’. Et critique: ‘Dans cette musique, on ne voit pas d’étape, il y a trop des 
jumps.” Ibid. 
7. “Celle d’un gros malin (ou d’une petite maligne, la réponse est anonyme). L’œuvre est attribuée au professeur, et 
la critique précise: ‘c’est pas de la musique, le compositeur fait n’importe quoi.’ Autrement dit, retour à l’envoyeur.” 
Ibid. 
8. “L’ensemble des réponses est massif. C’est un rejet.” Ibid. 
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nevertheless, Schaeffer did not ignore what he perceived as an overall tone of condemnation. I 
include them here not because they speak more truth than, say, a newspaper review; but rather, 
as examples of Schaeffer’s curious and complex relationship with his public. Schaeffer’s work is 
peppered with interactions with a public that exists beyond the specialized corridors of academic 
composition departments; and this is, in various ways, present throughout his work. But of 
course, he was not willing compromise on the sounds themselves. 
This chapter is an attempt to understand Schaeffer’s relationship with his audiences—
whether real, imagined, or desired—and the impact that his work had and was intended to have 
upon them. This means refusing hard distinctions such as those staged above—between private 
and public, research and action, and theory and practice. The most valuable question to ask of 
any “theory” is also one that affords its author the utmost respect: what if we take it seriously? 
The impact of the radical political and cultural transformations in Europe, reflected through the 
prism of decolonization, is a crucial and little explored subject for histories of elite culture, and it 
is in this area that this project begins to break new ground. 
Background 
Alongside his experimentation and research, Schaeffer led a busy life in public service. An 
engineer by training, he held several prominent positions within the French government’s radio 
and television network, the Radiodiffusion-télévision Française (RTF). He played a leading and 
at times controversial role in the French state’s mission to expand the broadcast media 
infrastructure throughout the French Union of the Fourth Republic—what became of, after a 
1946 rebrand, the French Empire. Under the auspices of the Radiodiffusion de la France Outre-
Mer (RFOM), which became in 1955 the Société de radiodiffusion de la France d’outre-mer 
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(SORAFOM), Schaeffer, as president, was given the remit to expand broadcast media 
infrastructure throughout France’s global territories. While Schaeffer pursued this objective with 
a sensitive and humane spirit—a detail whose omission would be unfair—his work was 
inevitably if not unavoidably colored by the logic of colonialism.  
A 1956 initiative, for example, involved setting up the SORAFOM headquarters, known 
as the “échelon central,” on the rue d’Amsterdam in the ninth arrondissement of Paris, from 
which state employees, rather than the in-situ colonial high commissioners, would manage the 
overseas radio network. Controlling the airwaves from the metropole meant further distance, in 
real terms, between the organization of media broadcasting and the local communities they 
served.9 When in 1957 Schaeffer was superseded by politician Robert Pontillon as director 
general of SORAFOM, his attention shifted towards co-founding, with Charles Duvelle, a 
“world music” record label, the Office de Coopération Radiophonique (OCORA). Later in life, 
Schaeffer even appeared in the American mainstream media, making the front page of the New 
York Times in 1988 for his involvement in a rescue operation following an earthquake in 
Armenia.10 Like his aspirations in research, Schaeffer’s public-facing activities involving the 
mass media were certainly grand in scope if not grandiose. He enjoyed unparalleled access to 
mass media apparatuses and public funds, making him in this regard arguably one of the most 
powerful composers of the twentieth century (rivals might include Pierre Boulez and Leonard 
Bernstein). And just like his research, his public work was not neglected in his writing; he 
                                                
9. Étienne Damome, “Vers un réseau outre-mer,” in Les Constructions Impatientes, eds. Martin Kaltenecker and 
Karine Le Bail (Paris: CNRS, 2012), 166. 
10. Bill Keller, “As Hope Dies, Quake Rescuers Pull Out,” New York Times, December 16, 1988. 
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frequently published thoughts on the mass media and analyzed in detail the power possessed by 
media institutions controlled at the state level.11 
Scholarship on Schaeffer’s public work, which in the Anglo-American world has thus far 
taken a back seat to exegetical summations of Schaefferian Thought, is especially urgent because 
Schaeffer’s public included not only Parisian intellectuals, and not only those heterogeneous 
masses sheltered under the umbrella of the West, but also what was called, in the nomenclature 
of the day, the Developing World. Guilty at times of (hardly the worst crime) allowing a 
virtuosic turn of phrase, one usually expressing sentiments of global or even cosmic proportion, 
to direct his thoughts, Schaeffer’s waxing universal becomes complicated when considered in the 
context of the postwar colonial landscape and the ensuing movements of decolonization. 
Lost in Translation: Making Media out of Sense 
“There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish 
swimming the other way, who nods at them and says ‘Morning, boys. How’s the water?’ And the 
two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and 
goes ‘What the hell is water?’.” 
David Foster Wallace famously conjured up this image while addressing the graduating 
class of 2005 at Kenyon College.12 It was also a favorite of media theorist Marshall McLuhan, 
and it is with that image that a discussion between him and Schaeffer began. It was 1973, and the 
                                                
11. See, in particular, Pierre Schaeffer, Essai Sur La Radio Et Le Cinéma, Esthétique Et Technique Dans Les Arts-
Relais, 1941-1942 (Paris: Allia, 2010); and Pierre Schaeffer, Machines À Communiquer: Pouvoir Et Communication 
(Paris: Seuil, 1972). 
12. The commencement speech has been transcribed and published as David Foster Wallace, This is Water: Some 
Thoughts, Delivered on a Significant Occasion, about Living a Compassionate Life (New York: Little Brown, 
2009), 3. 
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two men met in front of television cameras to debate the effect of the mass media upon the 
senses. Over the course of their discussion, the pair did their best to disagree with each other 
despite the considerable language barrier.13 (A complete transcript and translation of this 
exchange can be found in Appendix C of this document.) Not insignificantly, the program never 
aired on public television and therefore might be considered a failure—a failed attempt for 
Schaeffer to connect with the public at the time, although the footage, which is haphazardly 
edited, has since found a home online. The video is valuable because it is not only a record of 
Schaeffer performing in public (regardless of it not making the cut) but also a unique insight into 
his relationship with one of the most public media theorists of the moment. 
After introductory synthesizer music, interviewer Guy Dumur asks McLuhan about the 
fish that doesn’t know that it lives in water; he then asks McLuhan about his lack of enthusiasm 
for television despite his theoretical engagement with the medium for ten years. The 
interviewer’s thoughtful (and perhaps mischievous) question is efficiently converted by a 
translator into “you don’t like T.V.?,” which McLuhan flat out ignores. Instead he returns to the 
image of the blissfully ignorant fish, making some blanket statements about what he termed 
media “environments”:  
You? Err, the media are environments. Comme l’eau pour le poisson. They are 
service environments, and, um, they each is [sic] a vortex, to use the Cartesian 
metaphor. The, um, every medium is a vortex. For example, the vortex of 
Guttenberg swallowed the whole medieval world and destroyed it, and then brings 
back the world of antiquity, taken from antiquity a version of probably the 
medieval world within.14  
                                                
13. Pierre Schaeffer, Guy Dumur, and Marshall McLuhan. “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec MacLuhan,” January 




This is quintessential McLuhan, rephrasing his famous dictum “the medium is the message.”15 
For McLuhan, mass-communication media, like the fishes’ water, act upon our lives in a 
totalizing yet imperceptible manner, and they have the power to transform human societies to the 
extent that they define historical epochs.  
McLuhan continues his opening statement by characterizing his contemporary world in 
these techno-essentialist terms: “Today in the electric age, the vortex of electric services 
swallows the industrial technology of nineteenth century man and it throws back at us the occult, 
ESP, extra sensory perception. What has come back to us suddenly with the electric vortex is the 
hidden world, the inner world of the occult.”16 This is an astute observation—the connection 
between electronic media technologies and non-rational, spiritual knowledge—but Schaeffer is 
far from impressed: “I do not want to let you go on throwing around a metaphor that I think is 
vague, that I consider amusing, while you are such a precious man.”17 Instead of discussing lofty 
intellectual ideas, Schaeffer wants to establish common ground with McLuhan; he attempts to 
emphasize parallels between the two men’s lives, noting their shared background in engineering 
and that they are both interested in mysticism because of their Catholic faith (McLuhan balks at 
the association with the mystic). The conversation continues—just about—as the two men 
jockey for dominance, a competition Schaeffer easily wins, no doubt (at least in part) because the 
conversation takes place on his home turf. 
                                                
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
17. “Je ne veux pas vous laisser, er, continuer sur ce que j’appelle le lancer des métaphores que j’estime vague, que 
j’estime amusé, alors que vous êtes un homme si précieux.” Ibid. 
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Figure 4.1: Pierre Schaeffer and Marshall McLuhan debate in front of television cameras in 
1971. (Source: Getty Images). 
Along with his study on the impact of the printing press, published in 1962, McLuhan’s 
seminal work, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, of 1964, is a key text for media 
studies and media theory, and it raises many of the issues that he discusses with Schaeffer.18 It is 
in the latter work that he coins his “medium is the message” catchphrase, along with his 
distinction between “hot” and “cool” media. By “the extensions of man,” McLuhan means that 
all media are prostheses of the human—not only physical but mental. Sense-perception plays a 
significant, even foundational role in McLuhan’s thought: it is extended by media and, at the 
                                                
18. Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2011); Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Berkeley, CA: Gingko Press, 
2003). 
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same time, provides a blueprint for those media: “Every culture and every age has its favorite 
model of perception and knowledge that it is inclined to prescribe for everybody and 
everything.”19 Thus, McLuhan’s theory of the relationship between the senses and media is 
based on a persistent trope: that a medium is sense-specific; that media can be mapped, one-to-
one, onto the senses. “The effects of technology,” McLuhan writes, “do not occur at the level of 
opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patters of perception steadily and without any 
resistance. The serious artist is the only person able to encounter technology with impunity, just 
because he is an expert aware of the changes in sense perception.”20 Had McLuhan repeated that 
last remark in the filmed discussion, he would surely have charmed Schaeffer. 
McLuhan has been made into something of a villain when it comes to the issue of 
dividing the senses; among historians of the senses, he is renowned as the inventor of what they 
call the Great Divide: the equation of the non-Moderns with non-literate, emotion-centered, 
oral/aural cultural traditions, and the Moderns with cultural practices involving visual cultural, 
literacy, and rationality. It is easy to be critical of McLuhan here, and many have been. Historian 
of the senses Mark Smith, for example, has criticized some of McLuhan’s assumptions: 
“McLuhan’s argument was over-theorized, under-researched, and took on an absolute quality, 
one that can leave readers with the impression that preliterate societies are exclusively oral-aural 
and emotional and that literate societies are exclusively visual and rational.”21 Yet splitting the 
modern from the non-modern in sweeping terms is by no means unique to McLuhan; and making 
                                                
19. McLuhan, Understanding Media, 7. 
20. Ibid., 31. 
21. Mark Smith, Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting and Touching History (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2007), 12. 
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large claims about the influential relationship between media and the senses is not, in itself, such 
a crazy idea. In many ways, it is this relationship that the discipline of media studies is built on. 
Dividing the Sensorium 
A key moment in the debate captured on film comes after McLuhan makes heavy going of a 
distinction between senses that are continuous (the visual field of fixed Euclidean space) and 
those that are discontinuous (touch, smell, sound, concrete poetry, musique concrète):  
Visual man lives in a space that is fixed Euclidean space. Rigid, continuous, 
rational logic. Visual space is rational. It is fixed, continuous; but all the other 
spaces are discontinuous. Touch is entirely discontinuous. Smell is discontinuous. 
Sound is discontinuous. The poetry concrète is based on touch. The musique 
concrète …22 
At the mention of the last, and with almost Pavlovian reflexes, Schaeffer pounces: 
The ear is touch, isn’t it? The ear is a portion of skin. But I hate to follow you in 
this absolutely arbitrary separation of the senses. I think that man has always 
managed to group together all his senses and understood his work in relation to all 
of them, at least earlier. I hate the segregation of the senses; I never allow it. [I 
hate] Your historical classification of the visible. But why continue playing? So, 
do not talk about the things we hate!23 
McLuhan’s comeback, that “Le technologie ségrégât les sens,” (technology separates the senses) 
is another example of his tendency towards media and technological determinism—rather than 
                                                
22. “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec MacLuhan.” 
23 “L’oreille, c’est toucher, n’est pas? L’oreille c’est une portion de peau. Mais je déteste vous suivre dans cette 
répartition absolument arbitraire à mon sens des sens. Je pense que l’homme, tous les temps et toujours, se toujours 
arrangé pour regroupé tous ses sens et compris les œuvres dans parmi si bien tout à l’heure. Je déteste la ségrégation 
des sens, je ne jamais admis. Votre classification historique visible. Mais pour quoi continuer jouer? Alors ne 
parlons pas des choses que nous détestons.” Ibid. 
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media extending humans (as his motto goes), humans, it seems, becomes extensions of media. 
But McLuhan is also no slouch; when Schaeffer expresses his disdain of the division of the 
senses, McLuhan’s “moi aussi” possesses a subtle power, adding weight to his opinion, as if to 
say I wish it were otherwise too but, sadly, it is the case. 
The reference to what has often been termed as the “sensorium” is an important reminder 
that experimentation with the senses does not necessarily have to take place within one sensory 
domain. Although I have difficulty with the projection of a non-Modern state of sensorial 
purity—an imagined time before the fall—I do not mean to suggest that we should simply return 
to a naive realism where the senses are concerned. 
There are two ideas where the sensorium is concerned: the modern and the primitive 
senses. This presupposes the nature-culture binary and aligns itself with the “natural,” to an 
origin point before the Fall, before corruption and the precision instruments of modernity and 
their dissection of what was once real feeling, authentic being of and in the world without 
knowing why and without being able to ask. While the sensorium is often alluded to in histories 
and theories of the senses, it does not have a secure meaning. I want to venture that this becomes 
a fetish or an object of fantasy, a way of limiting or restricting ourselves, or even a satisfaction 
for the desire for guilt on the part of we humans—and let’s face it, there is still an uneasy elision 
between histories of Modernity, whose purpose is to tell the history of the emergence of the 
modern subject and the object, which on another day might be called self-awareness and 
consciousness, with the emergence of the “human” more generally. Those two histories are (most 
probably) not the same.  
Recourse to the non-Modern sensorium, especially when in conjunction with recourse to 
the nature-culture divide, is to gesture towards an idealized, pure, archaic origin point, one that 
	 130 
perhaps recalls that elusive experience that Foucault sought (but did not find): experience before 
knowledge; a state of grace before the fall. There are obviously many reasons to be skeptical 
here. I’ll mention one in particular. To desire a lost, perfect sensorium is to accept the Moderns 
on their own terms; it is to take for granted that, in modernity, the senses have indeed been 
irrevocably divided (whether by media or through other kinds of discursive and material 
practices). As Schaeffer knows well, in practice experience defies any notion of the autonomy of 
the (five) modern senses. To put it curtly and to borrow from Bruno Latour: we have never been 
modern.24 
Schaeffer himself saw an essential link between the new media technologies of his day 
and the human senses. For him the connection was bilateral: media technology impacted upon 
the senses while also serving as sensorial prostheses. This symbiotic—perhaps “entwined” is 
better—relationship has its precursors: a similar notion has persisted where the arts are 
concerned—an art for each sense, reads the slogan.25 Schaeffer is clearly weary of such 
conceptions, and that is why he castigates McLuhan. However, while Schaeffer was outwardly 
invested in forms of multi-sensual experience, his experiments (and, as we have seen in Chapter 
2, even his theory) in musique concrète have been read as attempts to purge the auditory realm of 
all other sensory information; in other words, the at its core, his work was based on isolating a 
single medium and a single sensory domain. While clearly troubled by the notion of a divided 
sensorium, the issue is complicated where musique concréte is concerned; nevertheless, there are 
many similarities between Schaeffer and McLuhan—perhaps more than their discussion 
suggests. 
                                                
24. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge (MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
25. See Paul Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics part I," Journal of the 
History of Ideas (1951): 496-527. 
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 Sensory Education Overseas 
“My personal biography coincides with the history of the mass media,” Schaeffer tells 
communication theorist Anthony Wilden in another appearance in front of the cameras.26 This 
interview, filmed in 1972, was part of a publicity drive for Schaeffer’s Communication et 
Pouvoir; it sees the two men discuss the impact of the rapidly-growing mass media—at that 
moment, primarily radio and television. Recalling his biography, Schaeffer reveals the extent of 
his ambitions during the 1950s: “And I had a euphoric period where I found, I thought, that we 
would renew all the arts; that we would communicate with all the planet; that we would bring a 
wonderful civilization to underdeveloped countries. And I have changed a lot. And I think that 
(perhaps this is the emergence or the sadness of aging) all the mass media have aged a lot.”27 
Trailing off with tones nostalgic and melancholic, Schaeffer speaks with his characteristic 
humility, dismissing his earlier intentions for their naiveté, but his strategic distancing also 
suggests an uneasiness about his own position within the recent global history of the mass media. 
Particularly significant here is that in these words we see different aspects of Schaeffer’s work 
merging with one another; renewing the arts is uttered in the same breath as global 
communication and civilizing the developing world—activities ostensibly unrelated. 
Later in the interview, Wilden suddenly rounds on Schaeffer, calling him out for what he 
believes is an overly idealized and intellectualized position: “What about material, poverty, want, 
                                                
26. “Ma biographie personnelle coïncide avec l’histoire de masse media.” Pierre Schaeffer and Anthony Wilden, 
“Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec Anthony Wilden,” January 1, 1972, produced by the Office national de 
radiodiffusion télévision française, video, 16:06, http://www.ina.fr/video/CPF86633089/entretien-de-pierre-
schaeffer-avec-anthony-wilden-video.html.; Pierre Schaeffer, Machines À Communiquer: Pouvoir Et 
Communication (Paris: Seuil 1972). 
27. “J’ai un période euphorique où j’ai trouvé, j’ai cru, que nous allions renouveler tous les art; que nous allions 
communiqué avec tout le planent; que nous allions apporté un civilisation merveilleuse aux pays sous développée. 
Et j’ai beaucoup changé, et je trouve, est-ce que c’est peut-être là surgis où la tristesse de vieillir, que tous les mass 
media on beaucoup vieilli.” “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec Anthony Wilden.”  
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malnutrition? What good are these ideas to someone who’s starving to death? What good is this 
to, for instance, a Vietcong guerilla or an Indian on an American reservation?” Schaeffer’s 
structural analysis given in reply hardly helps his case: “Malnutrition stems from the fact that 
some developed countries have exhausted the resources of the planet.”28 Wilden continues: 
But you have it in the United States, and no doubt in France as well. It’s part of 
the social order. And one can talk about malnutrition biologically and 
malnutrition perhaps in terms of other forms of exploitation. That is to say: a 
system that prevents people from following their own way, their own creative 
possibilities. This has nothing to do with ideas as such except that ideas are used 
against them, but it has to do with material exploitation.29  
Schaeffer gracefully cools down the suddenly heated debate: 
Yes, but the difficulty is we must find solutions that are good for China, that are 
good for India, solutions that are ideologically different for different countries. 
When the universal force of the human spirit that says the Chinese are out, the 
Indians are out, but they are right to do things differently than we do in France or 
they do in the USA. It is to accept difference. But you are the specialist of 
difference. I know I am preaching to the converted30 
Schaeffer published a polemic in the Annales de Communication in 1954, laying out what 
he saw as the main problems and possible solutions for providing the colonies with improved 
communications. The state of broadcasting in the colonies was poor; addressing the issue meant 
working, Schaeffer claimed, with “one of the most paradoxical meeting points between European 
                                                
28. “La malnutrition vienne de fait que certain pays sur développée en épuisée les ressources de la planète.” Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. “Oui mais il faut bien que la difficulté c’est, par exemple, des solutions qui sont bonne pour la chine, et qui sont 
bonne pour l’inde, sont les solutions qui sont idéologiquement diffèrent pour les autres pays. Hors la force 
universalité de l’esprit humain vers que on dise les chinois ont hors, les Indes ont hors, mais ils ont raison de faites 
des choses qui sont diffèrent dis qu'on fait France ou étais unis. C’est admettre la différence. Mais vous vous êtes le 
spécialiste de différences, alors. Je sais bien je parle avec un convaincu.” Ibid. 
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culture and indigenous civilizations.”31 Here, Schaeffer understands the West as not so different 
to the Rest; he provides an interesting analogy between the folklore of the Malayan “indigenous 
population”—a designation that he does not apply to all Africans but rather to a certain 
population excluded from the European influence—and broadcasting technology: “[I]n a few 
years,” he writes, “the Dogon’s ‘cloud hook’ will be replaced by an antenna. It is magic that is 
right. The sky answers at fixed times; Unfortunately his language, often clouded by parasites, 
remains distant and sometimes cryptic.”32 
Where it existed, the magic of radio transmission was aimed at an “advanced European 
public” in the colonies, where the aim seems to have been to provide an “imitation of the 
metropolitan radio before or after the war.”33 But while the European model of broadcasting was 
an instrument designed to provide entertainment (or “leisure” as Schaeffer puts it), he believed 
that the carte blanche the colonial landscape provided invited a more pedagogical approach. 
“The primary needs of the indigenous masses who ask to be educated even before being 
informed, educated even before being able to appreciate artistic programs”34 does not come 
innocently. The tone here laments the situation in the West: The public there has no conception 
of the true power of radio, thus mere leisure should not be the only goal—while the implication 
                                                
31. “La Radiodiffusion dans les territoires d’outremer est l’un des points de rencontre les plus paradoxaux entre 
culutre européen et civilisations autochtones.”  Pierre Schaeffer, “Vers un réseau de radiodiffusion outremer,” 
Annales de Communication (1954): 45-47; here, 45. 
32. “En quelques années le ‘crochet à nuage’ des Dogons fait place à une antenne. C’est la magic qui avait raison. 
Le ciel répond à heures fixes ; malheureusement son langage, souvent brouillé de parasites, reste lointain et, parfois, 
sibyllin.” Ibid. 
33. “Les émissions actuelles, en dépit de certains efforts, notamment en A.O.F., A.E.F. et à Madagascar, sont surtout 
destinées à un public européen évolué et, il faut bien le dire, à l’imitation de la radio métropolitaine d’avant ou 
d’après guerre.” Ibid. 
34. “ besoins premiers des masses autochtones qui demandent à être instruites avant même d’être informées, 
éduquées avant même d’être en mesure d’apprécier des programmes artistiques Ibid. 
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that the colonies provide an opportunity to “get things right” seems at the very least a little tone 
deaf. 
This is one of the key quotations: 
To be honest, the radio we are thinking of is not a public radio, which would look 
too much like a propaganda organ. Programs need to be aligned primarily with 
basic education techniques, secondly with revolution and the advancement of 
local cultures. This radio must address the mass, but touch the individual in his 
privacy, his dignity and, often, his distant loneliness.35 
This is Schaeffer’s critique of the situation as he found it:  
Until now, only the notion of a ‘station’ has gone overseas. This notion does not 
correspond to reality. The ‘station’ of Brazzaville for example, although 
established in A.E.F., is not intended for African listeners, it technically 
constitutes a relay from the metropolis to the most distant countries. The waves go 
everywhere and may not fall anywhere if too particularistic points of view do not 
develop them into a larger ‘network’ made up of ‘meshes which, relaying each 
other from time to time, cover as large a whole as the overseas territories at the 
lowest cost.36 
Clearly Schaeffer was an advocate for the transformative potential of radio. He imagined 
an “upside down” radio, where the content spread by the mass media would come directly from 
the people. He gives little indication for how this would happen practically; and it perhaps 
reveals a certain idealization of the “people” of the developing world versus the power structures 
                                                
35. “ Pour tout dire, la radio à laquelle nous pensons n’est pas une radio de place publique, qui ressemblerait trop à 
un organe de propagande. Les programmes doivent être alignés en premier lieu sur les techniques d’éducation de 
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territoires d’outremer, et ce aux moindres frais.” Ibid., 45-46. 
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of the West—in which, of course, he was a powerful force. While Schaeffer’s intent here is 
clearly to improve the situation, he does seem to have failed to see, with his vision of an “upside-
down radio,” his own role in the establishment of this communication infrastructure: 
representing the European, white elite, his thoughts on what should happen and how are certainly 
not intention-less actions. It will depend on one’s political opinions—Wilden certainly voiced a 
particular brand of objection “what about malnutrition … etc.” But Schaeffer’s goal is by no 
means frivolous; he wanted to empower these communities to organize and represent their own 
cultures because he saw that as the means towards prosperity. 
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Figure 4.2: Map of the French Radio Overseas Network in 1955.37 
Navigating the High-Low Divide 
A different example of Schaeffer’s attempts to reach a larger audience is reflected in a letter he 
received in October of 1959, from journalist Marc Pierret. Schaeffer had inquired about the 
                                                
37. The original caption under the map reads: “L’un des enjeux de la Radio d’outre-mer fut d’augmenter le 
rayonnement de ses stations, dont le réseau d’émetteurs était totalement indigent lorsque Pierre Schaeffer effectua 
ses premières missions en 1953.” [One of the stakes of Overseas Radio was to increase the coverage of its stations, 
whose transmitter network was in total disrepair when Pierre Schaeffer made his first missions in 1953.] The map is 
from Étienne Damome, “Vers un réseau outre-mer,” in Les Constructions Impatientes, eds. Martin Kaltenecker and 
Karine Le Bail (Paris: CNRS, 2012), 164-177; here, 177. 
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possibility of having a film entitled “Expériences musicales 59” shown on television and at the 
cinema; presumably he had asked Pierret (who interviewed Schaeffer and has had that collection 
published) for advice and to pitch it to television executives.38 The response was perhaps not 
exactly what Schaeffer had hoped. Pierret’s main concerns are instructive. “… I think [the 
film’s] content is good enough for us to consider using it,” he writes, continuing with the 
following caveat: “Provided, that is, that it is not regarded as a purely didactic work, nor as a 
demonstrative exposition addressed only to an elite. It would be inappropriate to define it as 
entertainment.”39  
On the other hand, Pierret suggests exactly a pedagogical role for Schaeffer’s film outside 
of France: “More generally, within the framework of Cultural Exchanges, [the film] would be 
most at home abroad in the French Institutes: in France, in the circuits dependent on the Ministry 
of National Education.”40
 
Most telling of all, however, is the following suggestion: “Although 
the commercial distribution of the film as a full-length feature film seems to me compromised by 
the poor quality of the images, I would propose that it could be projected for free at some 
specialized cinemas (Studio Bertrand, Ursuline’s, etc.). It would be interesting to see the public’s 
                                                
38 “Expériences musicales 59: notes préparatoires,” 1959, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, B194 D1854 1.7.2, L’Institut 
Mémoires de l’édition contemporaine (IMEC). L’abbaye d’Ardenne, Caen, France. 
39. “Néanmoins je pense que son contenu est assez positif pour en envisager une utilisation rationnelle. A condition 
toutefois de ne considérer ce film ni comme une œuvre purement didactique, ni comme un exposé démonstratif 
s’adressant à une élite. Il ne conviendrait pas d’avantage de le définir comme un divertissement.” Marc Pierret, 
Letter to Pierre Schaeffer, October 10, 1959, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, B194 D1854 1.7.2, L’Institut Mémoires de 
l’édition contemporaine (IMEC). L’abbaye d’Ardenne, Caen, France. 
40. “D’une manière plus générale et dans le cadre des Echanges Culturels, elle trouverait également le meilleur 





“For the T.V. only: Presentation of short technical sequences. To be incorporated 
into a series of broadcasts intended for the broadest audience.”42 The film script itself exhibits 
Schaeffer’s dramatic flair. It is interesting to gauge, from the kind of material Schaeffer 
considers appropriate, the kind of audience he intended to address. 
Conclusion 
In many ways, Schaeffer's research experiments and public service are obviously and explicitly 
one of a piece: his research, after all, was sponsored generously by the state. And such 
sponsorship speaks more generally about larger music-historical trends; that an “experimenter” 
in sound would also preside over the modernization of broadcasting media apparatus in overseas 
territories bares an indelible mark of its time. Such a context was prepared by the long history of 
the figure of the composer, who by the postwar period had been transformed into a researcher. 
The elision of Schaeffer’s experimental research and his public work raises difficult ethical 
questions, but having surveyed some of his attempts to truly engage the public, such concerns are 
perhaps allied.  
Schaeffer was fond of declaring his work a failure. Writing in his diary while working on 
his Orphée, he offers the following self-appraisal: “Already a failure musically, inconsistent in 
substance, this Orphée is coming into being like a monster, is constructing itself like the cells of 
a cancer. So I will fail courageously. But what I can expect meanwhile is, for sixty hours a week, 
                                                
41. “Bien que la distribution commerciale du film dans les conditions normales jumelage avec un long métrage) me 
parais se compromise par la mauvaise qualité des images, il serait opportun d’en proposer la projection gratuite dans 
certains cinémas spécialisés (Studio Bertrand, Ursulines etc.). Les réactions du public seraient intéressantes à 
connaître.” Ibid. 
42. Pour la T.V. seulement: Présentation de courtes séquences techniques. A incorporer dans une suite d’émissions 
s’adressant au public le plus large et dont nous serions producteurs. Ibid. 
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a veritable time in Hell.”43 Most likely, he would have viewed his attempts at public outreach in 
the same light. At the same time, Schaeffer’s high-profile cannot be ignored; he wielded an 
enormous amount of influence, both within the avant-garde musical world and the French 
broadcasting network. 
A counter example of Schaeffer’s image as a failed public figure is the strikingly 
glamorous write-up that he received in American Vogue magazine, of all places, in 1953.44 
There, he is presented as a “curious young man-traveler, writer of novels and travel stories, 
engineer, inventor, and amateur musician.” The article represents Schaeffer’s experiments with 
sound favorably, emphasizing it’s futuristic quality while denigrating music, unlike Schaeffer’s, 
that has more to do with “fireside domesticity.”45 In her enthusiastic endorsement, Peggy 
Glanville-Hicks, the article’s author, offers her own listening advice: “It does not require, or 
invite, the complete concentration of the mind; rather, it seeps in at a subconscious level, 
suggesting and underlining moods and the free-association activity of the unfocused brain.”46 
Glanville-Hicks characterizes listening to musique concrète “propound[ing] a world of the mind 
dehumanized, outside individual entity and scope, universal, interplanetary; an outer space where 
being develops a supreme indifference to personal incarnation and its specific viewpoints 
warmed by blood.” Despite the euphoric tone, these descriptions of reduced listening have a dark 
side, especially when considered in relation to Schaeffer’s doctrine of audile technique, 
discussed in Chapter 2. If in the early 1950s Schaeffer appeared, at least to one American 
                                                
43. Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, 98. 
44. Peggy Glanville-Hicks, “Tapesichord: The Music of Whistle and Bang,” Vogue (July 1953): 80-81; 108. 
45. Ibid., 80.  
46	Ibid.,	108.	
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reviewer, as the harbinger of a dehumanized kind of listening, it is perhaps no surprise that his 
engagement with the public was not more successful.  
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Concluding Remarks 
There are many threads, leads, avenues of inquiry, unanswered (and some unanswerable) 
questions that remain. How am I to make sense of it all? I cannot make everything in the 
preceding pages add up exactly, but that, in many ways, has been my point all along. There are, 
however, some broad themes that have emerged, and lessons to be learned, from the complex 
web that my material has spun. 
Schaeffer and Tomatis were both individuals with deeply personal ways of thinking. 
Despite the task of the historian to always contextualize the individual’s knowledge, to relate it 
to a broader social setting, we should not overlook the idiosyncratic ways in which both 
Schaeffer and Tomatis—as networks, if you like—drew together so many disparate sources to 
produce a unique collage of thoughts, technologies, and practices. Both men took seriously the 
task of constructing patch-work world views, rather than adopting and championing a single 
ideological position or philosophical school of thought. This resistance to dogmatism, as well as 
a commitment to interdisciplinary thought, allowed both to fashion professional careers that were 
in many ways in tune with their deepest personal concerns (beliefs about what the universe is, for 
example). For both men, music—Western Art Music—was a red thread that pulled together the 
diverse range of elements. And, of course, listening—the experience of music—was the activity 
that fascinated them the most. 
Another strong connection is both men’s desire to correct perceived problems in 
individuals: Tomatis endeavored to restore his patients to their optimal state; Schaeffer insisted 
that his audience should be deconditioned and reconditioned with his new kind of listening. 
There are many explanations for this desire. One interpretation could be that their attempts to 
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redirect the history of humankind was a symptom of a broader need to “reset” culture at large. 
Schaeffer especially, who was possibly more utopian than Tomatis, sought to establish a “new” 
culture, one that would shed the burden of the West’s past culture, which was, in the postwar 
climate, said (and is still said) to be corrupt. Making a case for this interpretation is difficult 
without recourse to a mythic “postwar” ethos, but, at the very least, we can observe a concerted 
effort, by the French government in Schaeffer’s case and by the medical profession in Tomatis’s, 
to encourage experimentation. This institutional approach to experimentalism—and of the avant 
garde, which Georgina Born has dealt with in some length—took hold following the Second 
World War.1 In that era, elite culture moved towards a paradigm focused on research, which, in 
France at least, was encouraged by the state. 
Another significant connection between Tomatis and Schaeffer is their relationship with 
the mainstreams of culture that flowed around them. Both were outsiders—experimenters—
testing the limits of the possible, regardless of conventional wisdom. Who knows where this 
personality trait comes from, but with historical distance we can frame this position on the 
fringes as an historiographical problem: where exactly do Tomatis and Schaeffer fit in our 
broader history of music, and our broader history of ideas in the West? 
I have tried to avoid a debate about whether my protagonists are modernists or 
postmodernists, because I do not think that they easily fit into either category—furthermore, 
these categories themselves are less appealing than they once were, and there may be good 
reason to discard of them altogether. In any case, Schaeffer, it could be argued, exhibited an 
avant gardist wish to destroy contemporary culture and replace it with a new one. Is the avant 
                                                
1. Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-garde 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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garde a product of modernity even though it seeks to undermine its foundations?  Or is it a 
symptom of postmodernism? In many ways, the intellectual movement that we call 
postmodernism is said to derive from jaded beliefs in grand narratives of the Enlightenment 
project, which became suspect thanks to its perceived failure, which was confirmed with aplomb 
(and an atomic bomb) by the horrors of the Second World War.2  
I can imagine a cogent argument that places both Schaeffer and Tomatis firmly in the 
postmodernist category. As “hybrid” thinkers that entertain not only rationality but spirituality, 
they could easily qualify. But I think the important point is that they were by no means anti-
humanist; they somehow managed to eschew postmodernist pessimism and narratives of the 
“post-human” and instead connect their ideas to a longer history of thought, one that could 
loosely be understood as humanism in the broadest sense. That they managed to resist the lures 
of scientism and rationalism, while maintaining a humanist core, points towards an unwritten 
history of Western (but perhaps, in a more general sense, of human) culture that is not, also, the 
history of modernity—or its negation, for that matter. 
One way this issue has surfaced is through work that attempts to broaden our notion of 
modernity, to dispute the story that scientists, say, have told about themselves—a story involving 
rationalism, reason, and objectivity. Bruno Latour has gone to great lengths to argue that “we 
have never been modern,” at least not on the terms that the Moderns themselves (ourselves?) 
deploy.3 And Latour is not alone. Anthropological and sociological perspectives on the modern 
                                                
2. See Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity Versus Postmodernity,” New German Critique 22, no. 1 (1981): 3-14. See also 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972). 
3. See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); and Bruno 
Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). See also Thomas Laqueur, “Why the Margins Matter: Occultism and the 
Making of Modernity,” Modern Intellectual History 3, no. 1 (2006): 111-135. 
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West, developed over the past quarter century, have redirected research on cultures of modernity, 
making strange what is often taken for granted about the Moderns—namely, that they are 
modern.4  
Lifting the rock of musical modernity reveals vibrant non-modern lifeforms; it also 
begins a historiographical renegotiation of the power structures that separate modern cultures 
from the non-modern, paving the way for comparative work that can bridge the still-persistent 
conceptual divides of West vs rest, elite vs popular, high vs low. I am not suggesting that we 
dispense with the idea of modernity altogether, but rather that, just like my inquiry into 
experience, we acknowledge the limits of our models. In other words, can the words and deeds 
of our historical actors escape the force of modernity? Or to put it directly to the historian: can 
we entertain the possibility that actions and thoughts have a history of their own, one quite 
separate from the historical narratives into which we might want to force our subjects. Must there 
be an incompatibility between our concepts and modes of thoughts that consider human behavior 
in the broadest terms possible—the Latourian network, perhaps—and our detailed accounts of 
individuals’ lives and experiences? 
I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation that I wanted to avoid the tendency for 
social constructivist arguments to (ironically) claim absolute knowledge of the world. My 
criticism is intended to register a confusion surrounding what was once a theoretical method—
discourse analysis, in whatever guise—which has, inexplicably, imperceptibly metamorphosed 
into an ontological argument: not only might we describe experience as affected by our holy 
                                                
4. As well as the previously cited works by Latour, see Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists 
and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). For an anthropological 
perspective, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
	 145 
trinity of forces—discourse, material, and practice—but, those three elemental forces, when 
arranged in specific configurations—call it a network, a mangle, a gathering, the social, a web, a 
matrix, call it what you want—produce experience. A miraculous transfiguration, the 
transubstantiation of intellectual concepts into reality itself. 
Again, I want to resist the totalizing effect of this kind of thinking which, if taken to 
extremes, can feel mechanistic and overly determined. This means taking diagrams like Figure 
C.1, Latour’s depiction of what he calls the “modernist settlement,” and asking, is this it?  
 
Figure C.1: Bruno Latour’s “Modernist Settlement.”5 
 
                                                
5 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 24. 
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I suggest Figure C.2 as an alternative. Perhaps, in seeking out experience, we must look 
to the negative space surrounding grand ontologies like Latour’s. This heuristic of negative space 
invites us to peer into the gaps between the known, to explore the uncharted territories where the 
force of various systems cannot be felt. 
 
Figure C.2: A new settlement. 
As far as our histories of music are concerned, Tomatis and Schaeffer perhaps dwell in 
the negative space that lurks behind our prominent narratives. Could a musical history of the 
twentieth century also be a history of sound processing, one in which the advent of the 
technological facility to manipulate sound spurred action in diverse fields that sought ways of 
manipulating the listener? 
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I want to return for a moment to the Schaeffer-McLuhan exchange, discussed in detail in Chapter 
2. My favorite moment is where Schaeffer cajoles McLuhan, asking if it is true that the media 
theorist has, as Schaeffer has heard on the grapevine, a sign above his desk that reads “A 
specialist abstains.”6 McLuhan denies it, and Schaeffer suggests it must be a legend. Schaeffer 
then shares a Chinese inscription that he has in his office. It reads “Mistakes can be taught, but 
the truth cannot.”7 Paradoxically, Schaeffer introduces that saying as “false.” 
I also have an inscription above my desk. It is a short poem/thought experiment/piece of 
performance art by Yoko Ono, called “Water Piece,” and it reads: “Steal a moon on the water 
with a bucket. Keep stealing until no moon is seen on the water.”8 That’s exactly my feeling as I 
arrive at this concluding section. The moon will fade and the sun come up, no matter how much 
furious progress is made emptying a lake of its water, with a bucket. It might be tempting, in this 
new dawn, to feel as though one has let Ono down, that all that splashing around was in vain. But 
look again at the instruction; nowhere does she suggest how to make the moon disappear, just 
that one should continue until it does. Mission accomplished. 
                                                
6. Schaeffer’s phrase is “spécialiste exceptionire.” “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec MacLuhan.” 
7. “L’erreur s’enseigne, la vérité non.” Ibid. 
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i. These photographs were taken at the Mozart Brain Lab in Sint-Truiden, Belgium, where a Tomatis Museum holds 
the doctors personal archive. The Electronic Ears are ordered here according to their age, beginning with the oldest. 




























































Alfred Tomatis’s Spectral Analyses of Caruso’s Voiceii 
 
Figure 7 
Un fa 3 dièse. En premier lieu nous reproduirons: un fa3 dièse, un ut4 dièse [figure 8], 
enregistré en 1901. Ces deux spectres n’offrent aucune caractéristique du son de qualité: il n’y a 
pas d’harmoniques prédominants; on ne reconnaît pas encore la qualité Carusienne. 
 
An F-sharp 3. To begin we will reproduce an F-sharp 3 and a C-sharp 4 [figure 8], recorded in 
1901. These two spectra do not exhibit any characteristics of the “good” quality sound 
associated with Caruso. Because there are no predominant harmonics, we cannot yet identify the 
Carusian sound. 
                                                
ii. Alfred Tomatis, “La correction de la voix chantée,” paper presented at the Cours International de Phonologie et 




Un ut4 dièse. On y trouve toujours: outre le son fondamental peu important ne dépassant que 
rarement 30 à 40 dB, une gerbe d’harmoniques élevés au-delà de 2.000 c/s, extrêmement dense, 
extrêmement riche. Cet ensemble est caractéristique du son Carusien. 
 
A C-sharp 4. Besides the small fundamental sound rarely exceeding 30 to 40 dB, we always find 
a shower of harmonics higher than 2,000 c/s [cycles per second; a prior measurement unit of 
frequency before Hertz (Hz)], extremely dense, extremely rich. This distribution of frequencies is 




Un la 3 bémol caractéristique du son Carusien; outre le son fondamental de faible intensité, on 
note une large bande d’harmoniques élevés au-delà de 2.000 c/s; de plus on relève au passage 
l’importance relative de la gerbe des harmoniques par rapport au son fondamental. 
 
An A-flat 3, characteristic of the Carusian sound. In addition to the low-intensity fundamental 
sound, there is a wide band of harmonics higher than 2,000 c/s; moreover, note the relative 




Un si3 bémol sur une nasale (AN). L’évolution Carusienne s’est poursuivie, la voix est devenue 
plus aérienne, plus veloutée, plus en tête; on reconnaît le son fondamental en suivant le spot de 
la gauche vers la droite, au niveau du troisième trait vertical; en continuant le trajet du spot vers 
la droite on trouve entre les quatrième et cinquième traits verticaux une bosse répondant à la 
consonance nasale du AN; plus à droite encore la gerbe très riche des harmoniques élevées. 
 
A B-flat on a nasal AN [vowel-sound]. A the Carusian evolution continued, his voice became 
more airy, more velvety; we recognize the fundamental sound by following the curve from left to 
right, up until the third vertical line; between the fourth and fifth vertical lines there is a bump 





Un si3 bémol sur un A; on retrouve une image identique à la précédente sans participation 
nasale. 
 





Ce spectre répond à un la3 bémol émis en 1906 par Caruso lors de sa belle époque; à l’audition 
ce son apparaît de mauvaise qualité, il est dur, serré, pénible. On voit l’augmentation 
considérable du son fondamental, tandis que les harmoniques sont réduits à une seule pointe, 
d’intensité à peine égale à celle du son fondamental. 
 
This spectrum shows an A-flat 3 emitted in 1906 by Caruso (at the time of his belle époque); to 
the ear, this note sounds poor: it is hard, tight, and painful. We can see an considerable increase 
in volume of the fundamental sound while the harmonics are reduced to a single point of an 




Un la3 sur un A; ce son a été émis par Caruso plus tardivement vers 1910-1912; on constate un 
diminution des harmoniques élevés, tandis que le rapport des valeurs relatives du son 
fondamental aux harmoniques se modifie au bénéfice des graves; nous notons au passage que 
l’apparition des sons graves par étalement du son fondamental vers la gauche du spectre, se 
traduit à l’audition par des sons de gorge. 
 
An A3 on an A [vowel sound]; this sound was emitted by Caruso around 1910-1912; there is a 
diminution of the high harmonics, while the ratio of the fundamental sound to the harmonics is 
modified for the benefit of the bass; we note in passing that increased bass sounds surrounding 




Plus typique encore ce la3 sur I, la gerbe élevée s’amenuise de plus en plus, tandis que 
s’accroissent les sonorités de gorge. 
 
Even more typical is this A3 on an I [vowel sound]. The harmonics diminish more and more, 




Ce si3 sur un é apporte de façon plus démonstrative encore la preuve de la chute des aigus qui 
diminuent dans leur intensité, l’augmentation du son fondamental, et surtout l’apparition très 
important du son de gorge traumatisant. 
 
This B3 on an é [vowel sound] provides, even more demonstratively, evidence of the falling 
highs (their decrease in intensity), the increase of the fundamental sound, and the very 




Sur ce spectre, répondant à un la3 sur un é, on ne reconnaît plus les éléments caractéristiques 
du son Carusien, il rappelle de façon frappante le spectre de la figure 7. 
  
On this spectrum, depicting an A3 on a é [vowel sound], one no longer recognizes the 





Il s’agit là d’un son émis sur un si3 sur un A, le son fondamental a pris une importance 
exagérée, il atteint une intensité qui dépasse largement 70 dB. 
 
This is a B3 on an A [vowel sound]. The fundamental sound has taken on exaggerated 




Pierre Schaeffer in Conversation with Marshall McLuhan: Transcription and Translationiii 
Guy Demur (interviewer): Vous avez dit un chose qui m’apparut très intéressant. Vous avez dit 
le poisson ne sait pas, ne connait pas l’eau dans laquelle il vie. Et vous, vous êtes un 
philosophe dix ans de la télévision et vous n’aimez pas le télévision? 
You said something that interests me very much. You said that fish do not know that they 
live in water. You have been a philosopher of television for ten years, and you do not like 
television? 
Translator: You don’t like T.V.? 
Marshall McLuhan: You? Err, the media are environments. Comme l’eau pour le poisson. They 
are service environments, and, um, they each is [sic] a vortex, to use the Cartesian 
metaphor. The, um, every medium is a vortex. For example, the vortex of Guttenberg 
swallowed the whole medieval world and destroyed it, and then brings back the world of 
antiquity, taken from antiquity a version of probably the medieval world within. Today in 
the electric age, the vortex of electric services swallows the industrial technology of 
nineteenth century man and it throws back at us the occult, ESP, extra sensory 
perception. What has come back to us suddenly with the electric vortex is the hidden 
world, the inner world of the occult. 
Pierre Schaeffer: Non, je ne veux vous peut vous laisser les plus de loin. Est-ce que vous venez 
de dire … err, je le dis, avec la, franche dise amicale qui lui caractérisais un échange de 
gens connu, c’est le McLuhan que je déteste. Non, je vous aime beaucoup mieux que ça. 
Je ne veux pas vous laisser, er, continuer sur ce que j’appelle le lancer des métaphores 
que j’estime vague, que j’estime amusé, alors que vous êtes un homme si précieux. 
No, I do not want to let you continue any further. Have you just said … err, I say, with all 
frankness and friendliness, that he [the interviewer?] characterized an exchange between 
well-known people, that I hate McLuhan. No, I like you much better than that. I do not 
want to let you go on throwing around a metaphor that I think is vague, that I consider 
amusing, while you are such a precious man. 
McLuhan: The metaphor of Descartes, vortex … 
Schaeffer: Non, oui, Descartes n’est pas spécialement de mes amis, ni dès votre. Non, vous 
permettez, dans la maelstrom, vous permettez, je vous tends d’une main, n’est pas, pour 
                                                
iii. Pierre Schaeffer, Guy Dumur, and Marshall McLuhan. “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec MacLuhan,” January 
1, 1973, produced by Office national de radiodiffusion télévision française, video, 11:34, 
http://www.ina.fr/video/CPF86633088/entretien-de-pierre-schaeffer-avec-mac-luhan-video.html.  
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ne pas laisser en Français dans le maelstrom d’une métaphore trop facile. Je veux vous 
dire ce que j’aime chez vous. 
No, yes, Descartes is not especially one of my friends, nor of yours. No, in the maelstrom, 
if I may, I extend to you a hand not leave you, in French, in the maelstrom of an overly 
simple metaphor. I want to tell you what I like about you. 
McLuhan: Ah! The metaphor founded, err … Baudelaire built his work on the maelstrom. 
Schaeffer: Nous nous ne garons pas. Je vais vous dire moi l’hommage que je désire vous rendre, 
cette un hommage épineux.  
Let’s not bore ourselves. I will tell you the tribute I wish to pay to you. This is a thorny 
tribute. 
Translator: It’s a backhanded compliment. 
Schaeffer: Je dirais que derrière nos portraits officiels, derrière la garniture de les chemisés 
lesquelles très vide, il y a des choses assez amusant, n’est pas, nous sommes ingénieures 
tous les deux, au départ. Nous avons été des enfants, des enfants quel venir … 
I would say that behind our official portraits, behind our masks, there are some pretty 
funny things, aren’t there? We were both engineers, initially. We were children, children 
who came … 
McLuhan: I began life as an engineer. 
Schaeffer: Voila. Nous avons aussi quelque, quelque grand mysticisme.  
There you go. We are also both interested in mysticism. 
McLuhan: No.  
Schaeffer: Dis en brièvement, vous êtes plus ou moins converti au catholicisme. 
To put it briefly, you have, more or less, converted to Catholicism 
McLuhan: Oh! But not mystic. 
Schaeffer: Moi, je garderais dix ans de mon Christianisme volontiers quelque mystique. 
I would consider my ten years of voluntary Christianity somewhat mystic. 
McLuhan: Ah! C’est un métaphore vague! 
Schaeffer: Mais ce qui est intéressant c’est que dans votre bureau, m’a-t-on dit, il y a une 
inscription, “spécialiste, s’abstenir,” c’est vrai ?  
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But, what's interesting is that, in your office, there is an inscription that reads "A 
specialist abstains” Is that right? 
McCluhan: No. 
Schaeffer: C’est la légende. Dans mon bureau il y a une inscription en chinois, qui est d’ailleurs 
fausse et que j’adore et que je vous confie : c’est “L’erreur s’enseigne, la vérité non.” 
It is a legend. In my office, there is a Chinese inscription that is also false, that I adore, 
and that I will tell you. It is: “Mistakes can be taught, but the truth cannot.” 
McLuhan: Toujours a paradox. Visual man lives in a space that is fixed Euclidean space. Rigid, 
continuous, rational logic. Visual space is rational. It is fixed, continuous; but all the 
other spaces are discontinuous. Touch is entirely discontinuous. Smell is discontinuous. 
Sound is discontinuous. The poetry concrète is based on touch. The musique concrète … 
Schaeffer: L’oreille, c’est toucher, n’est pas? L’oreille c’est une portion de peau. Mais je déteste 
vous suivre dans cette répartition absolument arbitraire à mon sens des sens. Je pense que 
l’homme, tous les temps et toujours, se toujours arrangé pour regroupé tous ses sens et 
compris les œuvres dans parmi si bien tout à l’heure. Je déteste la ségrégation des sens, je 
ne jamais admis. Votre classification historique visible. Mais pour quoi continuer jouer? 
Alors ne parlons pas des choses que nous détestons. 
The ear is touch, isn’t it? The ear is a portion of skin. But I hate to follow you in this 
absolutely arbitrary separation of the senses. I think that man has always managed to 
group together all his senses and understood his work in relation to all of them, at least 
earlier. I hate the segregation of the senses; I never allow it. [I hate] Your historical 
classification of the visible. But why continue playing? So, do not talk about the things we 
hate! 
McLuhan: [speaking over Schaeffer] I don’t agree with that. Je déteste aussi. Le technologie 
ségrégât les sens. L’homme littéraire has a need of continuous discourse. [addressing the 
translator] Tell him. L’homme littéraire a la [sic.] besoin de la discours [sic.] continue. 
Pas de dialogue. Avec l’acoustique comes dialogue. The literary man leaves … 
[inaudible] … gives lectures, no dialogue. 
Demur: La télévision permet le dialogue? 
Does television allow dialogue? 
McLuhan: No, because only newspaper men are on television, so they don’t understand 
dialogue. 
Schaeffer: Voila! [inaudible] Que le pendent de début de votre vie comme le début de ma vie. 
Nous avons été fanatiques de mass médias. Pense-que comme la vouait? 
Here is! [inaudible] During the beginning of your life was like the beginning of my life. 
We were fanatics of the mass media. Do you think so? 
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Translator: Were you ever a fanatic of mass media? 
McLuhan: No. 
Schaeffer: Non, je parle des première vingt année de votre expérience. 
No, I'm talking about the first twenty years of your life. 
McLuhan: I have always found them very amusing. I have never taken them seriously. 
Schaeffer: Est-ce que nous pouvons pour laisse au moins ce point comme cœur au faire amuser 
que nous avons avancé une expérience personnelle et en le même temps si que l’histoire 
continuer nous somme devenu de plus en plus critique sur les mass media, vous et moi. 
Est-ce qu’on peut trouver au moins ce point d’accord. 
Can we at least allow this point, as far as to amuse ourselves: we both had personal 
experiences [with the mass media] and at the same time, as the story has continued, we 
have become more and more critical about the mass media. You and I. Can we find at 
least this point of agreement? 
McLuhan: I am not a critic, I am a student. 
Demur: Vos points de vues à tous deux sont inconciliable. Mais alors, en plus de mon dit, n’est 
pas, qu’est-ce que vous faites en fait parce que … Bon vous vous dites que vous êtes dans 
la télévision malgré tout vous en parlé beaucoup. McLuhan qui ne y ait pas en parle 
beaucoup également. Alors, qu’est-ce que vous faite, tous les deux? Qu’est-ce que vous 
faites? Vous êtes là pour simplement étudier, ou constater un phénomène avec 
scepticisme? 
Your points of view are irreconcilable. But what are you actually doing? Because you say 
you're in the TV world, or at least you talk a lot about it. McLuhan does not speak as 
much about it. So, what are you doing, both of you? What do you do? Are you there to 
simply study or to critique a phenomenon with skepticism? 
Schaeffer: Je pensais la différence entre McLuhan et moi ce que McLuhan a beaucoup succès 
qu’on lui écoute beaucoup et moi très peu. Par conséquence il est un d’éclair bascule des 
fer. Et je veux bien savoir ce que McLuhan le temps de s’énerve dans les couettes 
immenses.  
I think the difference between McLuhan and me is that McLuhan has a lot of success and 
is listened to a lot whereas I am not. As a consequence [inaudible]. And I want to know 
how McLuhan has the time to get upset in the choruses. 
McLuhan: I am a satirical observer. All my work is satirical. 
Schaeffer: Oui, je pense qu’on le comprend. Mais, je vous demandais tout à l’heure, et je crois 
c’est une négation important. Est-ce-que l’on d’une vie, qui comme notre biographie qui 
nous êtes très commune et poussé la naissance des mass media et peut-être le rapport j’ai, 
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et je crois leur déclin. Est-ce que vous assentie comme moi qu’il y a une courbe dans 
l’histoire court mais déjà changent les mass médias. 
Yes, I think I understand. But, I asked you earlier, and I think it's an important negation: 
is the life of a life, which like our biographies is very similar, marry the birth of the mass 
media and perhaps the report I have, and I believe their decline. Do you agree with me 
that there is a trajectory of this short history that has already changed the course of the 
mass media? 
McLuhan: If the coverage of events is thousands of times bigger than the events. The war in 
Vietnam is a very small little war but the coverage is huge. The real war today is the 
media themselves. Coverage has become … [trails off] 
Schaeffer: Je suis heureux de trouver en fin quelque choses que j’estime être le plus important 
de la confusion. N’important qu’on aime ou qu’on n’aime pas le masse media quand sois 
pour ou contre. Même pourtant, c’est ridicule rire et ça je suis … Je crois vous avez dire 
de bien voire bien compris que les mass media sont telle même devenu l’évènement, le 
sort que tous les problèmes politique maintenant sont n’ont pas de s’exprimé á travers de 
le media, mais de posséder le media. Vous êtes d’accord? 
I am happy to finally find some things that I consider to be the most important of the 
confusion. It does not matter how much we love or do not like the mass media, whether 
we’re for or against it. Even so, it's ridiculous to laugh and that I am … I think you have 
said well or even understood that the mass media are truly becoming the event, that the 
fate of all the political problems today do not only concern what is expressed through the 
media but also who owns it. Do you agree? 
Translator: The whole point is to possess media and not speak through them. 
McLuhan: But politics are now for the … pour les oiseaux. Les images have taken over. Politics 
sont fini.  
Schaeffer: Oui, toujours un en tirer par un bon mot. Mais les oiseaux ont peurs aussi tuer leurs 
œufs, n’est pas?  
Yes, always one to get in a bon mot. But birds are also afraid their eggs will die. 
Translator: Sometimes the birds’ eggs get hatched before they want to. 
McLuhan: Sometimes a little bird can tell you a lot. 
Schaeffer: Question. Est-ce que en vous un consulte, est-ce que au canada ou étais unis les gens 
de masse media qui demande le conseil? Et quelle leur dit vous? 
Question. Are you a consultant? Do people in the mass media in Canada or the USA ask 
for your advice? And what did you tell them? 
McLuhan: No, they can find all the answers in my books. They don’t have to come to me. 
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Schaeffer: Pourquoi dites-vous dans le dernière entretien avec Sterne, par exemple, qu’une 
bonne connaissance de la dynamique de media permettrait qu’on eut de cet dynamique et 
qu’on améliore les media? 
Why did you say in the last interview with Sterne, for example, that a good knowledge of 
media dynamics would allow us to have this dynamic and improve the media? 
McLuhan: I think it is best that these big operators are making their presence known. They are 
people who would be very likely to abuse knowledge. 
Schaeffer: Comment dit si jamais ne possédions vous ou moi, ou tous les deux, le secret de 
media nous amourions n‘une pas le dire. 
What if you or I never owned the secret of the media and we did not like to say it? 
McLuhan: Yes, I’d keep it to myself. 
Schaeffer: À dit avancer à bonne heure comment c’est personne ne veux pas écouter l’essential 
de ce que nous disons. 
To say in advance that nobody wants to hear the essence of what we have to say. 
Translator: He says that nobody wants to listen to the essence of what you say so it doesn’t 
matter anyway. 
McLuhan: Very true. But that is why my enemies are better than my friends. They compel 
people to listen. So, do not make friends, only enemies. Then you will hear … [inaudible; 




Pierre Schaeffer in Conversation with Anthony Wilden: Transcription and Translationiv 
Anthony Wilden: Mr. Schaeffer, you spent 35 years, I think, in broadcasting associated with the 
French government network, and during this time you must have done just about every 
job that is possible to do: engineer, producer, director, author. You’re also internationally 
known, I believe, as the inventor of electroacoustic music. You spent some years in 
Africa after the war setting up a radio network. And now you’re the director of the 
research division of the French Government broadcasting network. But inside this 
government network, you seem to be a dissenter. Would you like to explain just in what 
sense—how you relate to the institution? 
Pierre Schaeffer: Ma biographie personnelle coïncide avec l’histoire de masse media. Puis que 
quand j’étais jeune ingénieur, je commencé à un temps que la, un peu après, que là, 
L’ORTF, qui s’appelle la radiotélévision française--la radio française, la télévision 
n’existait pas. Quand suit j’ai eu relocations de voir ce que la naissance de cette radio: 
d’abord en France puis dans le continent Africain, puis cette découverte de la, on peut 
faire de la musique avec tous les sons registré par le microphone, et enfin la télévision. Et 
j’ai un période euphorique où j’ai trouvé, j’ai cru, que nous allions renouveler tous les art; 
que nous allions communiqué avec tout le planent; que nous allions apporté un 
civilisation merveilleuse aux pays sous développée. Et j’ai beaucoup changé, et je trouve, 
est-ce que c’est peut-être là surgis où la tristesse de vieillir, que tous les mass media on 
beaucoup vieilli.  
 
Je pense que nos oreilles sont rassasiées de son et de message. Et McLuhan lui-même a 
dit “medium is the message” ce qui a veux bien sous-entendre que les contenue sont 
annulé que personne ne dit plus rien la personne. McLuhan n’est pas derrière l’appareil 
de masse media comme je suis. J’ai la chance d’être dans l’institution de mass media. Et 
McLuhan parle de la télévision comme un auditeur, comme un téléspectateur comme un 
homme qui est à l’extérieur de système, je suis malheureusement dans le système. 
L’essential de ce que je à dire ce que à l’intérieur de système, non seulement on peut 
analyser comment le système fonction et donc que le pouvoir et la communication sont 
entièrement lié, mais à mon sens, c’est un nouvelle appareille pour examiner la société. 
Cette à dire que je prends la position tout à fait symétrique de McLuhan. Pour McLuhan, 
les mass media permet à tout le monde à parler a tout le monde, et moi je dis que les mass 
media permet à quelques-uns d’observer comment le monde fonction et probablement ils 
espèrent le manipuler. 
                                                
iv. Pierre Schaeffer and Anthony Wilden, “Entretien de Pierre Schaeffer avec Anthony Wilden,” January 1, 1972, 
produced by the Office national de radiodiffusion télévision française, video, 16:06, 
http://www.ina.fr/video/CPF86633089/entretien-de-pierre-schaeffer-avec-anthony-wilden-video.html. 
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My personal biography coincides with the history of the mass media. When I was a young 
engineer, I started at the ORTF, which is called the radiotélévision française--the radio 
française, the television did not exist at that time. Next, I relocated to witness the birth of 
radio: first in France, then on the African continent. Then followed the discovery that we 
can make music with any sound recorded by a microphone. Then, finally, came 
television. And I had a euphoric period where I found, I thought, that we would renew all 
the arts; that we would communicate with all the planet; that we would bring a wonderful 
civilization to underdeveloped countries. And I have changed a lot. And I think that 
(perhaps this is the emergence or the sadness of aging) all the mass media have aged a 
lot. 
 
I think our ears are satiated with sound and messages. McLuhan himself said that the 
"medium is the message," which is to imply that the contents of a message is irrelevant 
and that no one says anything to each other. But McLuhan is not behind the mass media 
apparatus like me. I am lucky to be inside the mass media institution. McLuhan speaks of 
television as a listener, as a viewer, as a man who is outside of the system. I am 
unfortunately in the system. The essence of what I have to say from inside the system is 
that not only can we analyze how the system functions, and therefore recognize that 
power and communication are entirely related, but, in my opinion, the mass media is is a 
new apparatus that allows us to examine society. In other words, I take the opposite 
position to McLuhan. For McLuhan, the mass media allow everyone to talk to everyone; I 
say that the mass media allow a few to observe how the world functions, and probably 
they hope to manipulate it. 
Wilden: Power and Communication is the title of your second book on communication, on 
communication machines as you call them. Would you like to explain what you mean by 
power and communication. 
Schaeffer: C’est pour moi un entrouvrit intéressant parce que même ces dernières années, mal 
bien que je sois complètement mêlé, professionnellement au mélange de la 
communication ou le pouvoir--c’est à dire de la censure, de l’autocensure, des précaution 
que moi producteur ou directeur je dois prendre pour que plus ou moins le quelque 
choses passe entre le gros appareil et message et la grande publique--et bien, malgré tout 
ça je ne vais pas compris assez que le pouvoir, le champs de pouvoir, qui s’exerce non 
seulement entre dans les champs politique, mais dans les champs personnelle étais 
entièrement identique ou mélangé avec le champs nous comme s’appelle la 
communication. 
 
Ou bien on parle le pouvoir et on peut plus parler de communication ou bien parle la 
communication et le pouvoir est inclus. Et dans cet ouvrage, je n’ai pas pu donner une 
définition de pouvoir ou de la communication, qui soit indépendant de l’autre terme. J’ai 
recours des métaphores physiques comme, par exemple, les relations entre la masse et 
l’énergie. Tout la physique traditionnelle quoi qu’a cru que la masse existée, et que 
l’énergie cette est autre chose. Et depuis Einstein, nous savon que la masse peut se 
transforme en énergie, et l’énergie représente une masse. Je pense que le pouvoir et la 
communication ça ressemble à la relation entre masse et l’énergie. 
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For me, this is an interesting finding because, even in recent years, despite mixing 
communication and power in my profession—in other words, censorship, self-censorship, 
precaution with whether I'm a producer or a director, operating more or less between the 
large media apparatus, the message, and the public at large—well, in spite of all that, I 
do not understand enough how power—the channels of power, not only in the political 
domain, but also in the personal domain—is completely mixed up with the channels of 
communication. 
Or we can talk about power, and we can talk about communication, or talk about 
communication and power together. In this book, I could not give a definition of power or 
communication, independently from the other term. I use metaphors from physics like, for 
example, the relationship between mass and energy. Traditional physics thought that 
mass existed, and that energy is another thing. But since Einstein, we know that mass can 
be transformed into energy, and that energy represents a mass. I think that the 
relationship between power and communication resembles the relationship between mass 
and energy. 
Wilden: In speaking about the relationship between power and communication, and introducing 
the idea of communication and the communication of information is linked essentially to 
the relationships of power, it seems to me that this brings in another level of the question. 
Schaeffer: Les networks ne sont pas autre chose que l’image de système politique. C’est une 
image très exacte. Ce qui est important c’est le contrôle qui est dissimulé derrière. Et qui 
empèche ce système évalué. Le sort que le système est profondément reflété par le miroir 
que le network. Et ce qui est beaucoup plus important c’est de voir comment les citoyens 
des pays s'autocensure, et que le dispositif même de la télévision est un dispositif 
terrifiant, terroriste. Actuellement, il nous est difficile, même malgré nos efforts de parler 
comme nous parlerions à la froid dans l'intimité. Et dans cette intimité que nous 
cherchant avec des millions de gens. Est-ce qu’il est possible même de chercher une 
intimité avec des millions de gens. C’est peut-être un problème absurde. 
 
Ce qui a d'importance depuis que la télévision existe, c’est que les gens du monde entière, 
les tous les races, et de tous les continents, on a perçu pour la première fois l’humanité 
dans sa nudité—comment dit n’est pas littéralement—le père est nu. Et aucune censure 
du monde ne peut empêcher qu’on voir les atrocités, la violence, l’injustice, et le 
mensonge se lis, dans les yeux des gens qui parle. Et les bêtises, sur lise dans les bouches 
des responsable politiques. Et les sortisses, sur lit, sur la bouche, dans les propos des 
savants qui ne disses finalement que des choses inutiles et prétentieuse. Cette image du 
monde absolument grotesque et fantastiquement scandaleuse et probablement celle qui a 
choquée la jeunesse de tous les payées du monde a dépit de tous les censure. 
 
Et cet autre monde est tout à fait diffèrent du monde de l’éducation, de l’interprétation 
que dans les universités du monde entière a des petites différences près. Et nous vivant 
dans une idée idiote. En cœur il a beaucoup d’idée, qui a beaucoup de science certes. Il a 
beaucoup de connaissance. Mais il n’y a pas beaucoup de vraie connaissance. Vous savez 
Il y a deux mots en française pour dire “knowledge”--c’est le savoir et la connaissance. 
Le savoir c’est ce qui sont saigne dans le livre. La connaissance c’est quelque chose qui 
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est derrière la savoir qui est ce qu’on suppose l’essentielle. L'essentielle, c’est le servis de 
l’homme. Ce n’est pas la connaissance du cosmos. 
The networks are nothing other than the image of the political system. It's a very accurate 
picture. What is important is the control hidden behind the media, who prevents the 
system from being evaluated. The fate of the system is deeply reflected by the mirror of 
the network. And, even more important, is to see how citizens of countries self-censor, 
and that the very device of the television is a terrifying, terrorist device. Currently, it is 
difficult for us, despite our efforts to speak as we would talk to the cold in intimacy, and 
in this intimacy, that we seek with millions of people—is it even possible to seek intimacy 
with millions of people? This may be an absurd problem. 
What has become important since the advent of television is that we have seen humanity 
for the first time in all its nakedness—people all over the world, all races, and all 
continents. How can I put it? Not literally: the father is naked. And no censor in the 
world can prevent one from seeing the atrocities, the violence, the injustice, and the lies 
you can read in the eyes of the people who speak. And the nonsense, spoken from the 
mouths of politicians. And the fate read in the words of scientists who, in the end, says 
only useless and pretentious things. This image of the world is absolutely grotesque and 
fantastically scandalous, and probably the one that shocked the youth of all the citizens 
of different nationalities from around the world, despite all the censorship. 
 
And this other world is quite different from the world of education, the narrative told in 
universities around the world that makes only a small differences. We live in an age of 
silly ideas. The scholar has a lot of ideas, which includes a lot of science of course. He 
has a lot of knowledge. But he does not have much true knowledge. You know, in French 
there are two words to say "knowledge”: le savoir and la connaissance. Le savoir is what 
you find in books. La connaissance is something that is behind le savoir that is supposed 
essential. Essential knowledge is that which serves man; it is not the knowledge of the 
cosmos. 
Wilden: I’d like to put two questions [to you], which are linked. One about violence, but first I’d 
like to see what kind of relationship you make between what you said about mental 
pollution and the question of ecological pollution as such, which is, as you know, very far 
advanced in the United States in relationship [sic.] to Europe. 
Schaeffer: La civilisation d’une masse en autrement détruis la différence, détruis les différences 
entre les civilisations est un monde continental et les différences de races. C’est très bien 
de demandé l’égalité des races. Mais il fourrait demander l’égalité dès l’homme blancs, 
noir, et jaunes, et respecté les trésors particuliers et diffèrent qui sont dans leur traditions. 
Et comme les hommes ne peut rien dire d'utile aux hommes autres, et comme la 
communication a bloqué par la masse media, le seul recours est la violence. La violence 
c’est quelque chose, et un phénomène très profond, d'abord la violence fait partie de 
l’homme, il faut la reconnaitre. Et nié la violence, c’est simplement enfermer la violence 
dans la subconscience individuelle ou collectif. Mais comme la violence dérange 
beaucoup les gens, aussi bien d’ailier les individus, que la collectivité, les 
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gouvernements, que les églises, on n’est vacuole la violence dans des films de fiction. 
Pour ne pas parler de la vraie violence. 
Mass culture destroys difference, destroys the differences between civilizations, 
continents, races. It is very good to demand the equality of the races. But we must insist 
on asking for equality of the white, black, and yellow men, and respect the peculiar and 
different cultural treasures that are part of their traditions. And because man cannot say 
anything useful to others, and as communication has been blocked by mass media, the 
only recourse is violence. Violence is a very deep phenomenon; first of all, violence is 
part of man, and this must be recognized. Denying violence simply confines it to the 
individual or collective subconscious. But because violence is so disturbing to people, to 
individuals, to the community, to governments, to churches, violence in fictional films, it 
is not a thing of the past. This is not to mention real violence. 
Schaeffer: Et en autrement la violence que l’homme doit assumer a l'intérieure de l'humain; dans 
cet psychologie, dans civilisation, de famille, de collective. On sent que derrière la 
manipulation particulière des networks et des système nationaux, il y a une énorme 
manipulation planétaire parce que la planète est divisée en trois classes finalement. Les 
approximations Marxiste, c’est pas mal, c’est assez utile. Mais personne a une air de 
vouloir admettre que il y a toujours une classe dominante.  Il comprit celle qui était sous 
le prolétariat, un niveau pas beaucoup mieux que celle qui était sous la bourgeoisie. La 
seule façon d'équilibré le savoir, et le pouvoir, c’est de mélangé les choses, de ne pas 
laisser les classes, les trois grand classes séparait: les gens du pouvoir, les gens du savoir, 
et les peuple--un faut plus les ciels humain. C’est pourquoi j'essai dans mon entourage, et 
j'essai dans la situation institutionnelle, je le trouve d'obliger les gens tôt de moi à la fois, 
de seconds dire comme les peuple, de second dire come les gens du savoir et aussi des 
humaine pouvoir parce que personne ne veut s'assumer pouvoir. 
 
De même je pense que le savoir, le savoir qui a un importe, c’est le contraire de la 
spécialisation et de l'accumulation exponentielle de la quantité de savoir diffèrent. C’est 
forcément à travers les différences de rechercher entre philosophe, scientifique, 
sociologue, physicienne, ce qui a un import à l’homme. Et, en finira pas trouver ce qui a 
malheureusement nos crève les yeux, c’est à dire, la menace, qui pèse peu un peu aussi 
c'est trente ans, cinquante ans, un siècle ou deux, mais la menace absolument réelle, qui 
pèse sur l'humanité, qui a trois d'enfant, qui a une petite planète, qui est quelle 
commencer détraquer. L’attitude typique, vis à vis d’une nouvelle menace, de pollution, 
et de la catastrophe planétaire, c’est l’attitude de la revendiqué comme un savoir ou un 
pouvoir ou l'attitude de leur refusé.  
 
Et si lorsque on agit c’est question de la mass media, c’est typiquement la question plus 
difficile, plus que c’est une question qui est agressive. Et je me demande toujours quand 
on faire message pour beaucoup de millions des gens et quand parle de menace qui pèche 
sur la planète. Et quelle condition ce message peut passer? 
 
Les éducateurs sont parlés de la connaissance c’est simplement pour la perpétué. Et on 
pense que on transmet dans cette connaissance au peuple de la terre entière on va 
améliorer leurs vies. Je pense qu'il faut faire un révision critique de cette connaissance. Il 
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faut d’abord dire que cette connaisses c'est partiel, que la science n’est pas la science de 
l’homme, que la diffusion de se savoir, ne réponds pas au véritable besoin de différant 
pays. Et je pense que les pays les plus menacé par la démographie, par la famine, les 
payées de l’Asie en ce moment, sont de comprendre la première, que la question n’est pas 
d’avoir des, une connaissance avec des diplômes mais une connaissance qui a vié au 
motive de vivre. Une connaissance qui liée engagement politique. 
 
En fait, on a consumé deux, on a fait deux bêtises. Premièrement, on a changé la religion; 
la religion c'est la science, ne pas que les sciences ne-ce pas estimables. Est-ce que la 
science prétend donner une réponse à l’homme et, par conséquent, le pouvoir est dans les 
mêmes conditions de manipulations de la science. Il était, dans les épochès archaïques, 
hors toute notre éducation tant à faire des gens, des spécialistes et du savoir. Parce que 
c’est une zone il faut bien que les enseignants disse quelque chose a jeune gens, mais 
aucune chose à dire--c’est apprendre la chimie, la physique, et le mathématique--pour le 
reste, leurs qui touche de la vie, nous n'avons plus rien à dire à nos enfants. Cette à dire 
que les pères non seulement sont tué, mais ils sont nués, et peut-être quand ils étaient tués 
parce qu’ils étaient nués. Je pense que donc il aura un groupe d’homme qui soit noire, 
blanc, qui sois savant, qui sois dépêtre, qui soit d'équipe pensera qu’il y a raison, et pas 
les autres. Je pense qu’il n’y a pas une solution. 
On the other hand, man must recognize the violence within; in his psychology, in his 
civilizations, families, and collectives. There is a feeling that behind national 
manipulation of networks, there is a huge planetary manipulation because the planet is 
divided into three classes. The Marxist approximations is not bad and quite useful. But 
nobody seems to want to admit that there is always a dominant class. Marx understood 
that which was under the proletariat, a level not much better than that which was under 
the bourgeoisie. The only way to balance knowledge and power is to mix things up, not to 
let classes, the three big classes, separate: people from power, people from knowledge, 
and people [inaudible]. That's why I try in my group and institutional situation, I find it 
to force people early from me at a time, to say second people like the people, to second 
say like the people of knowledge and also human power because no one wants to assume 
power. 
 
Similarly, I think that knowledge, knowledge that has an importance, is the opposite of 
specialization and the exponential accumulation of quantities of different knowledge. It 
is, inevitably, the differences between fields of research—between philosophers, 
scientists, sociologists, physicists—which is important to man. And, in the end, we will 
not see what is blindingly obvious; that is to say, the threat, which has weighed, bit by 
bit, for thirty years, fifty years, even a century or two. The absolutely real threat weighs 
on humanity, who has three children, who has a small planet, which is starting to break 
down. The typical attitude, towards a new threat—pollution, planetary disaster—is the 
attitude of claims as knowledge or power, or an attitude of their refusal. 
 
And if when one acts it is question of the mass media, it is typically more of a difficult 
question than it is a question which is aggressive. I always wonder, when we are 
communicating with many millions of people, and when we are talking about the threat to 
the planet: what conditions can this message produce? 
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Educators have spoken of knowledge simply to be perpetuated. And we think that, by 
transmitting this knowledge to the people of the whole world, we will improve their lives. 
I think we need to critically review this knowledge. We must, first of all, admit that this 
knowledge is partial, that science is not the science of man, that the diffusion of 
knowledge itself does not answer to the real need of different countries. And I think that 
the countries most threatened by overpopulation and famine--the countries of Asia, at the 
moment--understand already that the question is not to have an acquaintance with 
diplomas but an acquaintance with the motivation to live, a knowledge linked to political 
commitment. 
 
In fact, we have made two mistakes. First, we have changed our religion; our religion 
today is science, not that the sciences are not to be held in high regard. Does science 
claim to provide answers for man and, consequently, provide power under the conditions 
of manipulations of science. In ancient times, all our education has made people 
specialists and experts. Because it's a zone, teachers must say something to young people, 
but they have nothing to say—learn chemistry, physics, and mathematics—for the rest, 
their lives, we have nothing more to say to our children. That is to say that the father is 
not only killed but is naked, and perhaps he was killed because he was naked. I think that 
there will be a group of men who are black, white, who are knowledgeable, who are 
disembodied, who will be a team of reasonable thinkers, and not the others. I cannot see 
a solution. 
Wilden: What about material, poverty, want, malnutrition? What good are these ideas to 
someone who’s starving to death? what good is to, for instance, a Vietcong guerilla or an 
Indian on an American reservation? 
Schaeffer: La malnutrition vienne de fait que certain pays sur développée en épuisée les 
ressources de la planète. 
Malnutrition stems from the fact that some developed countries have exhausted the 
resources of the planet. 
Wilden: But you have it in the United States, and no doubt in France as well. It’s part of the 
social order. And one can talk about malnutrition biologically and malnutrition perhaps in 
terms of other forms of exploitation. That is to say: a system that prevents people from 
following their own way, their own creative possibilities. This has nothing to do with 
ideas as such except that ideas are used against them, but it has to do with material 
exploitation. 
Schaeffer: Oui mais il faut bien que la difficulté c’est, par exemple, des solutions qui sont bonne 
pour la chine, et qui sont bonne pour l’inde, sont les solutions qui sont idéologiquement 
diffèrent pour les autres pays. Hors la force universalité de l’esprit humain vers que on 
dise les chinois ont hors, les Indes ont hors, mais ils ont raison de faites des choses qui 
sont diffèrent dis qu'on fait France ou étais unis. C’est admettre la différence. Mais vous 
vous êtes le spécialiste de différences, alors. Je sais bien je parle avec un convaincu. 
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Yes, but the difficulty is we must find solutions that are good for China, that are good for 
India, solutions that are ideologically different for different countries. When the universal 
force of the human spirit that says the Chinese are out, the Indians are out, but they are 
right to do things differently than we do in France or they do in the USA. It is to accept 





Poetry After Études aux objets: Translationv 
Marche paralysée à travers 
un univers étrange 
c’est la fuite éperdue dans les airs 
Les arbres arrachent eux-mêmes 
leurs feuilles et meurent 
Le nuage étouffe toute vie 
La terre est anéantie 
Soleil et blé unis et mêlés 
créaient une couleur éblouissante 
 
Walking paralyzed through 
A strange universe 
It is the desperate flight in the air 
The trees snatch themselves 
Their leaves and die 
The cloud stifles all life 
The earth is wiped out 
Sun and wheat united and mixed 
Created a dazzling color 
                                                
v. Textes écrits par des enfants à l’écoute de “Études aux objets” (author unknown), 1975, Fonds Pierre Schaeffer, 
B105 D1037, L’Institut Mémoires de l’édition contemporaine (IMEC). L’abbaye d’Ardenne, Caen, France.  
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Si la ville t’ensorcelle 
creuse un trou noir 
la mort règne … s’avance … recule 
Une sphère d’une autre planète atterrit 
c’est la fin du monde 
Seul le cri désespéré des oiseaux reste 
Il grimpe la colline sous l’orage 
qui gronde au loin 
Plusieurs flèches partent 
La flèche se ficha dans une orange 
sur le mandarinier 
Un astre tombe sur la terre 
avec un bruit sec 
La lune jouait avec un elfe 
dont le bonnet surmonté de clochettes 
luisait sous la caresse des étoiles 
Le volcan sourit. Un peu de lave 
lui sortit de la bouche 
Une étoile filante sémite et s’éteignit 
Une poussière d’or se posa sur un ange 
Pour le remercier il lui fit un cadeau 
 
If the city strikes you 
Digs a black hole 
Death reigns … advances … retreats 
A sphere of another planet lands 
It’s the end of the world 
Only the desperate cry of the birds remains 
He climbs the hill under the storm 
Who scolds in the distance 
Several arrows leave 
The arrow fell in an orange 
On the mandarin tree 
A star falls on the earth 
With a dry noise 
The moon was playing with an elf 
Whose bonnet surmounted by bells 
Shone under the caress of the stars 
The volcano smiles. A little lava 
Came out of his mouth 
A Shooting Star Semitic and Extinct 
A golden dust settled on an angel 
To thank him, he gave him a present 
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Le Temps s’écoule goutte à goutte 
des bruits incongrus animent l’univers sans vie 
Toute la surface de la terre doit disparaitre 
tout être englouti 
pour faire place à un autre monde 
C’est la fin du monde 
Dans l’espace noir et silencieux 
deux engins interplanétaires s’affrontent 
en lançant de tous côtés des rayons lumineux 
de toutes les couleurs de l’arc en ciel 
toutes les nations prouvèrent à leur tour 
qu’elles étaient capables 
sur cette grosse balle 
de ne penser qu’à l’amour et la paix 
 
Time flows drop by drop 
Incongruous noises animate the universe without life 
The whole surface of the earth must disappear 
All being engulfed 
To make room for another world 
It’s the end of the world 
In the black and silent space 
Two interplanetary missiles 
By throwing light rays on all sides 
Of all the colors of the rainbow 
All the nations proved in their turn 
They were capable 
On this big ball 
To think only of love and peace 
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Le vent souffle en rafales glaciales 
Une planète se décroche tombe sur la terre 
et engloutit tout le monde terrestre 
Les lames métalliques se répercutaient 
sur ces cylindres 
et le vent passait soufflant sourdement 
sur cette planète étrange mystérieuse 
Ces crépitements me rappelaient 
que cette planète était ensorcelée 
Sur le bord d’un étant le danger progresse 
progresse et bientôt l’eau toujours montant 
va recouvrir la maison 
la peur envahit mon esprit 
tous ces sons me torturent 
mais à la fois sont reposants 
La balle rebondit sur un ressort 
roule dans un tube de verre qui tinte 
Je me sens monter sur la lune 
comme une balle qui monte 
et toc le vent a brisé la bulle 
je meurs … mais ce n’est qu’un rêve 
 
The wind blows in frigid gusts 
A planet falls apart on the ground 
And engulfs all the earthly world 
Metallic blades had repercussions 
On these cylinders 
And the wind was blowing dully 
On this mysterious strange planet 
These cracklings reminded me 
That this planet was bewitched 
On the edge of one being the danger progresses 
Progress and soon water always rising 
Will cover the house 
Fear invades my mind 
All these sounds torture me 
But at the same time are restful 
The ball bounces on a spring 
Rolls in a glass tube that hits 
I feel myself climbing on the moon 
Like a ball that rises up 
And toc the wind broke the bubble 
I die … but it is only a dream 
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Plainte du monde pliante de la terre 
la lumière essaie de percer le monde 
qui nous entoure 
elle se glisse se heurte à la nuit 
Le danger frôlait la ville de son aile 
les espoirs inquiets persécutent leurs armes 
l’homme se morfond dans son univers 
Un long gémissement 
une plainte interminable appelle 
mais personne n’y répond 
Autour des prisons en béton 
grouillaient des bêtes 
des bêtes non apprivoisées 
courant partout comme affolées 
des bêtes appelées ‘hommes’ 
Une fée vêtue de blanc apparait 
un nuage blanc entoure ce monde 
tout merveilleux 
 
Complaint of the Folding World of the Earth 
Light tries to break through the world 
that surrounds us 
She slips into the night 
The danger was near the city of his wing 
Worried hopes persecute their weapons 
The man is morphing in his universe 
A long groan 
An endless complaint calls for 
But no one answers 
Around Concrete Prisons 
Teeming with beasts 
Of untamed animals 
Running everywhere like mad 
Beasts called ‘men’ 
A fairy dressed in white appears 
A white cloud surrounds this world 
all wonderful 
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Le vent siffle longuement 
un volet bat dans le vent 
Dans un vieux grenier désert 
une harpe désaccordée gît 
et les gouttes d’eau clapotent 
une à une dans l’onde 
Un monde de choses vit tout seul 
Le fil de fer s’approche doucement du cristal 
et lui demande sa main 
Les mouvements au ralenti de quelqu’un 
marchant sous l’eau 
Par une sombre nuit d’hiver 
un grand navire se détache sur l’océan 
Le danger approche à vue d’œil 
Une nouvelle ville renaît 
puis d’autres encore 
 
The wind whistles for a long time 
A shutter beats in the wind 
In an old desert granary 
A detuned harp lies 
And the drops of water 
One by one in the wave 
A world of things lives on its own 
The wire gently approaches the crystal 
And asks her hand 
The slow motion of someone 
Walking under water 
By a dark winter night 
A large ship stands out on the ocean 
The danger approach at sight of eye 
A new city is reborn 
Then others 
	 196 
Une ville s’éveillait petit à petit 
Dans un silence de ténèbres 
il avance 
Un astronaute plans dans le vide 
il a une impression de vertige 
Dans la mine tout s’effondre 
Quelqu’un marche dans les feuilles 
quelque chose de terrible arrive 
Des objets non identifiés 
envoient des radiations 
sur les humains 
Des être affreux sont munis d’armes 
à rayons cosmiques 
 
A town was awakening little by little 
In a silence of darkness 
he’s advancing 
An astronaut shots in the void 
It has an impression of vertigo 
In the mine everything collapses 
Someone walks in the leaves 




Frightful ones are armed with weapons 
With cosmic rays 
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Nuit bizarre où l’inquiétude règne 
Un homme marche dans une longue galerie 
en verre 
Des objets se déplacent tous seuls 
ils s’entre choquent roulent dansent même 
le sol se dérobe et la personne 
tombe dans le vide sans jamais s’arrêter 
Dans cette maison hantée 
c’est la fête des fantômes 
La vie se déplace au ralenti 
Une fleur sort rapidement de terre 
et brusquement éclat 
C’est une impression de vision 
de joie de rêve 
 
Bizarre night where worry prevails 
A man walks through a long gallery 
glass objects move by themselves 
They shock each other roll dance 
The ground shrinks and the person 
Falls into the void without ever stopping 
In this haunted house 
It is the feast of ghosts 
Life moves slowly 
A flower comes out quickly from the ground 
And suddenly shine 
It is an impression of vision 
from a dream of joy 
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Dans un paysage rocheux 
le vent souffle 
L’enfant sent que la peur est en lui 
Dans l’ombre deux animaux 
se battent à coup de corne 
Un désastre arrive un avion explose 
au-dessus d’une ville 
tous les immeubles se détruisent 
des Martiens s’avancent 
aucune bombe ne peut les toucher 
Dans une grotte avec des stalagmites 
tout résonne 
L’homme essaye de s’évader de l’enfer 
le monstre arrive 
A la vue de petits nains 
qui se sauvent dans la forêt 
Un dragon apparait 
Puis une douce fée arrive 
vêtue de soie 
 
In a Rocky Landscape 
the wind is blowing 
The child feels that fear is in him 
In the Shadow Two Animals 
Fight with horn 
A disaster happens a plane explodes 
Over a city 
All buildings are destroyed 
Of the Martians advance 
No bomb can touch them 
In a cave with stalagmites 
all resonates 
The man tries to escape from hell 
The monster arrives 
At the sight of little dwarfs 
Who escape into the forest 
A dragon appears 
Then a sweet fairy arrives 
Dressed in silk 
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Dans un temple le mystère règne 
un détecteur de fusées nucléaires 
se met en alerte 
Dans une forêt sinistre 
une soucoupe volante vient se poser 
Des êtres venus d’ailleurs 
du monde martien 
débarque sur la terre 
Un mineur creuse dans un sous-sol 
et découvre une grotte de diamants 
Une grande fusée puis d’autres 
apparaissent dans le ciel étoilé 
 
In a temple the mystery reigns 
A nuclear rocket detector 
Gets on the alert 
In a sinister forest 
A flying saucer comes to rest 
Beings from other countries 
Of the Martian world 
Landed on land 
A miner digs into a basement 
And discovers a diamond cave 
A large rocket and then others 
Appear in the starry sky. 
